Rafter v. Raymark Industries, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 October 1993 |
| Citation | 632 A.2d 897,429 Pa.Super. 360 |
| Parties | Rose Ann RAFTER, Adm. of the Estate of Robert J. Rafter, Deceased, and Rose Ann Rafter, in Her Own Right v. RAYMARK INDUSTRIES, INC., GAF Corporation, H.K. Porter, Southern Textile Corp., Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., Pacor, Inc., Keene Corporation, Garlock, Inc., Pittsburgh Corning Corp., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., Armstrong World Industries, Fibreboard Corporation, Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., and Nicolet Industries, Inc. Appeal of KEENE CORPORATION. Oliver TUZI and Alice Tuzi v. RAYMARK INDUSTRIES, INC., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Co., Pittsburgh Corning Corp., Celotex Corp., GAF Corp., Southern Textile Co., Eagle-Picher Industries, Keene Corporation, Owens-Illinois Glass Co., H.K. Porter Co., Inc., Garlock, Inc., Armstrong World Industries Inc., Fibreboard Corp., Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., and Nicolet Industries, Inc. Appeal of KEENE CORPORATION. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Bruce H. Bikin, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Stephen W. Wilson, Philadelphia, for appellees.
Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ.
This is a consolidated appeal from the July 28 and August 21, 1992 orders denying appellant's, Keene Corporation, motions for judgment n.o.v., new trial and/or remittitur and affirming the jury verdicts in favor of appellees, Rose Ann Rafter (deceased) and Alice Tuzi (deceased), and awarding appellees delay damages. Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
1. Did the lower court err in ruling on certain objections regarding expert medical testimony which rulings were prejudicial to Keene Corporation?
2. Did the lower court err on charging the jury on the issue of substantial contributing factor and the role that plaintiff Tuzi's tuberculosis played in causing his lung cancer?
3. Did the lower court err in failing to remit the amounts of the judgments for plaintiffs?
Appellant's Brief at 3. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Both appellee-Rafter (hereinafter "Rafter") and appellee-Tuzi (hereinafter "Tuzi") filed separate complaints on April 19, 1983 and March 14, 1983 respectively, against appellant and other defendants seeking to recover for injuries arising out of their occupational exposure to asbestos. On January 6-14, 1992, a consolidated jury trial on damages was held. 1 The jury found that Rafter suffered $181,000 in damages and that Tuzi suffered $605,000 in damages, as a result of their occupational asbestos exposure. Pursuant to its stipulation of liability, appellant was found liable to Rafter for 1/6 of the award of $181,000 or $30,166.07 and to Tuzi for 1/5 of the award of $605,000 or $121,000. Additionally, the trial court awarded Rafter and Tuzi delay damages in the amount of $26,184.49 and $116,503.33, respectively, against appellant. Post-trial motions were filed and denied. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in permitting prejudicial hearsay medical testimony to be considered by the jury and to apply the rules regarding such testimony unevenly among the parties. Appellant points to several incidents of error which we will address in seriatim.
Appellant first objects to certain testimony of Rafter's expert witness, Dr. Daniel DuPont. Specifically, appellant contends that Dr. DuPont's testimony regarding a report made by a Dr. Atkinson was inadmissible hearsay. We disagree. Preliminarily, we point out that "[t]he admission of expert testimony is a matter for the discretion of the trial court and will not be remanded, overruled or disturbed unless there was a clear abuse of discretion." Estate of Pew, 409 Pa.Super. 417, 424, 598 A.2d 65, 69 (1991) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 645, 607 A.2d 255 (1992). As appellant correctly states in its brief, "[h]earsay evidence is defined as in-court evidence of an out-of-court declaration, whether oral or written, which is offered to show the truth of the out-of-court assertion." Kemp v. Qualls, 326 Pa.Super. 319, 327, 473 A.2d 1369, 1373 (1984) (citation omitted).
In summarizing the materials reviewed in forming his opinion, Dr. DuPont stated that he examined an independent report issued by Dr. Atkinson. After a careful review of Dr. DuPont's testimony, however, we can find no mention by Dr. DuPont of the contents of Dr. Atkinson's report. See Videotaped Deposition of Dr. DuPont, 1-7-92, at 6-9, 11. Accordingly, we find no basis for appellant's assertion of hearsay and appellant's claim must fail.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to allow appellant's expert, Dr. Epstein, to state that certain x-rays taken of Tuzi were read by a Dr. Promisloff as exhibiting "scar tissue formation with calcium deposited in the scar tissue at the top of both sides of the chest." 2 Videotaped Deposition of Dr. Epstein, 1-8-92, at 31-32. Appellant argues that although this testimony was hearsay evidence, it should not have been excluded from evidence. We disagree.
