Rael v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1:15-CV-00983-SCY/KK,1:15-CV-00983-SCY/KK
• Parties: THOMAS RAEL, Plaintiff, v. SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, INC. and ART SUAZO, individually and as an employee of SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

THOMAS RAEL, Plaintiff, v. SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, INC.and ART SUAZO, individually and as an employeeof SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, INC., Defendants.

No. 1:15-CV-00983-SCY/KK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

September 19, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17) and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 22). Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims are preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), commonly referred to as Section 301, and, alternatively, fail to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 17. Plaintiff contends that, should the Court determine that Plaintiff's claims are not preempted by Section 301, the Court should remand the case. ECF No. 22. Having reviewed Defendants' Motion, the relevant law, and being otherwise fully advised, the Court finds that their motion should be GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initially filed his complaint in state district court claiming age discrimination contrary to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 through 634. ECF No. 1-1. Defendants subsequently removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff then amended his complaint withdrawing the age discrimination claim and adding claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort. ECF No. 6.

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he began his employment with Smith's as a journeyman meat cutter in 1989. ECF No. 6 at 1. As a journeyman meat cutter with Smith's, Plaintiff's employment was covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). ECF No. 18-1. Plaintiff alleges that in 2013, Defendant Art Suazo was promoted to the position of Market Director, thus becoming Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. ECF No. 6 at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that once Suazo became his supervisor, Suazo constantly harassed, belittled, and degraded Plaintiff. ECF No. 6 at 2. This harassment allegedly consisted of Suazo frequently yelling at Plaintiff that he was moving too slowly and that younger employees could get the job done quicker and better. ECF No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff further alleges that Suazo constantly referred to Plaintiff as "old man." ECF No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that, during his employment with Smith's, he injured his back in an on-the-job injury while Suazo was present and that this was the reason he was unable to work as fast as Suazo demanded. ECF No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that Suazo told him that if Plaintiff did not like the way Suazo treated him, that he could find another job. ECF No. 6 at 3.

Plaintiff further alleges that he complained of Suazo's behavior to various supervisors and executives at Smith's, including store director Jim Armijo and the head of human resources for the New Mexico district of Smith's stores. ECF No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that these individuals all told Plaintiff that they would speak with Suazo regarding the harassment. ECF No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that, despite these representations, the harassment continued and Suazo never modified his behavior. ECF No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that he eventually resigned from his position due to Suazo's conduct. ECF No. 6 at 2.

II. ANALYSIS

The Court's analysis begins and ends with whether Plaintiff's claims are preempted by Section 301 because, as Plaintiff argues, if the claims are not preempted, the Court should remand his two state law claims. See Romero v. Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., 739 F.Supp. 1472, 1475 (D.N.M. 1990) ("if a plaintiff asserts state-created legal rights that exist independently of a labor agreement and plaintiff's claims do not rely on the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, then complete preemption does not apply to the claims and they should be remanded to state court."). Accordingly, because the preemption question is controlling, the Court will not consider Defendants' arguments that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Section 301 states:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has made clear that the preemptive effect of Section 301 is not limited to state claims alleging violations of labor contracts but also includes tort claims relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed and any legal consequences that were intended to flow from breach of that agreement. Allis-Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985); see also Cisneros v. ABC Rail Corp., 217 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that Section 301 "preempts questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement...whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort."). Thus, "[a] state rule that purports to define the meaning or scope of a term in a contract suit therefore ispre-empted by federal labor law." Allis-Corp., 471 U.S. at 210. Preemption, however, arises only when an "evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Id. at 211. "As long as the state law-claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 (1988).

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

To establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in New Mexico, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the conduct in question was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe; and (4) there is a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the claimant's mental distress. Trujillo v. Northern Rio Ariba Elec. Co-op, Inc., 2002-NMSC-004, ¶ 25, 131 N.M. 607. Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is preempted under Tenth Circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit has routinely concluded that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are preempted by Section 301—though not always. See Mock v. T.G.& Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 530 (10th Cir. 1992) ("This Court has specifically held that claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are preempted by section 301."); Garley v. Sandia Corp., 236 F.3d 1200, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001) ("We are not required to find preemption in every conceivable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress which arises from conduct in the workplace" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Defendant relies primarily on Johnson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 921 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1990). Similar to the present case, the plaintiff's claim in Johnson was based, in part, on allegations that the plaintiff's supervisor repeatedly verbally abused him, including yelling athim and calling him names. Id. at 1017. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's claim was preempted because each of the plaintiff's allegations "directly relate[d] to either explicit or implied rights derived from the CBA." Id. at 1020. The court further emphasized that the distinguishing feature between the plaintiff's claim and cases in which state-law claims were not preempted was the lack of an independent state-law standard to evaluate the employer's conduct. See id. at 1021 ("Oklahoma's tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not create an independent method of measuring when an employer's work-related conduct is outrageous."). In such situations, the resolution of the plaintiff's claim will require an examination of the CBA to determine the reasonableness of the employer's conduct. Id. at 1020; see also Garley, 236 F.3d at 1214 (stating that determining whether a defendant's conduct was outrageous will require construction of the defendant's "rights and obligations under the CBA as that is the reference point against which [the defendant's] actions must be scrutinized"); Mowry, 415 F.3d at 1158 (same).

The need to determine a defendant's rights and obligations under the CBA is especially strong when a plaintiff's allegations relate to conduct subject to the CBA's grievance procedures. For instance, in Steinbach v. Dillon Companies, Inc., the Tenth Circuit stated that a plaintiff's allegation that a manager abused her authority in fabricating an unexcused absence charge would require the court to examine the manager's authority to cancel plaintiff's vacation, require her to return to work, and the propriety of initiating disciplinary proceedings which were "subjects covered by the collective bargaining agreement, and...subjects ordinarily addressed in a grievance procedure." 253 F.3d 538, 542 (10th Cir. 2001). Similarly, in ruling that the plaintiff's claim was preempted, the Tenth Circuit in Johnson emphasized that the plaintiff "could haveused the CBA's grievance procedure for any of the allegations in his complaint since all the allegations involved either a suspension, discharge or work-related dispute." Id.

Conversely, in Albertson's Inc. v. Carrigan, the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was not preempted because the state-law claim could be resolved without reference to or interpretation of the CBA. 982 F.2d 1478, 1482 (10th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff in Albertson's alleged...