Raggio v. Richardson

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before CHARLES CARROLL, C.J., SWANN, J., and SPAET, HAROLD B.; CHARLES CARROLL
• Citation: Raggio v. Richardson, 218 So.2d 501 (Fla. App. 1969)
• Decision Date: 28 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 68--157,68--157
• Parties: Mary C. RAGGIO, formerly known as Mary C. Richardson, Appellant, v. Alice Irene RICHARDSON, as Administratrix of the Estate of Eugene C. Richardson, Jr., Appellee.

Page 501

218 So.2d 501

Mary C. RAGGIO, formerly known as Mary C. Richardson, Appellant, v. Alice Irene RICHARDSON, as Administratrix of the Estate of Eugene C. Richardson, Jr., Appellee.

No. 68--157.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 28, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1969.

Frank J. O'Connor and Robert M. Riddle, Miami, for appellant.

Kovner, Mannheimer & Greenfield, Horton & Schwartz, Miami, for appellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C.J., SWANN, J., and SPAET, HAROLD B., Associate Judge.

CHARLES CARROLL, Chief Judge.

This appeal, by one of the defendants below, is from a summary judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff.

On May 5, 1967, the plaintiff Alice Irene Richardson, widow of the decedent Eugene C. Richardson, Jr., acting in her capacity as administratrix of his estate, filed suit in the circuit court of Dade County against the appellant Mary C. Raggio, the former wife of the decedent, and against The Travelers Insurance Company, claiming on behalf of the estate the proceeds of a life insurance policy under which the appellant Mary C. Richardson (now Raggio) was the beneficiary at the time of death.

By the pleadings and evidence which were before the trial court on hearing appellee's motion for summary judgment, the following facts appeared. The appellant and the decedent had married in 1942. On May 31, 1962, the appellant filed a suit for divorce against the decedent. Six months later, at a time when the parties were separated and the divorce suit was still pending, they entered into a separation agreement, on November 8, 1962. The terms thereof provided that the residence of the parties and an automobile should be transferred to the wife, that the husband would retain his tools and personal belongings and that he would pay all bills which the parties had previously incurred. The agreement then provided that each party thereby released the other from claims Arising out of the marital relation, and that it would operate as a settlement of claim Then or theretofore existing between the parties. The language of the agreement as to the provisions just mentioned was as follows:

'IV. For and in consideration of the execution and delivery of the conveyances assignments and liens hereinafter described, each party hereby releases and relinquishes to the other all rights or claims of dower, curtesy, inheritance, descent, distribution, and all other rights or claims growing out of the marriage relations between them, and each shall be forever barred from all rights in the estate of the other party, real, personal or mixed, now owned or hereafter acquired, and that the wife does hereby agree to waive any and all alimony or support money now and hereafter.

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'X. That this is a complete settlement of any and all claims of whatever kind or nature now and heretofore existing between the parties, on account of their marriage or otherwise, and that this agreement is made freely and voluntarily on the part of each of the parties, without any compulsion, constraint, apprehension or fear of or from one to the other, and for the purpose of making a complete settlement of any and all claims whatsoever of the parties hereto, in or against the other, or his or her properties.'

On November 12, 1962, four days after the settlement agreement was entered into, the husband applied to The Travelers Insurance Company for a group life insurance policy, and on the application listed the appellant as the person to be named as beneficiary in the policy to be issued. Shortly thereafter, on November 21, 1962, a final decree of divorce was entered, which referred to and approved the agreement. On December 1, 1962, ten days after the entry of the divorce decree, the life insurance policy, naming the appellant (by then his former wife) as the beneficiary, was issued and was received by Richardson. On February 8, 1964, Richardson married the plaintiff Alice Richardson, and remained married to her until his death which occurred in April of 1967.

At the time of his death Richardson held another life insurance policy which he had acquired while married to the appellant, and on which the appellant also appeared as the beneficiary prior to and at the time of the decree of divorce. However, on July 17, 1964, approximately six months after Richardson remarried, he changed the beneficiary on the latter policy, substituting his new wife in place of the appellant as beneficiary. Richardson did not, prior to his death, change or attempt to change the beneficiary (appellant) on the policy involved here, which as above stated was issued to him after his divorce from the appellant.

In her suit as administratrix the appellee claimed the defendant-appellant was barred by the terms of their said agreement from receiving the proceeds of the policy in question. By answer the appellant admitted the agreement, denied that its terms covered or barred her right to the proceeds of the policy, and averred that decedent had intended the proceeds of the policy to be paid to her.

By stipulation of the parties to the suit the defendant Travelers Insurance Company paid over the proceeds of the policy to certain named trustees, to be deposited in an interest bearing account in a Miami saving bank, pending outcome of the contest therefor between the plaintiff and the defendant-appellant.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and after hearing thereon the trial court granted summary...