Ragnone v. Porter Cnty.

• Decision Date: 25 September 2015
• Docket Number: NO. 2:13-CV-164,2:13-CV-164
• Parties: DAVID RAGNONE, Plaintiff, v. PORTER COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Indiana, DAVID LAIN, in his capacity as the Sheriff of Porter County, Indiana, MARY GAYDOS, in her capacity as an officer in the Porter County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

DAVID RAGNONE, Plaintiff,
v.
PORTER COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Indiana, DAVID LAIN,
in his capacity as the Sheriff of Porter County, Indiana, MARY GAYDOS,
in her capacity as an officer in the Porter County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.

NO. 2:13-CV-164

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION

September 25, 2015

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants Porter County, David Lain, and Mary Gaydos, on October 24, 2014 (DE # 24). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion (DE # 24) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Counts II, III, X, and XI are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in their entirety. Counts I, IV, V, VI, VII against Defendant Porter County are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Counts V, VI, and VII against defendants Lain and Gaydos personally are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This case remains pending as to Count I against defendants Lain and Gaydos in their official capacities, Count IV against Defendant Lain in his official capacity, Counts V, VI, and

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VII under a respondeat superior theory of liability, and Counts VIII and IX.

BACKGROUND

In 2013, Plaintiff David Ragnone ("Ragnone") filed this action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against Defendants Porter County, David Lain ("Lain") in his capacity as Sheriff of Porter County, and Mary Gaydos ("Gaydos") in her capacity as an officer of the Porter County Sheriff's Department (together, "Defendants"), alleging federal claims of excessive force, denial and delay of medical attention, and inadequate supervision and training. Ragnone also raised several state law claims. After the close of discovery, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on October 24, 2014. (DE# 24.) Ragnone filed his response to Defendants' motion on January 5, 2015. (DE# 30.) Defendants filed their reply to the motion on January 19, 2015. (DE# 32.)

DISCUSSION

Standard

Summary judgment must be granted when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a

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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). "However, our favor toward the nonmoving party does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture." Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

While the movant bears the initial burden of production to inform the district court why a trial is not necessary, these requirements "are not onerous" where the nonmovant "bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on a particular issue." Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013). A party may move for summary judgment based on either "affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim" or by "asserting that the nonmoving party's evidence [is] insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Id. at 1169 (citation and internal quotations omitted). A party

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opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely on allegations or denials in his own pleading, but rather, must "marshal and present the court with the evidence [he] contends will prove [his] case." Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an essential element on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).

Material Facts

In early May 2011, Ragnone was arrested on an invasion of privacy charge and held without bond at the Porter County Jail ("Jail"). (Compl. ¶ 10.)¹ On May 15, 2011, Ragnone verbally argued with another inmate while in a pod area of the Jail. (DE# 25-2 (Incident Report 11-1054).) Corrections officers asked Ragnone to step into the hallway to speak with them regarding the argument. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 8).) Gaydos advised Ragnone that he would be going to the disciplinary pod to serve a twenty-three hour lockdown for arguing in violation of the Jail's rules. (Id.) According to Gaydos, Ragnone became "irate and very

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aggressive" with the officers upon hearing this information, and refused to go to the disciplinary pod. (Id.) Ragnone testified at his deposition that he told the officers that he would not go to the disciplinary pod "willingly," and that if they took him there, he would "put up a fight," so they had a "better chance" of putting him into the "chair," meaning the Jail's Emergency Restraint Chair ("ERC"). (DE# 30-1 at 19-20; DE# 25-4 at 2.) Ragnone attests that he was not irate or aggressive, and asserts that he was not verbally or physically aggressive to the officers. (DE# 30-3 (Ragnone 2d Aff. ¶ 2).)

Gaydos attests that two officers escorted Ragnone to the disciplinary pod, where Ragnone allegedly said that he would "bash his head against the wall," became emotional, and started to cry. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 8).) Upon hearing Ragnone's statement, Gaydos determined that he needed to be placed in the ERC to prevent him from harming himself. (Id.) Ragnone attests that Gaydos decided to place him in the ERC immediately upon his objection to going to the disciplinary pod, not while being transported there. (DE# 30-3 (Ragnone Aff. ¶ 2).) He denied threatening to harm himself or the officers. (DE# 30-1 at 4-5, 32.)

Gaydos asserts that she followed the requirements under the Jail's SOP 07-12 Section II, "Using the Emergency Restraint Chair," when she decided to place Ragnone in the ERC, and when she secured him in the ERC. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 16); see id. at 21 (Jail

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SOP 07-12).) The ERC contains a lap belt, wrist straps, shoulder straps, and ankle straps. (Id. at 22-23.) The shoulder straps are to be fastened "by passing the free ends over the shoulders and under the armpits, and securing the free ends to the shoulder strap clevises located on the back of the ERC, then tighten[ing] by pulling down on the should strap handle." (Id. at 23.) Gaydos attests that the Jail's officers are trained to make sure the ERC's shoulder straps do not go around the inmate's chest, head or neck. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 6).)

After securing Ragnone in the ERC, Gaydos claims that she initiated a 15-minute observation log for Ragnone, pursuant to which Ragnone was observed every fifteen minutes. (Id. ¶ 9).) According to Defendants, various members of the Jail staff checked on Ragnone between 10:45 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. when he was released from the ERC. (Id.; DE# 25-3 at 32 (Ragnone Observation Log, May 15, 2011).) Gaydos states that she performed a restraint check on Ragnone at 1:00 p.m. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 10).) She claims that Ragnone asked to remain in the ERC, which she noted in the observation log. (Id.; DE# 25-3 at 32.)

Ragnone testified that after fifteen minutes into his confinement in the ERC, he told Gaydos that something was wrong and he could not breathe, and that she responded by tightening the straps. (DE# 30-1 9, 22, 28-29.) Ragnone testified that he began to notice breathing difficulties when the straps were put on, and

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that after Gaydos tightened the straps, he experienced pain that seemed to get worse. (Id. at 22, 27.) Gaydos claims that Ragnone never indicated that the straps were too tight or that he had trouble breathing or chest pain. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 10, 13, 17).)

Gaydos attests that she checked on Ragnone around 2:00 p.m. with a nurse who took his vital signs, though he refused to perform the range of motion exercise. (Id. ¶ 11.) Ragnone testified that during his time in the ERC, he was not seen by any medical personnel, and was monitored only through a window, not in person, with the exception of someone offering him lunch, which he declined because he couldn't breathe. (DE# 30-1 at 9-10.) Ragnone was released from the ERC around 2:30 p.m., and placed in a padded cell. (DE# 25-3 (Gaydos Aff. ¶ 12.) Ragnone testified that he was first seen by medical personnel after he was out of the ERC, at 3:30 p.m. (DE# 30-1 at 9-10.)

Ragnone testified that his pain was reduced after he left the ERC, but gradually escalated as the afternoon progressed into the night. (Id. at 23.) By 9:30 or 10:00 p.m., he had to hold his hands above his head continuously in order to breathe, and was unable to sit or lie down, or do anything other than stand with his hands elevated, for approximately three hours. (Id. at 23-24.) At approximately 11:30 p.m., Ragnone reported to Corrections Officer Dobson ("Dobson") that he...