Radtke v. Everett, 92582

• Citation: 501 N.W.2d 155,442 Mich. 368
• Decision Date: 02 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 4,No. 92582,J,92582,4
• Parties: , 61 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1644, 61 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,336, 61 USLW 2771 Tamara J. RADTKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stuart B. EVERETT, D.V.M., Individually; and Clarke-Everett Dog and Cat Hospital, P.C., a Michigan Professional Corporation, Defendants-Appellants. an. Term 1993. Calendar
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 155

501 N.W.2d 155

442 Mich. 368, 61 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1644,

61 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,336, 61 USLW 2771

Tamara J. RADTKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stuart B. EVERETT, D.V.M., Individually; and Clarke-Everett

Dog and Cat Hospital, P.C., a Michigan

Professional Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 92582, Jan. Term 1993.

Calendar No. 4.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 12, 1993.

Decided June 2, 1993.

[442 Mich. 371] Mark D. Williams (P41120), Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge, Traverse City, for plaintiff-appellee.

Seth M. Lloyd (P16742), Nancy L. Niemela (P38131), Lauren A. Rousseau (P40772), Dykema Gossett, Detroit, and William M. Davison (P12570), Cunningham, Davison, Beeby, Rogers & Alward, Traverse City, co-counsel for defendant-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey (P24215), Sol. Gen., Robert L. Willis, Jr. (28106), Dianne Rubin (P25142), Asst. Attys. Gen., Detroit, for amici curiae Michigan Civil Rights Com'n, Michigan Dept. of Civil Rights.

Stark and Gordon by Sheldon J. Stark (P23192), Royal Oak, for amicus curiae MTLA.

Clark, Klein & Beaumont by Dwight H. Vincent (P21840), J. Walker Henry (P14882), Rachelle G. Silberberg (P36591), Patricia Bordman (P43947), Detroit, for Michigan Mfrs. Ass'n, amicus curiae.

Diane M. Soubly (P32005), John H. Willems (P31861), Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, Detroit, for amici curiae American Society of Employers, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn., Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce, and Michigan Chamber of Commerce.

Women and the Law Clinic by Julie Kunce Field, P-43308, Suellyn Scarnecchia, P-33105, Ann Arbor, for amicus curiae University of Michigan Law School.

Chiamp & Associates, P.C. by Charlene Snow, P-26923, Detroit, for amicus curiae WLAM.

OPINION

RILEY, Justice.

At issue are the elements of a prima facie case of a hostile work environment under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq.; M.S.A § 3.548(101) et seq. We hold that a hostile work environment claim is actionable when the work environment is so tainted that, in the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have perceived the conduct at issue as substantially interfering with employment or having the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment. Additionally, we hold that although a single incident of sexual harassment is generally insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment, a single incident may be sufficient if severe harassment is perpetrated by an employer in a closely knit working environment. ¹ We also hold that the Court of Appeals improperly reached the issue whether the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L. § 418.131; M.S.A. § 17.237(131), bars an alternative claim of assault and battery when the claim does not allege that the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff.

Thus, we affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals that plaintiff has alleged a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, albeit on different grounds, and we reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order granting summary disposition regarding the assault and battery claim.

I

Plaintiff's sexual harassment, constructive discharge, and assault and battery claims were summarily dismissed by the trial court pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). The Court of Appeals reversed. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with an examination of the applicable standards for granting summary disposition.

A

MCR 2.116(C)(8) permits summary disposition when the "opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted." MCR 2.116(C)(8), therefore, determines whether the opposing party's pleadings allege a prima facie case. Marrocco v. Randlett, 431 Mich. 700, 707, 433 N.W.2d 68 (1988). Hence, the court "does not act as a factfinder," but "accepts as true all well-pleaded facts." Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 324, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984). Only if the allegations fail to state a legal claim will summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) be valid. Macenas v. Village of Michiana, 433 Mich. 380, 387, 446 N.W.2d 102 (1989).

While MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a plaintiff's claim. Velmer v. Baraga Area Schools, 430 Mich. 385, 389-390, 424 N.W.2d 770 (1988). MCR 2.116(C)(10) permits summary disposition when "[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." ² A court reviewing such a motion, therefore, must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party. Stevens v. McLouth Steel, 433 Mich. 365, 370, 446 N.W.2d 95 (1989). ³ Accordingly, this Court examines and recites the facts in the instant case in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

B

Plaintiff Tamara Radtke was employed as an unregistered veterinary technician for defendant Clarke-Everett Dog and Cat Hospital, P.C., beginning in January, 1984. The hospital is owned in equal shares by defendant Dr. Stuart Everett and Dr. James Clarke. ⁴ As of May, 1988, her duties included supervising staff, assisting the doctors during surgery, scheduling, and performing minor janitorial tasks. She assisted each doctor nearly equally, and possessed a "good [working] relationship" with each. There were no incidents of sexual harassment before the date in issue.

As commonly occurred, on Sunday, May 29, 1988, plaintiff was working alone with defendant Everett to provide weekend emergency veterinarian services. In her deposition plaintiff stated that after a lengthy day of work, she suggested that they take a break. Everett agreed. Plaintiff proceeded to the hospital's lounge and poured them each a cup of coffee. She then relaxed on the couch, with her back leaning into its corner and her legs on the sofa.

After finishing a few phone calls, Everett joined her and proceeded to sit next to her. Plaintiff, believing that Everett's behavior was inappropriate, attempted to leave the couch "the minute he sat down." Everett, however, physically restrained her by firmly placing his arm around her neck and holding her down. Plaintiff, both frightened and surprised by Everett's behavior, described what followed during her deposition:

"I tried to pull my head up three times, and, on the third time, I realized he was not going to let me go. And then finally, when his arm relaxed, I sprung forward, and I told him, 'You don't want to do this.' "

Although plaintiff forcefully escaped his grip, Everett began to flatter her. Plaintiff rebuffed his newest advances by stating, "You don't want to do this. I don't want to do this. You're married. I'm married." Everett responded by caressing plaintiff's neck. Again she protested, but he simply ignored her pleas. Indeed, he then attempted to kiss her by grabbing her neck and pushing his face towards hers. Plaintiff successfully pushed his face away, left the couch, and walked across the room. ⁵ Plaintiff then stated that she wished to smoke outside, and encouraged Everett to accompany her in public, which he did. The working day was finished without incident.

Plaintiff further stated when deposed that she did not know or could not know whether defendant was trying to hurt her, but she stated that he "would have or could have." She acknowledged that he might have mistakenly believed she wished to kiss him and that he did not condition the terms or conditions of her employment upon the acceptance of his advances.

That evening plaintiff discussed the incident with her husband, and she tendered her resignation, along with a list of requests, ⁶ to Everett's office the next morning. ⁷ The following day, Dr. Clarke and plaintiff cursorily discussed the incident. Plaintiff also began psychological counseling that day. Although plaintiff suffered no physical injuries, she alleges severe emotional pain stemming from the incident. ⁸

C

In December, 1988, plaintiff filed a four-count civil suit against Everett and the hospital in the Grand Traverse Circuit Court. Plaintiff alleged that she was (1) sexually harassed in violation of the Civil Rights Act, (2) constructively discharged on the basis of sex, (3) the victim of assault and battery, ⁹ and (4) denied access to her personnel files in violation of the Employee Right to Know Act, M.C.L. § 423.501 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.62(1) et seq. The crux of plaintiff's case is that Everett's actions constituted sexual harassment because they created a hostile work environment thereby forcing her resignation.

The Employee Right to Know Act count was dismissed by stipulation. In August, 1989, the trial court granted summary disposition regarding the remaining counts pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). After reviewing plaintiff's complaint and deposition, the court ruled that she had failed to state a violation of the Civil Rights Act because her hostile environment claim was based upon a single incident of sexual harassment, which, as a matter of law, did "not rise to the level of severity and persistence which would permit recovery...." ¹⁰ Likewise, the court dismissed the constructive discharge count because it was dependent upon finding a hostile work environment. ¹¹ The court also ruled that the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L. § 418.131; M.S.A. § 17.237(131), barred plaintiff's claim of assault and battery because she failed to allege that Everett intended to harm her. ¹²

The Court of Appeals reversed on all counts. The Court, sua sponte, rejected its prior utilization of a reasonable person standard to determine whether a hostile work environment exists, and ruled:

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