Rafferty v. Rafferty

• Decision Date: 27 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 4:15-CV-1543 CAS,4:15-CV-1543 CAS
• Parties: JEANNE U. RAFFERTY, Plaintiff, v. KATHE RAFFERTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

JEANNE U. RAFFERTY, Plaintiff, v. KATHE RAFFERTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:15-CV-1543 CAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

January 27, 2016

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This removed matter is before the Court on defendantKathe Rafferty's ("Kathe")motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹PlaintiffJeanne U. Rafferty("Jeanne") opposes the motion.Kathe did not file a response and the time to do so has passed, so the motion ready for decision.For the following reasons, the Court will grant Kathe's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

I.Background

This action arises out of a dispute over entitlement to group Basic Life Insurance benefits payable by reason of the death of Thomas F. Rafferty.The life insurance benefits arise under an ERISA²-regulated employee welfare benefit plan originally sponsored by The May Department Store Company, now known as Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., and funded by a group life insurance policy issued by defendantMetropolitan Life Insurance Company("MetLife").Mr. Rafferty wasthe late husband of Kathe and the ex-husband of Jeanne.Jeanne and Kathe each claim entitlement to 100% of the Policy proceeds under separate beneficiary designations.

Jeanne was married to Thomas Rafferty from 1948 to 1977.Jeanne alleges that Mr. Rafferty began seeing Kathe romantically while still married to her, and Jeanne filed for divorce in 1976.Jeanne alleges that as part of their Separation Agreement, and as required by the terms of the 1977 Decree of Dissolution and a subsequent court order, Mr. Rafferty was to maintain the Policy in force for her benefit and keep her as the 100% irrevocable beneficiary thereof.On July 2, 1982, Mr. Rafferty executed a beneficiary designation form designating Jeanne as the sole primary beneficiary of 100% of the Policy's life insurance benefits.

Mr. Rafferty married Kathe in June 1977 and lived with her in Missouri until June 1989, when they moved to Erie, Pennsylvania.Kathe spent a week in Missouri in 1991 and has not been here since that time.On February 3, 2014, Mr. Rafferty executed a beneficiary designation form designating Kathe as the sole primary beneficiary of 100% of the Policy's life insurance benefits.Mr. Rafferty died of a brain tumor on May 22, 2015 at the age of 92.

Jeanne and Kathe each made claim to the Policy proceeds.On July 14, 2015, MetLife notified Jeanne and Kathe that their claims were adverse to one another and could not be resolved by MetLife without exposing itself and the Plan to the danger of double liability.MetLife stated that it was therefore required to file an interpleader action but suggested that Jeanne and Kathe attempt to resolve the matter amicably to preserve the Policy proceeds from litigation costs.On August 14, 2015, Kathe filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania(the"Pennsylvania action"), seeking a declaratory judgment under ERISA that she was the sole beneficiary of the Policy, and naming as defendants MetLife and Jeanne Rafferty.³

On September 3, 2015, Jeanne filed this action in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County, Missouri, asserting state law claims and naming as defendantsKathe Rafferty, MetLife, and Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc.("Macy's").Jeanne alleges she is entitled to the Policy proceeds under the Decree of Dissolution and state court orders.Jeanne also alleges that Mr. Rafferty had severe memory loss and Alzheimer's Disease and lacked the mental capacity to execute a beneficiary designation on February 3, 2014.Count I of the Petition seeks a declaration that the 2014 beneficiary designation was procured by Kathe's fraud, duress and/or undue influence, and that Kathe or someone on her behalf executed and/or compelled Mr. Rafferty to execute the 2014 beneficiary designation.Counts II, III and IV assert state law tort claims against Kathe for fraud, undue influence, and tortious interference with contractual relationship and/or expectancy, all in connection with the 2014 beneficiary designation.Count V asserts a state law tort claim against Macy's for negligent misrepresentation, based on Macy's incorrect representation to Jeanne in February 2015 that she was still designated as the sole primary beneficiary of the Policy.

Defendant MetLife removed the case to this Court on October 7, 2015 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under ERISA.The Notice of Removal asserts that the state law claims in Counts I and V of the Petition are completely preempted by ERISA, which provides the exclusive federal remedy for resolution of claims by employee welfare benefit plan participants and their beneficiaries and assignees, even when the ERISA-related nature of the action does not appear on the face of the Petition, citing Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200(2004).The Notice ofRemoval asserts that because the claims in Counts I and V of the Petition arise under the laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the entire case is removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).Finally, the Notice of Removal asserts that the Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 over the state law claims in Counts II-IV, and indeed the entire case, as the parties are of diverse citizenship and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.

Defendant MetLife filed its Answer to the Petition and filed a cross-claim and counterclaim for interpleader against Kathe and Jeanne, respectively, under ERISAandRule 22, Fed. R. Civ. P., asking that it be permitted to pay the Policy proceeds into Court and be discharged from any further liability.Kathe filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on October 23, 2015, and on November 12, 2015 filed her Response to MetLife's cross-claim for interpleader.Kathe's Response to the cross-claim did not assert a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.

II.Legal Standard

"To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists, which is accomplished by pleading sufficient facts 'to support a reasonable inference that the defendant[] can be subjected to jurisdiction within the state.'"K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591-92(8th Cir.2011)(quotingDever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072(8th Cir.2004))."Although the evidentiary showing required at the prima facie stage is minimal, the showing must be tested, not by the pleadings alone, but by the affidavits and exhibits supporting or opposing the motion."Id.(internal citations, quotation marks and quoted cases omitted).The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all factual conflicts are resolved in her favor in deciding whether the plaintiff made the requisite showing.Id.(cited case omitted).The burden of proof doesnot shift to the party challenging jurisdiction, however.Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816, 820(8th Cir.2014)

"The basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident party in Missouri is Missouri's long-arm statute."Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc., 689 F.3d 904, 910(8th Cir.2012)."Missouri's long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants who, inter alia, transact business, make a contract, or commit a tort within the state."Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 593(8th Cir.2011)(citingMo. Rev. Stat. § 506.500.1(2000))."In adopting the long-arm statute, the Missouri legislature'intended to provide for jurisdiction, within the specific categories enumerated in the statutes[e.g., transacting business or making a contract within the state,] to the full extent permitted by the due process clause.'"K-V Pharm.648 F.3d at 592(bracketed text in original)(quotingState ex rel. Metal Serv. Ctr. of Ga., Inc. v. Gaertner, 677 S.W.2d 325, 327(Mo.1984)(en banc)).In all instances, the long-arm statute requires that the cause of action arise from the doing of the enumerated act.Mo. Rev. Stat. § 506.500.3("Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this section.").

Further, "Even if personal jurisdiction over a defendant is authorized by the forum state's long-arm statute, jurisdiction can be asserted only if it comports with the strictures of the Due Process Clause."Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 594."The touchstone of the due-process analysis remains whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."Id.(internal quotation marks and quoted case omitted)."The fundamental inquiry is whether the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state to sucha degree that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there[.]"Id.(internal citation, quotation marks and quoted case omitted).

Minimum contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction may be evaluated under two theories: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.Id.The Supreme Court recently stated that "only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there."Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760(2014)(internal citations omitted)."For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile[.]"Id.(quotingGoodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54(2011)).

"Specific jurisdiction is proper 'only if the injury giving rise to the lawsuit occurred within or had some connection to the forum state, meaning that the defendant...