Raggs v. Pittsfield Charter Twp.
| Decision Date | 07 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-13946 |
| Parties | Derian Raggs, Plaintiff, v. Pittsfield Charter Township, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Following his arrest on October 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action against two officers who arrested him, along with Pittsfield Charter Township, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court shall GRANT Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and grant summary judgment in Defendants' favor as to Counts II, III, IV, V, and VI of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. That leaves only Count I, Plaintiff's § 1983 excessive force claim remaining.
The Court shall DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. As to Counts II through VI, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor, as explained below. As to Count I, the § 1983 excessive force claim, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment because, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Defendant Officers, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants used excessive force.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 excessive force claim, Count I, is the only claim that will proceed to a jury trial in this matter.
Plaintiff Derian Raggs ("Plaintiff" or "Raggs") filed this action on October 13, 2014. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Docket Entry No. 5), filed on December 2, 2014, is the operative complaint and it asserts claims against the following Defendants: 1) Matthew Kessler ("Kessler"); 2) Ryan Reppert ("Reppert"); and 3) Pittsfield Charter Township ("the Township"). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserts the following claims: 1) "Violation of the Fourth Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Excessive Force" (Count I); 2) "False Arrest/False Imprisonment" (Count II); 3) "Violation of Fourth Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Unreasonable Seizure Without Probable Cause" (Count III); 4) "Malicious Prosecution" (Count IV); 5) "Violation of the Fourth Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Malicious Prosecution" (Count V); and 6) "Pittsfield Charter Township's Constitutional Violations" (Count VI).
Following the close of discovery, both Plaintiff and Defendants filed summary judgment motions. Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to FRCP 56 Against Defendants Matthew Kessler and Ryan Reppert" (Docket Entry No. 26) and Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Docket Entry No. 23).
This Court's practice guidelines, which are expressly included in the Scheduling Order issued in this case, provide, consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) and (e), that:
In compliance with this Court's guidelines, in support of their Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants filed a "Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute" (Docket Entry No. 24) . In response to that submission, Plaintiff filed a "Counter-Statement of Disputed Facts" (Docket Entry No. 28 at 8-13) .
In support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Kessler and Reppert, Plaintiff filed a "Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute" (Docket Entry No. 26 at 9-12) ( ) but Defendants did not file a counter-statement responding to it.
Because the Court will be addressing Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment first, the Court includes here the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
In the early morning hours of May 13, 2012, Raggs arrived at his girlfriend's apartment at 4159 Chester Drive in Pittsfield Township, Michigan. (Defs.' and Pl.'s Stmt. A at ¶ 1).
At 3:20 a.m., the Pittsfield Township Public Safety Department received, via telephone, a noise complaint about a vehicle in the parking lot at the apartment complex. . The report indicates that the caller reported the noise was coming from a car in the parking lot but the caller could not identify the vehicle. (Id.).
Officer Kessler and Sergeant Reppert were both dispatched to the area of 4175 Chester Drive regarding the noise complaint. .
Kessler testified that dispatch did not advise him, and he therefore did not know, if the noise complaint was coming from a male, a female, or more than one person. He also did not have a description of the vehicle. (Kessler Dep. at 23-24; Ex. ). Kessler drove to the apartment complex at a normal rate of speed and did not activate the patrol car's lights or sirens. (Kessler Dep. at 26).
Kessler arrived at the apartment complex at 3:24 a.m. (Id.). When he first pulled into the parting lot, Kessler did not hear any music or noise. (Kessler Dep. at 30). But as he drove through the parking lot, Kessler was listening for music and looking for occupied cars or cars with loud stereos playing. (Kessler Dep. at 30).
Kessler heard the music before seeing Raggs in his car. (Kessler Dep. at 34). During his deposition, Kessler estimated that he first heard the music when he was between 50 and 75 feet away from Raggs's car. (Id. at 31-32). After hearing the music, Kessler used a spotlight and observed Raggs sitting in the driver's seat of his parked car. (Kessler Dep. at 34).
At this time, Raggs was the only person in the parking lot. That is, there were no other people in their vehicles or standing around. (Kessler Dep. at 31).
It is undisputed that Raggs was sitting in the driver's seat of his parked car, with the stereo on. (Raggs Dep. at 52-56). Raggs testified that he had his windows rolled down because he was smoking a cigar before entering the apartment, where his infant child was staying. (Raggs Dep. at 49-50). Raggs testified that his vehicle was still running when he exited it and the stereo was still playing. (Raggs Dep. at 55-56).
Kessler and Raggs then both exited their respective vehicles at about the same time. Raggs testified that he exited his vehicle because he wanted to see what was going on in the complex, as to why the police were there. (Raggs Dep. at 57).
Raggs testified that he spoke to Kessler first, which is reflected on an audio recording of the exchange. . That audio recording includes the following discernable exchange between Raggs and Kessler:
Raggs was the first to speak, saying to Kessler, (Def.'s Ex. 5 at 3:25.37). Kessler responded that someone had called about a noise complaint and asked to see Raggs's "ID." The conversation continued, with Kessler asking to see Raggs's ID and telling him he was investigating a noise complaint.
At approximately 3:26:09, Raggs said, "I don't give a fuck what you investigating, I told you if they heard music I just put it up." .
The situation is then heard escalating, without video of the encounter. It is undisputed that, at some point during the encounter, Plaintiff was tasered by one of the officers. Plaintiff was then arrested and taken to jail.
After the incident, Raggs was charged with two counts of resisting and obstructing. (Defs.' and Pl.'s Stmt. A at ¶ 19).
The district court concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Raggs on the night in question. At the preliminary examination, the district court bound Raggs over on those two counts of "Assaulting/Resisting/Obstructing, a violation of MCL 750.81d." (Ex. 6 to Defs.' Br. at 4).
The Washtenaw County Circuit Court (Judge Melinda Morris), however, disagreed with the probable cause ruling by the district court and ultimately granted Raggs's motion to quash the information. (Id.)
In Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants concede that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Count I, Plaintiff's excessive force claim. But Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor as to all other counts.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish: 1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; 2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Dominguez v. Correctional Medical Services, 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009).
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability from civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established...
To continue reading
Request your trial