Raffel v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore City

• Decision Date: 13 January 1905
• Citation: 59 A. 702,100 Md. 141
• Parties: RAFFEL v. SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. OF BALTIMORE CITY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

59 A. 702

100 Md. 141

RAFFEL v. SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. OF BALTIMORE CITY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 13, 1905

Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; George M. Sharp Judge.

Suit by Bertha S. Raffel against the Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore City. From a decree for defendant, complainant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, BOYD, PEARCE, and SCHMUCKER, JJ.

Joseph C. France, for appellant.

Bernard Wisenfeld and Edwin G. Baetjer, for appellee.

BRISCOE J.

This bill was filed to vacate and declare void a voluntary deed of trust from the appellant to the appellee. The bill was filed on the 10th day of March, 1902, and alleges that the appellant was, on or about the 17th day of February, 1896 the owner of certain real and personal property, amounting to the sum of $25,000, which she obtained of her father, Daniel Stein, late of the state of California; that on the 13th of April, 1896, not being conversant with business affairs, and because upon marriage in the future she was desirous of having the property and the income free from the control of her husband, she conveyed the property by a deed of trust to the appellee, to hold upon certain trusts mentioned therein. By the terms of this deed the appellee was to hold the property "in special confidence and trusts, and to pay the net income thereof into her own hands, reserving, however, the right by a last will and testament to bequeath and devise all the property that may be a part of the trust estate in any manner that she may see fit, either to create trust estates by such will or to dispose of the same absolutely; and upon failure to make and execute such last will and testament, then all, or such part thereof that remain undisposed of at the time of her death shall vest in her next of kin or heirs according to law"; the appellee to have power to sell any of the property, to receipt for the same, and to reinvest the proceeds of the sale; and the appellee also to have the power to return to the appellant out of the estate the sum of $5,000 at such time and in such installments as the appellee company shall, in its discretion, deem fit. The appellant then avers that while, by a proper construction of the meaning and intent of the deed, she desired the appellee company to manage and control her property, she did not, by its terms, deprive herself of the right of alienation and disposition of the property, and she understood that the trust created by the deed was revocable at any time, at her pleasure. She also avers that at the time of the execution of the deed she was inexperienced in business matters, and did not understand the legal effect of the deed, but believed at the time that the trust was revocable at her pleasure. She further avers that since the execution of the deed she was intermarried with one Jacob M. Raffel, and, being now able and competent to manage and control her property, she desires to have it returned to her, but that the appellee company refuses so to do. The prayer of the bill is that the deed be declared null and void, and that the appellee company be decreed to deliver the property described in the deed to the appellant. The appellee, in its answer, admits the execution of the deed and its acceptance of the trust according to its terms, but avers that by the deed the appellant deprived herself of the right to dispose of the estate conveyed, except by last will and testament; that the trust created by the deed is irrevocable; and that the appellant knew at the time of the execution of the deed that the trust created thereby was not revocable. The case was heard upon bill, answer, and proof, and from a decree of circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore City, denying the relief prayed, and dismissing plaintiff's bill of complaint, this appeal has been taken.

The appellant's claim to relief is based upon two grounds First, that, if the deed creates an irrevocable trust, and deprives her of the control of her property, it was executed by her in ignorance of its meaning, and under circumstances which equitably entitle her to its cancellation; and, second, by a proper construction of the deed she has not divested herself of anything more...