Ragland v. State

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: LITTLE, J.
• Citation: Ragland v. State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 S.E. 682 (Ga. 1900)
• Decision Date: 11 July 1900
• Parties: RAGLAND v. STATE.

36 S.E. 682

111 Ga. 211

RAGLAND v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 11, 1900

Syllabus by the Court.

1. It is not, without a request to do so, obligatory on the judge presiding in the trial of a criminal case to give in charge to the jury the law applicable to a theory of the defense raised alone by the statement of the accused. Yet, when a given charge is directed to a theory raised by the defendant's statement, it should fully and distinctly cover the theory so raised. (a) Whether an advance by one man armed with a stick on another in the nighttime, and declining to stop when called on to do so, constitute circumstances equivalent to an assault, so as to authorize a homicide to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter, is a question for the jury.

2. One may lawfully kill another who is attempting by violence or surprise to commit a felony on his person, and this is true whatever may be the grade of the attempted felony. It is therefore error, after correctly charging that a bare fear of the offense is not sufficient to justify the killing, but that it must appear that the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man that a felony was about to be committed on his person, and that the party killing really acted under the influence of these fears, and not in a spirit of revenge, for the judge to add, "So, to a person killing in his defense, it must appear that the danger was so urgent and pressing at the time of the killing that in order to save his own life the killing of the other was absolutely necessary." etc. The language quoted is the law of justifiable homicide in cases of mutual combat only and has no connection whatever with the law of homicide to prevent the commission of a felony on the person of the slayer.

Error from superior court, Clayton county; J. S. Candler, Judge.

John Ragland was convicted of murder, and brings error. Reversed.

John B Hutcheson and John D. Humphries, for plaintiff in error.

W. T Kimsey, Sol. Gen., and J. M. Terrell, Atty. Gen., for the State.

LITTLE J.

Ragland was indicted for the murder of Blessett by shooting him with a pistol, which, it is alleged, was committed in the county of Clayton on February 1, 1900. The accused was convicted and sentenced to be hanged. He made a motion for a new trial on a number of grounds, which was overruled, and he excepted. Such portions of the evidence as are necessary to be referred to are stated in the opinion. The first three grounds are those usually found in motions for new trial under the practice which has grown up in this state,--that is, "that the verdict is contrary to evidence, and without evidence to support it; that the verdict is decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence; that it is contrary to law and the principles of justice and equity." When the first of these grounds appears in a motion, it seems that the insertion of the two latter are certainly unnecessary and could readily be omitted. These stereotyped grounds appear without any good reason, in almost every motion for a new trial we are called on to consider. All others which seek to attack the verdict in a general way might well be omitted, without endangering the case of the plaintiff in error in this regard; and it may not be amiss, in this connection, to observe that, especially in a criminal case, a ground of the motion that a verdict "is contrary to the principles of justice and equity," is altogether superfluous. The justice which one charged with crime is entitled to invoke is the law of the land. He has no equity. His guilt or innocence must be determined by the evidence for and against him. So far as this record discloses, there was no eyewitness to the shooting which resulted in the death of Blessett; and as to what transpired at the time of the shooting the jury was left to determine from the statement made by the deceased after he was shot, and the statement and admissions of the accused. It appears from the testimony of the father of the deceased: That the younger members of his household had been out to a party that night, and had returned home, where he was. That about 1 o'clock the same night his deceased son came home and told him that he was shot. Witness sent for a physician. He had a conversation with his son before he went for the physician, and repeatedly during the week which he lived afterwards. The statement made in these conversations was that the accused shot deceased in the road, at or near a certain oak tree, as he was coming out of a gate; that the accused called to him and said, "Stop there," and in return he called, saying, "Hello, John;" that accused again said "Stop," and then shot him. The deceased further stated in his conversation to this witness that after he was shot he spoke to the accused, and the accused said to him, "God damn you! Why didn't you speak?" The tree and gate referred to in the statement of the deceased, the witness testified, were about 60 or 70 yards from his (the witness) house, and about 50 yards from Fannie McIntosh's house, in Clayton county. The statement made on his trial by the accused was to the effect that he was at a supper at a certain church; that the deceased and quite a number of other persons were there; that after the supper he went home with a girl named Fannie McIntosh; that after arriving at her house he pulled off his shoes and remained there some time; that he was induced to pull off his shoes by request of the McIntosh woman, she giving as a reason that deceased would speak about his presence at her house; that when he left he walked out of the house without his shoes, and, going down the steps on the west side of the house, he discovered a man in the corner of the chimney, about 15 feet from him; that he immediately...