Rafferty v. Trumbull Cnty.

Citation915 F.3d 1087
Decision Date15 February 2019
Docket NumberNo. 17-4223,17-4223
Parties Michele L. RAFFERTY, Plaintiff, Katie L. Sherman, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO, et al., Defendants, Charles E. Drennen, Individually and in His Professional Capacity, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

915 F.3d 1087

Michele L. RAFFERTY, Plaintiff,

Katie L. Sherman, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO, et al., Defendants,

Charles E. Drennen, Individually and in His Professional Capacity, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-4223

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: December 4, 2018
Decided and Filed: February 15, 2019
Rehearing En Banc Denied March 21, 2019*


ARGUED: Angelica M. Jarmusz, FISHEL HASS KIM ALBRECHT DOWNEY, LLP, New Albany, Ohio, for Appellant. Sarah Thomas Kovoor, Warren, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Angelica M. Jarmusz, Daniel T. Downey, FISHEL HASS KIM ALBRECHT DOWNEY, LLP, New Albany, Ohio, for Appellant. Sarah Thomas Kovoor, Warren, Ohio, for Appellee. Lauren M. Weinstein, MOLOLAMKEN LLP, Washington, D.C., Jay R. Schweikert, CATO INSTITUTE, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.

Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Charles Drennen appeals the decision of the district court denying him summary judgment on Plaintiff Katie Sherman’s Eighth Amendment claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated below, this Court AFFIRMS the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

Sherman was incarcerated at the Trumbull County Jail from November 18, 2013 to April 30, 2014. During Sherman’s incarceration, Drennen worked at the Trumbull County Jail as a corrections officer. Drennen was regularly assigned to patrol the pod where Sherman lived with Michele Rafferty, another female inmate.

Between February 1, 2014 and Sherman’s release on April 30, 2014, Drennen demanded that Sherman expose her breasts for him to view on three or four occasions. Sherman complied with Drennen’s demands. On one or two occasions, Sherman masturbated in Drennen’s presence "because he asked for it." (Sherman Dep., R. 102 at PageID #705.)

Sherman does not allege that Drennen ever touched her. And Drennen never explicitly threatened Sherman. But Sherman was deeply disturbed by Drennen’s demands. As a result of Drennen’s abuse, Sherman’s post-traumatic stress disorder

915 F.3d 1092

worsened and her night terrors and flashbacks increased in severity.

Sherman never reported Drennen to anyone in the Trumbull County Jail administration because she felt intimidated by him; she "didn’t know what to expect" if she refused his demands. (Id. at PageID #716.)

B. Procedural History

Sherman and Rafferty sued Drennen and various officials from Trumbull County (together "Defendants"), alleging Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims against Drennen and Monell claims against the Trumbull County officials. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on every claim except for Sherman’s Eighth Amendment claim against Drennen, finding that Drennen was not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. Drennen appealed the district court’s decision.1

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

"Congress has given this court ‘jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.’ " Miami-Luken, Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin. , 900 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ). "[A] denial of summary judgment is generally not a final judgment." Devlin v. Kalm , 630 F. App'x 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hoover v. Radabaugh , 307 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 2002) ). "However, under the collateral-order doctrine[,] ‘a limited set of district-court orders are reviewable’ even though they are ‘short of final judgment.’ " Peatross v. City of Memphis , 818 F.3d 233, 239 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 671, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). A district court order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Brown v. Chapman , 814 F.3d 436, 443–44 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 526–529, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ). But this jurisdiction is limited; "circuit courts can review a denial of qualified immunity only ‘to the extent that it turns on an issue of law’—the appeal cannot be from a district court’s determination that there is a genuine dispute of material fact." Chapman , 814 F.3d at 444 (quoting Forsyth , 472 U.S. at 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806 ). Accordingly, a defendant challenging a district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity must "concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff for purposes of the appeal." Baker v. Union Twp. , 587 F. App'x 229, 232 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moldowan v. City of Warren , 578 F.3d 351, 370 (6th Cir. 2009) ).

Drennen "concede[s] the most favorable view of the facts to Ms. Sherman for the purposes of this interlocutory appeal." (Def. Br. at 4.) Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. See Baker , 587 F. App'x at 232.

915 F.3d 1093

B. Standard of Review

"We review de novo a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds." Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. , 705 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Tucker v. City of Richmond , 388 F.3d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 2004) ).

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A dispute about a material fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.’ " Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ. , 708 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 305 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2002) ). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must "view[ ] [the evidence] in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). Further, "all reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the non-moving party." Moran v. Al Basit LLC , 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. OPPCO, LLC , 219 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2000) ). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324–25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

C. Analysis

1. Qualified Immunity

"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). As the Supreme Court has explained, "[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Id.

"The qualified immunity analysis entails two general steps, which can be considered in any order." Godawa v. Byrd , 798 F.3d 457, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808 ). "First, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? Second, is the right clearly established?" Seales v. City of Detroit , 724 F. App'x 356, 359 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Silberstein v. City of Dayton , 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006) ). "To qualify as clearly established, [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Kindl v. City of Berkley , 798 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Lewis , 779 F.3d 401, 412 (6th Cir. 2015) ).

"[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an officer is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." Courtright v. City of Battle Creek , 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Johnson v. Moseley , 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015) ).

2. Eighth Amendment

"The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners from the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."

915 F.3d 1094

Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville , 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Goodrich , 649 F.3d 428, 434 (6th Cir. 2011) ). The Supreme Court has explained that "[a]mong ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those that are ‘totally without penological justification.’ " Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). However, "[t]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’...

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