Raft River Land & Live Stock Co. v. Laird

• Decision Date: 20 November 1917
• Citation: Raft River Land & Live Stock Co. v. Laird, 168 P. 1074, 30 Idaho 804 (Idaho 1917)
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: RAFT RIVER LAND & LIVESTOCK CO., a Corporation, Appellant, v. S. H. LAIRD, Respondent

168 P. 1074

30 Idaho 804

RAFT RIVER LAND & LIVESTOCK CO., a Corporation, Appellant, v. S. H. LAIRD, Respondent

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 20, 1917

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for Power County. Hon J. J. Guheen, Judge.

Action for debt. Judgment for defendant. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

W. R Griswold, for Appellant.

"To rescind a contract for the purchase of a chattel the property purchased should be returned, or offered to be returned within a reasonable time, unless it is of no value to either party." (Gale Sulky Harrow Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 46 Kan. 324, 26 P. 703; Luger Furniture Co. v Street, 6 Okla. 312, 50 P. 125; 35 Cyc. 151; Gifford v. Carvill, 29 Cal. 589; Robinson & Co. v. Roberts, 20 Okla. 787, 95 P. 246; Waymire v. Shipley, 52 Ore. 464, 97 P. 807.)

"Retaining the goods without objection after discovery of the fraud or defect, and using, selling, or otherwise dealing with the property, will estop the buyer to rescind." (35 Cyc. 141, 142; Detroit Heating etc. Co. v. Stevens, 16 Utah 177, 52 P. 379; Eagle Iron Works v. Des Moines Sub. Ry. Co., 101 Iowa 289, 70 N.W. 193; Morgan v. Thetford, 3 Ill.App. 323; Lyon v. Bertram, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 149, 15 L.Ed. 847.)

J. F. Nugent, J. P. Pope and Ross W. Bates, for Respondent.

"Whether the right to rescind was exercised within a reasonable time is usually regarded as a question for the jury." (35 Cyc. 153, note 48.)

"In the case of a warranty it is immaterial whether the seller knew his statements were untrue or not." (35 Cyc. 368, and cases cited.)

"Where there is an express warranty, the buyer is under no obligation to inspect or examine the goods purchased, but may rely on the warranty. The main purpose of a warranty is often to excuse examination and render examination unnecessary." (35 Cyc. 378, and cases cited.)

"Where there is some evidence to support the verdict of the jury, the judgment will not be reversed." (Lott v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 23 Idaho 324, 130 P. 88.)

MORGAN, J. Budge, C. J., and Rice, J., concur.

OPINION

MORGAN, J.

Appellant instituted this action to recover the purchase price of a mare sold by it, through one Crane, its agent, to respondent. Respondent's defense was that at the time of the sale appellant's agent expressly warranted that the animal was sound; that after the sale it was discovered to be so diseased and afflicted as to be of no value whatever and that after the discovery of the animal's defects he offered to return it to appellant. The jury returned a verdict for respondent and judgment was entered accordingly. From the judgment this appeal is taken.

The evidence is sufficient to disclose the fact that the mare was unsound, as alleged by respondent, and practically valueless.

The testimony introduced by respondent, to sustain his claim that appellant warranted the soundness of the mare, was to the effect that during the time the sale was being negotiated Crane told him the animal was sound in every particular, and "I will absolutely guarantee that mare. If she does not prove satisfactory, you can bring her back any time." This evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury in finding that Crane warranted the soundness of the animal. (Frey v. Failes, 37 Okla. 297, 132 P. 342; 35 Cyc. 365.) It is true Crane disputed the testimony of respondent in this particular, but no rule is better settled in this state than that this court will not disturb the verdict of a jury or the judgment of a trial court because of conflict in the evidence when there is sufficient proof, if uncontradicted, to sustain it. Among the recent cases so holding is Montgomery v. Gray (on rehearing), 26 Idaho 583, 144 P. 646; Graham v. Coeur d' Alene & St. Joe Transp. Co., 27 Idaho 454. 149 P. 509; Bower v. Moorman, 27 Idaho 162, 147 P. 496; Darry v. Cox, 28 Idaho 519, 155 P. 660; Jensen v. Bumgarner, 28 Idaho 706, 156 P. 114; John V. Farwell Co. v. Craney, 29 Idaho 82, 157 P. 382; Sweeten v. Ezell, 30 Idaho 154, 163 P. 612. The reason for this rule is that the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. It was within the province of the jury to, and it apparently did, discredit the testimony adduced by appellant to sustain its contention, and it is not for this court to say that it erred in returning the verdict it arrived at from the conflicting evidence before it.

Appellant contends that the court erred in giving certain instructions, and in refusing to give others which were requested by it, but, it is clear, this contention is based on the erroneous assumption that this action involved the question of fraud or deceit. Referring to the instructions refused by the court, appellant says in its brief: "These instructions were formulated and prepared under the provisions of the general rule of law in regard to rescission of contracts of sale for fraud." Its objection to the instructions given was that they omitted to charge the jury in respect to certain elements necessary where fraud is relied upon as a defense.

If respondent's defense had been based upon false representations alleged to have been made by appellant's agent, then it would have been necessary to prove that he made the representations knowing their falsity, or made them...