In support of this claim, appellant points to this court's holding in Primavera v. Celotex Corp., 415 Pa.Super. 41, 608 A.2d 515 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 641, 622 A.2d 1374 (1993), where we restated the long standing principal that "medical experts are permitted to express opinions which are based, in part, upon reports which are not in evidence, but which are customarily relied upon by experts in the profession." Id. at 47, 608 A.2d at 518 (footnote omitted). However, this court also emphasized that "[a]n 'expert' should not be permitted simply to repeat another's opinion or data without bringing to bear on it his own expertise and judgment." Id. at 52, 608 A.2d at 521. Here, Dr. Epstein never stated that he relied upon the conclusions of Dr. Promisloff in forming his opinion. See Videotaped Deposition of Dr. Epstein at 34-35. Accordingly, the Primavera exception does not apply and this claim must also fail.
Appellant next contends that it was error for the trial court to allow counsel for Tuzi's recitation of the out of court opinions of Dr. Hikon Chon, Dr. Elliott C. Schull and Dr. Sokolowski in cross-examining Dr. Epstein. We disagree.
Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in overruling its objection to counsel for Tuzi's cross-examination of Dr. Epstein regarding an x-ray of Tuzi taken by a Dr. Chon. See Videotaped Deposition of Dr. Epstein at 57-58. We disagree.
Preliminarily, we point out that "the scope and limits of cross-examination are within the trial court's discretion and the court's ruling thereon will not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law." Kemp 326 Pa.Super. at 324, 473 A.2d at 1371 (1984) (citation omitted). The right of cross-examination "includes the right to examine the witness on any facts tending to refute inferences or deductions arising from matters the witness testified to on direct examination." Id. Moreover, where a medical expert is cross-examined concerning reports or records which have not been admitted into evidence but which would tend to refute that expert's assertion, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow this cross-examination. Id. at 324-25, 473 A.2d at 1371.
On direct examination, Dr. Epstein stated that he had reviewed "all of [Tuzi's] x rays dating back almost 20 years and [he] saw no evidence of an asbestos-related change in his chest." Videotaped Deposition of Dr. Epstein at 52. On cross-examination, counsel for Tuzi questioned Dr. Epstein about an x-ray of Tuzi taken by a radiologist, Dr. Chon, who reported that the x-ray showed bilateral pleural thickening on Tuzi's lungs. 3 Clearly, when a medical expert reviews an x-ray in preparation for his testimony at trial, any reports prepared by the radiologist who took the x-ray could be expected to have some bearing or impact on that expert's findings. Here, however, Dr. Epstein failed to review Dr. Chon's report which stated that at least one of Tuzi's x-rays did show an asbestos-related change. 4 Thus, Counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Epstein regarding the x-ray and report of Dr. Chon was a legitimate attempt at diminishing the impact and reliability of Dr. Epstein's opinion. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Counsel's questioning regarding Dr. Epstein's report.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to sustain appellant's objection to the cross-examination of Dr. Epstein regarding a report of a Dr. Elliott C. Schull. This claim is spurious. Dr. Schull's report indicated only that Tuzi may have had cancer in the lungs, a fact conceded by both appellant and Dr. Epstein. As appellant has failed to demonstrate how it was prejudiced by this testimony, this claim is meritless.
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's objection to counsel for Tuzi's cross-examination of Dr. Epstein regarding a letter written by a Dr. Sokolowski. As mentioned above, the right to cross-examination includes the right to question a witness on facts tending to refute inferences or deductions made by the witness on direct examination. Kemp at 324, 473 A.2d at 1371.
On direct examination, Dr. Epstein testified that after reviewing the records supplied to him, it was his opinion that Tuzi's throat cancer was caused by his cigarette smoking and heavy use of alcohol and that Tuzi had not suffered from any asbestos-related disease. In cross-examining Dr. Epstein, counsel for Tuzi asked Dr. Epstein to read part of a letter written by a Dr. Sokolowski, a physician who had treated Tuzi for throat cancer. In the letter, Dr. Sokolowski stated that it was his opinion that Tuzi's throat cancer was a result of his exposure to asbestos-related materials. 5 Videotaped Deposition of Dr. Epstein at 76.
As this letter was written by a physician who was treating Tuzi for throat cancer and as it conveyed the...
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