Ragin v. Nw. R. Co. Of South Carolina, (No. 10139.)

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: WATTS
• Citation: 98 S.E. 286
• Parties: RAGIN . v. NORTHWESTERN R. CO. OF SOUTH CAROLINA et al.
• Docket Number: (No. 10139.)
• Decision Date: 28 January 1919

98 S.E. 286

RAGIN .
v.
NORTHWESTERN R. CO. OF SOUTH CAROLINA et al.

(No. 10139.)

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 28, 1919.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Clarendon County; John S. Wilson, Judge.

[98 S.E. 287]

Action by C. H. Ragin against the Northwestern Railroad Company of South Carolina and Henry W. Frost & Co. From orders of trial court overruling demurrer to the complaint and ordering its amendment so as to show a joint obligation of defendants, and dismissing complaint on failure to so amend, plaintiff and Henry W. Frost & Co. both appeal. Affirmed as to plaintiff, and reversed as to defendant Frost & Co.

Purdy & O'Bryan, of Manning, and Frank R. Frost, of Charleston, for appellants.

J. J. Cantey, of Summerton, for respondent.

WATTS, J. The appeal involved in this case is from orders of his honor, Judge Wilson. Both plaintiff and defendant Henry W. Frost & Co. appeal from said orders of his honor. The issues in this case are the "aftermath" of the case between same parties in the case reported in 10S S. C. 171, 93 S. E. 860. After that opinion was filed the plaintiff asked and was granted a nonsuit in the magistrate's court, and commenced the present action in the court of common pleas. Henry W. Frost & Co. appealed from the orders of Judge Wilson dated June 25, 1918, respectively, and C. H. Ragin appealed also from the order of date July 26, 1918.

The first, second, and fourth of Henry W. Frost & Co.'s exceptions raise the question whether the plaintiff has complied with Judge Wilson's order, and alleged a joint obligation between the defendants. If he has not done so, then he does not state a cause of action against Frost & Co. Under the facts of the former decision in this case, there is not a particle of doubt that there never was a joint possession of the bale of cotton, the subject-matter of the suit, or a joint tort between the railroad and Frost & Co. If the railroad received the cotton as a common carrier consigned to Frost & Co., and delivered it to Frost, then its liability ceased, for the railroad had then done as it had contracted to do. If Frost received the cotton and failed to account, then Frost & Co. would be liable. The undisputed evidence in the former case shows that the railroad delivered the cotton to Frost & Co., and that Frost & Co., according to the allegation of the complaint, accounted in part.

There is no sufficient allegation that there was a joint conversion. A mere suggestion, an allegation to...