Ragland v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty. Thomas J. Dart

• Decision Date: 10 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15 C 173,15 C 173
• Parties: DONALD RAGLAND, Plaintiff, v. THE SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY THOMAS J. DART, COOK COUNTY CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BAILEY, and the COUNTY OF COOK, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

DONALD RAGLAND, Plaintiff, v. THE SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY THOMAS J. DART,COOK COUNTY CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BAILEY, andthe COUNTY OF COOK, Defendants.

No. 15 C 173

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

February 10, 2016

Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER

PlaintiffDonald Ragland, formerly a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Jail(the "Jail"), filed suit against the Sheriff of Cook CountyThomas J. Dart("Dart") in his official capacity only, Cook County Correctional Officer Bailey, and the County of Cook("Cook County").¹Ragland, who has a permanent trachea, complains that Dart and Cook County acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs while he was at the Jail.Ragland also brings state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), negligence, and indemnification.²Dart and Cook County have moved to dismiss Ragland's first amended complaint.Because Ragland has not adequately alleged a Monell claim against Dart or Cook County, Ragland's § 1983 claim is dismissed without prejudice.As this is the only basisRagland has asserted for the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, Ragland must file a second amended complaint to remain in federal court.In filing an amended complaint, Ragland should also amend his IIED claim, as his currently pleaded IIED claim fails to sufficiently set forth a basis to hold Dart Cook County directly liable for the alleged extreme and outrageous conduct.Finally, the Court does not reach Dart and Cook County's immunity arguments because they are not sufficiently presented and are affirmative defenses more appropriately considered at a later stage.

BACKGROUND³

Ragland, a pretrial detainee at the Jail from April 18 through December 4, 2014, was housed in a Residential Therapy Unit of Division 8-3W.Division 8-3W is a part of Cermak Health Services ("Cermak") and intended for those detainees requiring medical, surgical, or psychological care.Ragland was placed in Division 8-3W because of his permanent trachea.On June 2, 2014, Ragland complained to Dr. Andrew Defuniak, a doctor employed by Cermak who worked at the Jail, that he was experiencing pain and discomfort with his permanent trachea and that its opening was drying out and closing.Dr. Defuniak prescribed a humidifier for Ragland.But Cook County Sheriff's Office employees did not provide Ragland with a humidifier, even though he had a prescription and filed a formal grievance requesting the humidifier on June 7.

Later that year, on November 23, Ragland was conducting routine maintenance on his tracheotomy tube when it began to bleed uncontrollably.Ragland had to be transported to the Cook County Stroger Hospital for emergency surgery to reopen the tracheotomy tube opening.About a week later, on December 1, 2014, Division 8-3W was painted.In order for Ragland'scell to be painted, Correctional Officer Bailey ordered Ragland to leave his cell.Painters wearing masks to protect themselves from inhaling the paint fumes then painted Ragland's cell.About an hour later, Bailey ordered Ragland back to his cell.Shortly thereafter, Ragland began having difficulty breathing through his trachea and experienced nausea, shortness of breath, dizziness, and lightheadedness.He also vomited.Although Ragland complained to Cook County correctional officers, including Bailey, they ignored his complaints.When he was still experiencing these issues the following day, Nurse Perez, a Cermak employee, informed Dr. Defuniak of Ragland's medical condition.Dr. Defuniak determined that Ragland's symptoms were caused by the paint fumes and provided Ragland with intravenous fluids and nausea medication.But when Dr. Defuniak released Ragland approximately two hours later, Cook County Sheriff's Office employees placed him in the same freshly painted cell.Ragland remained there until he was transferred to Stateville Correctional Center on December 4, 2014.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits.Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520(7th Cir.1990).In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor.AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614(7th Cir.2011).To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim's basis but must also be facially plausible.Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868(2009);see alsoBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929(2007)."A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleadsfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

ANALYSIS

I.Section 1983 Claim(Count I)

Dart and Cook County move to dismiss Ragland's § 1983 claim against them, arguing that Ragland has failed to properly allege a viable Monell claim.Ragland may hold Cook County and Dart in his official capacity liable under § 1983 when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury."Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611(1978).Liability may be based on (1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) a constitutional injury caused by a person with final policy making authority.McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324(7th Cir.2000).

Ragland alleges that Dart and Cook County acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice sanctioned by an individual with final policy making authority.⁴Doc. 11 ¶ 46.According to Ragland's response to the motion to dismiss, he is challenging three policies or practices: (1) the failure to maintain a grievance system or other procedure to address medical needs in a timely fashion, (2) the failure to provide restorative care, and (3) the creation of an atmosphere in which corrections officersand medical personnel are encouraged to disregard serious medical needs.Doc. 18at 7.As Ragland does not allege that any of these were express policies, the Court proceeds to analyze Ragland's claim under the second avenue of establishing Monell liability.To allege a widespread practice, Ragland must allege that the relevant official (here, Dart) was "'deliberately indifferent as to [the] known or obvious consequences'" of the alleged practice, i.e. that Dart was "aware of the risk created by the custom or practice and . . . failed to take appropriate steps to protect the plaintiff."Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 303(7th Cir.2009)(alteration in original)(quotingGable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537(7th Cir.2002)).Ragland must also allege that the policy or custom was the "moving force" behind the constitutional deprivation.Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. County of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514(7th Cir.2007).

Although Monell claims may proceed with conclusory allegations of a policy or practice, some facts must be pleaded to put the defendant on notice of the alleged wrongdoing.Armour v. Country Club Hills, No. 11 C 5029, 2014 WL 63850, at *6(N.D. Ill.Jan. 8, 2014)(citingMcCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616(7th Cir.2011), andRiley v. County of Cook, 682 F. Supp. 2d 856, 861(N.D. Ill.2010)).Here, Ragland's allegations of Cook County's and the Sheriff's Office's policy or practice are vague and broad, lacking in sufficient detail to put Dart and Cook County on notice of the claim against them.SeeMikolon v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 1852, 2014 WL 7005257, at *4-5(N.D. Ill.Dec. 11, 2014)(dismissingMonell claims that contained "only boilerplate conclusions, not well-pleaded facts," noting that the claim "approaches too closely a claim that seeks to hold the City responsible for all official actions of its employees").Nor has Ragland alleged sufficient facts to suggest that the conditions would have come to Dart's attention.SeeTorres v. Dart, No. 14 C 6258, 2015 WL 4379890, at *4(N.D. Ill.July 16, 2015)(allegations must demonstrate that incidents would have come to attention of policymakers).Although in his response Ragland cites to the Department of Justice's 2008 report involving medical care, which may involve such information, the wide-ranging reference to the document, without specific references to the policies and practices alleged in this case, is not sufficient to support Ragland's claim.SeeHarper v. Dart, No. 14 C 01237, 2015 WL 6407577, at *3(N.D. Ill.Oct. 21, 2015)(although "it might have been appropriate for [plaintiff] to rely on specific factual allegations in the Justice Department complaint," because plaintiff did not bring specific allegations to the court's attention, the court would not rely on the Justice Department's complaint or sift through it on its own to find support for plaintiff's attempted Monell claim).

Moreover, a plaintiff pursing a widespread policy or practice claim generally must allege more than one or even three instances of misconduct.Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303(declining to adopt a "bright-line rule[ ]" but indicating that there must be "more than one instance, or even three" of wrongdoing (citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted));Armour, 2014 WL 63850, at *6("[A] single isolated incident of wrongdoing by a nonpolicymaker is generally insufficient to establish municipal...