Ragan v. Stafford
| Decision Date | 20 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:16-cv-4097 |
| Parties | JAY RAGAN PLAINTIFF v. CLIFTON STAFFORD DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Before the Court is Plaintiff Jay Ragan's Motion for Sanctions and Motion in Limine Regarding the Offering of Evidence of Repairs.1 (ECF No. 22). Defendant Clifton Stafford filed a response. (ECF No. 28). Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 29). The Court finds the matter ripe for consideration.
On the morning of April 22, 2016, Plaintiff's vehicle struck a black cow in the roadway on Arkansas Highway 24, between DeQueen, Arkansas, and Horatio, Arkansas. It is undisputed that the cow belonged to Defendant and was pastured and fenced with other cattle on Defendant's nearby land. The cow escaped the pasture after breaking the top strand of a barbed-wire fence and pushing over a four-foot section of the fence. Following the accident, Plaintiff traveled by ambulance to the DeQueen Regional Medical Center. Soon after, Defendant repaired the broken section of fence by fixing and tightening the broken barbed-wire strand, putting in two new posts, and pulling up the rest of the knocked-over section of fence.
On October 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging that he suffered personal injury and damages as a result of, inter alia, Defendant's negligent failure to have, maintain, inspect, andrepair safe fencing in order to keep his cattle enclosed and off the nearby state highway. On October 25, 2016, Defendant filed an answer to the complaint. In November 2016, Defendant used a backhoe to remove the entire fence around his land and replaced it with a new fence. Defendant discarded the original, removed fence.
On February 22, 2017, the parties filed their joint Rule 26(f) report, which contained no reference to Defendant removing the original fence.2 On July 6, 2017, Defendant answered certain interrogatories inquiring about repairs and replacements to the fence by stating that he decided to replace the fence because it was "older." (ECF No. 21-3). On July 19, 2017, Defendant testified in his deposition that he took the old fence down and built a new fence on his land.
On August 9, 2017, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Court should grant summary judgment in his favor because Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Defendant breached any duty of care with respect to the kind and quality of fence enclosing Defendant's property. On August 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant motion.
Plaintiff's motion for sanctions argues that Defendant committed spoliation of evidence by intentionally removing and replacing the fence at issue in this case, and by failing to keep or otherwise preserve the original fence. Accordingly, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter spoliation sanctions against Defendant. In his motion in limine, Plaintiff asks the Court to allow him to present evidence at trial regarding Defendant's immediate post-accident repairs to the fence and his subsequent total removal and replacement of the fence. The Court will address each of Plaintiff's motions in turn.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant committed spoliation of material evidence by intentionally removing and replacing the fence surrounding his land, and by failing to keep or otherwise preserve the original fence. Plaintiff states that the fence around Defendant's pasture was a key piece of evidence in this case because his negligence claim is based largely on Defendant's failure to have, maintain, and repair a sufficient enclosure for his livestock. Plaintiff states further that, because the fence removal occurred before the parties conducted any discovery, Plaintiff is now prejudiced because he cannot inspect and evaluate the fence, obtain expert opinions regarding the fence's condition at the time of the accident, or cross-examine Defendant about the fence. Accordingly, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter various spoliation sanctions against Defendant.
Defendant argues in response that Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the removal of the fence because he has certain photographs of the fencing along the highway. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to inspect the fence and preserve it as evidence between the time of the accident and the disposal of the fence, and that Plaintiff regularly drove along the highway before and after the accident and could see the fence. Defendant argues further that the Court should deny the instant motion because nothing suggests that he removed and replaced the fence due to a "desire to suppress the truth."
"District courts have the inherent power to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process." Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 844 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Spoliation of evidence can constitute such an abuse. See Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1993). Spoliation is "the intentional destruction of evidence and when it is established, [the] fact finder may draw inference that [the] evidence destroyed was unfavorable to [the] party responsible for its spoliation." E*Trade Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230 F.R.D. 582, 587 (D. Minn. 2005) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary1401 (6th ed. 1990)) (alterations in original). Courts apply federal law to determine whether to impose sanctions for spoliation of evidence. Sherman v. Rinchem Co., 687 F.3d 996, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012). The imposition of discovery sanctions is a decision committed to the Court's discretion, but the scope of that discretion narrows as the severity of the sanction increases. Bergstrom v. Frascone, 744 F.3d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 2014).
"For an adverse inference instruction for spoliation to be warranted, a district court is required to make two findings: (1) there must be a finding of intentional destruction indicating a desire to suppress the truth, and (2) there must be a finding of prejudice to the opposing party." Lincoln Composites, Inc. v. Firetrace USA, LLC, 825 F.3d 453, 463 (8th Cir. 2016). The party seeking the sanction bears the burden of showing the requisite intent and prejudice. See Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court will now separately address the issues of intent and prejudice, and if the Court finds that both requisites have been met, the Court will then determine the appropriate sanction.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant intentionally destroyed and replaced the fence due to his desire to "suppress the truth." Plaintiff states that Defendant removed and disposed of the fence after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Plaintiff points the Court to the language of his complaint, which asserts in part that that Defendant's negligence in having, inspecting, and repairing the fence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff argues that this language put Defendant on notice of the fence's relevance and importance in this lawsuit, and that Defendant tore down and discarded the fence shortly after receiving the complaint and filing his answer.
Defendant argues in response that there is no hint of deception on his part. Defendant argues further that there is no "suggestion based in fact showing any 'desire to suppress the truth.'" (ECF No. 28).
As discussed above, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that Defendant committed intentional destruction of evidence indicating a desire to suppress the truth. Lincoln Composites, Inc., 825 F.3d at 463. "Intent is rarely proved by direct evidence, and a district court has substantial leeway to determine intent through consideration of circumstantial evidence, witness credibility, motives of the witnesses in a particular case, and other factors." Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is no direct evidence of whether Defendant intended to "suppress the truth" when he removed and discarded the fence. As a result, the Court must look to other factors to determine intent. Upon review, the record suggests that Defendant acted in bad faith by intentionally destroying evidence after he knew or should have known that the evidence was relevant3 to future or current litigation. Plaintiff's collision with the cow occurred on April 22, 2016. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 14, 2016, and Defendant filed his answer on October 25, 2016. Defendant removed and replaced the fence sometime in November 2016, shortly after filing his answer. Defendant did not attempt to replace his fence during the nearly six months that passed between the accident and the filing of this action. Instead, he only did so shortly after being served with Plaintiff's complaint, which set out a cause of action related to Defendant's alleged breach of his duty to have and properly maintain adequate fencing for his cattle. Defendant does not explain why he removed the fence, other than his statement that the fence was "older."
Defendant had the duty to preserve the fence because he had been put on notice by the complaint that the fence was at issue in Plaintiff's current lawsuit. See E*Trade Sec. LLC, 230 F.R.D. at 588 (). However, he did not do so,instead removing and disposing of the fence without first contacting Plaintiff's counsel to communicate his intention to do so, or to give Plaintiff an opportunity to inspect the fence beforehand.4 Moreover, Defendant did not keep the section of the fence at issue for use as evidence in this matter. The parties had not conducted any discovery at the time Defendant removed and disposed of the fence. Defendant's removal and disposal of the fence shortly after the commencement of litigation creates a sufficiently strong inference of...
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