Radspinner v. Charlesworth, s. 10473
Decision Date | 21 March 1984 |
Docket Number | Nos. 10473,10474,s. 10473 |
Citation | 346 N.W.2d 727 |
Parties | Richard E. RADSPINNER and Irene R. Radspinner, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Fay W. CHARLESWORTH and Eva Charlesworth, Defendants and Appellees. Warren CHARLESWORTH, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Richard E. RADSPINNER and Irene R. Radspinner, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Mills & Moore, Bismarck, for plaintiffs and appellants; argued by William R. Mills, Bismarck.
Baer & Asbridge, Bismarck, for defendants and appellees; argued by Richard B. Baer, Bismarck.
Richard and Irene Radspinner [Radspinners] appeal from the judgment entered by the District Court of Burleigh County on April 21, 1983. We vacate the judgment and remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Radspinners were, prior to 1982, long-time friends of Fay and Eva Charlesworth [Charlesworths]. The Radspinners owned and lived on a tract of land south of Bismarck. In an effort to have the Charlesworths build a home nearby, the Radspinners gifted a one-acre portion of their land to the Charlesworths by warranty deed dated September 13, 1979. The deed contained no reservations or restrictions. Upon being informed that an additional one-half acre would be needed for sewage purposes before a building permit could be issued for construction of a home on the site, the Radspinners gifted an additional one-half acre to the Charlesworths. The transfer was by warranty deed dated December 18, 1980, and was again without reservations or restrictions. In May of 1981, the parties executed a mutual access easement, each granting to the other an easement over the north thirty feet of their respective properties.
In December, 1981, at the Radspinners' annual Christmas party, Richard Radspinner overheard Eva Charlesworth mention that the Charlesworths were considering selling the property. The friendship between the Radspinners and Charlesworths quickly degenerated into a series of arguments and threats over the property. In February, 1982, the Charlesworths deeded the property to their son, Warren Charlesworth.
The Radspinners filed suit against the Charlesworths in March of 1982, claiming fraud and breach of contract. The Radspinners claimed that there was an oral agreement between the parties that the Charlesworths were to sell the land back to the Radspinners if they did not build on it, that the Charlesworths were not to build on or sell a portion of the property referred to as "the park" during the Radspinners' lifetimes, and that the Radspinners were to have use of "the park." The Charlesworths deny the existence of such an agreement, but do admit that there was an agreement that "the park" would not be built upon and that the families would use it as a park. Warren Charlesworth brought a separate action against the Radspinners alleging slander of title and interference with use of the property. The actions were consolidated and tried to the court without a jury.
The court held that Warren owned the disputed property in fee simple with no restrictions. The court awarded the Radspinners $100 as damages against Warren for their expense in removing brush and large stumps placed on their land by Warren when he cleared the roadway across the easement. The court dismissed the parties' other claims.
The Radspinners have raised numerous issues on appeal. We are unable to reach the merits, however, because we conclude that the findings of fact and conclusions of law, contained in the court's memorandum opinion, fail to provide a clear understanding of the basis of the court's decision and require remand for further findings and conclusions.
There are several inconsistencies within the memorandum opinion. For example, the court at one point states:
"The Radspinners, however, claim there exists an enforceable agreement as follows:
1. that the Charlesworths agreed not to build on part of the property referred to by the Radspinners as 'the park';
2. that the Radspinners could use 'the park' for their lifetime;
3. that the Charlesworths would not sell the property during the Radspinners' lifetimes;
4. that the Charlesworths would sell the property back to the Radspinners if they did wish to sell. (This condition was not referred to in the pleadings or the pretrial brief.)
After holding that the oral testimony regarding such agreements was inadmissible, the court further concluded:
The first passage quoted above indicates that there was an agreement regarding the park; the second states that the Radspinners failed to prove the existence of such an agreement. 1
There is also an inconsistency between the memorandum opinion and the judgment. In the memorandum opinion, the court states that the parties "executed a mutual access easement." In the judgment, however, Warren Charlesworth is deemed to be the owner of the disputed property "without reservations or encumbrances of any kind in favor of Richard E. and Irene R. Radspinner." Thus, the judgment appears to terminate the Radspinners' written, undisputed easement.
The Radspinners also argued at trial that a resulting or constructive trust could be imposed upon the property requiring the Charlesworths to hold "the park" in trust for the Radspinners' lifetime use. The trial court's findings and conclusions on this issue, in their entirety, were contained in one sentence: "The evidence submitted by the Radspinners did not support any kind of claim of resulting trust, nor was there a confidential relationship of any kind between the families." 2 There is a vast difference between a constructive trust and a resulting trust. The court did not differentiate between the two theories, and we are unable to determine from the court's findings whether the appropriate standards were applied.
Furthermore, the court's findings on this issue are conclusory. In Eszlinger v. Wetzel, 326 N.W.2d 215, 217 (N.D.1982), we quoted with approval the following language of the United States Supreme Court:
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