Raggi v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., CIV-90-6306.
Decision Date | 12 December 1991 |
Docket Number | No. CIV-90-6306.,CIV-90-6306. |
Citation | 779 F. Supp. 705 |
Parties | Darlene E. RAGGI, Plaintiff, v. WEGMANS FOOD MARKETS, INC., James Kellman, Individually and as Manager (Supervisor) Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Roy W. King, Rochester, N.Y., for plaintiff.
Michael A. Hausknecht, David P. Ford, Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, Rochester, N.Y., for defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Darlene Raggi, filed this action on July 26, 1991, pursuant to § 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the New York State Human Rights Law. Ms. Raggi alleges that she is a handicapped/disabled person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and that the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of that handicap. She further alleges that the defendants discriminated against her in violation of New York State Human Rights Law.
The defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, on the grounds that both Ms. Raggi's Rehabilitation Act claim and her State Human Rights claim are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Additionally, defendants argue that the State Human Rights claim is barred because plaintiff elected to pursue an administrative remedy instead of a judicial remedy. For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.
Plaintiff was employed by Wegmans for approximately fifteen years as an Accounting Office Manager, until she was terminated on June 11, 1986. At the time she was fired, she was thirty-four years old. From approximately 1982 until 1986, plaintiff underwent various surgical procedures, including two operations to remove sections of her stomach. Plaintiff alleges that despite her health problems, she remained able to perform her job responsibilities, that she is handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, and that the defendants were aware of her handicap.
She further alleges that prior to her termination, several of defendant's employees made remarks that demonstrate their discriminatory intent. For example, she alleges that defendant James Kellman, the manager of the store in which she worked, remarked that Wegmans was footing the bill for the plaintiff's surgery, that she was a detriment to the company, and that Wegmans could reduce its payroll by firing plaintiff and hiring someone half her age.
Shortly after she was terminated, plaintiff filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights, charging the defendants with discriminatory employment practices. The Division made a finding of probable cause and commenced hearings on the charges, which continued until August 17, 1989. The Administrative Law Judge issued his recommended findings and decision on April 10, 1991. He dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the defendants did not discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of either her age or disability. Plaintiff filed objections, and on May 29, 1991, the Commissioner issued a Notice of Order after Hearing, dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff filed this action on July 26, 1991.
1. The Most Appropriate Statute of Limitations:
29 U.S.C. § 794. The Rehabilitation Act does not, however, provide its own statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 504. Under such circumstances, the court must "borrow" the most appropriate state statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct.1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Marin v. New York State Department of Labor, 512 F.Supp. 353, 355 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683 (7th Cir.1987). Both parties agree that the court must look to New York State law to determine the most appropriate statute of limitations. They disagree, however, with respect to which of New York's several limitations provisions should apply.
Defendants urge the court to apply a three-year limitations period to plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that this court should apply New York's six-year limitation for contract actions, New York C.P.L.R. § 213(2).1 Alternatively, plaintiff argues that the court should apply New York C.P.L.R. § 213(1), which provides that "an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law," shall be commenced within six years.
In arguing that the court should apply C.P.L.R. § 213(2) to her Rehabilitation Act claim, the plaintiff focuses on the phrase "most appropriate limitations period." She alleges that defendants terminated her employment because she was handicapped, despite the fact that her handicap did not interfere with her job responsibilities. Thus, plaintiff argues that her claim is most closely analogous to an action for breach of implied contract, and that the sixyear limitations period is the one which most closely addresses plaintiff's claims.
Alternatively, plaintiff claims that C.P.L.R. § 213(1) should apply because a claim pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act is an "action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law." New York C.P.L.R. § 213(1). In other words, plaintiff reasons that section 213(1) is the limitations period which would best apply to her Rehabilitation Act claim. Although plaintiff's arguments are logical and somewhat appealing, this court concludes that existing Second Circuit dicta, together with the Supreme Court's reasoning with respect to similar statute of limitations issues, dictates that New York's three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions should govern plaintiff's claim.
Several district courts have held that a three-year limitations period should be applied to Rehabilitation Act claims.2 Marin, 512 F.Supp. at 355; McGuire v. Switzer, 734 F.Supp. 99, 104 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1990); Fiesel v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 490 F.Supp. 363, 365 (E.D.N.Y.1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1982); Reilly v. New York City Transit Authority, 1985 WL 3954, at 3 (S.D.N.Y.1985). Moreover, the Second Circuit has, at least in dicta, indicated that Rehabilitation Act claims are most likely subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Fleming v. New York University, 865 F.2d 478, 481-82 (2d Cir.1989).
Fleming, 865 F.2d at 481-82, n. 1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
As the Second Circuit suggests, the reasoning advanced by the Supreme Court in applying state limitations periods governing personal injury actions to other discrimination statutes is compelling. For example, in determining that a state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied to all cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court recognized that § 1983 is a broad remedial statute which encompasses many types of claims and many different factual scenarios. Wilson, 105 S.Ct. at 1945. As the Wilson Court noted, lower courts that have based their choice of a limitations period on the particular factual circumstances of each case have found "that their approach inevitably breeds uncertainty and time-consuming litigation that is foreign to the central purposes of § 1983." Id.; see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 577, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (). Thus, the Supreme Court has concluded that, in the interest of clear and consistent rules, the Court should "select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims." Wilson, 105 S.Ct. at 1947 (emphasis added); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2620-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) ( ).
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