Ragsdale v. Fishler

• Decision Date: 05 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20180993,20180993
• Citation: 491 P.3d 835
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: Kristi RAGSDALE, Appellant/Cross-appellee, v. George FISHLER, Appellee/Cross-appellant.

491 P.3d 835

Kristi RAGSDALE, Appellant/Cross-appellee,

v.George FISHLER, Appellee/Cross-appellant.

No. 20180993

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard April 10, 2020

Filed August 5, 2020

Stacy J. McNeill, James C. Dunkelberger, Salt Lake City, for appellant/cross-appellee

Karthik Nadesan, Salt Lake City, for appellee/cross-appellant

Chief Justice Durrant authored the opinion of the Court, in which Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Pearce, Justice Petersen, and Judge Hagen joined.

AMENDED OPINION¹

Chief Justice Durrant, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶1 Kristi Ragsdale runs Eva Carlston Academy (ECA), a residential treatment program for young women in a Salt Lake City suburb. Her neighbor, George Fishler, strongly objects to ECA's presence in his neighborhood. He expresses this objection by placing provocative signs in his yard, and by flipping off and swearing at Ms. Ragsdale and others entering or exiting ECA. In response to this behavior, Ms. Ragsdale sought a civil stalking injunction against Mr. Fishler. The district court denied both this injunction and Mr. Fishler's request for attorney fees. Both parties now appeal.

¶2 On appeal, Ms. Ragsdale raises three issues. First, she claims the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Fishler did not stalk her, because he directed his conduct toward ECA as a business. We reverse and remand on this issue because, in ruling that Mr. Fishler's conduct was ultimately directed at ECA, the district court misinterpreted the stalking statute.

¶3 Second, Ms. Ragsdale claims the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Fishler did not stalk her based on its finding that Mr. Fishler's conduct would not cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or emotional distress. We reverse and remand on this issue as well. The district court failed to assess the impact of Mr. Fishler's conduct on a reasonable person in Ms. Ragsdale's circumstances.

¶4 Third, Ms. Ragsdale argues that the district court improperly denied her injunction on the grounds that the First Amendment protects Mr. Fishler's conduct. We reverse and remand here, too, because the district court applied an incorrect First Amendment analysis.

¶5 Fourth, on cross-appeal, Mr. Fishler argues that the district court erred in denying his attorney-fees request. Because our reversal of the first three issues may affect the basis for the district court's attorney-fees decision, we vacate that decision and remand for a new determination.

Background

¶6 Ms. Ragsdale is the founder and executive director of the Eva Carlston Academy, an inpatient treatment facility for young women recovering from severe depression and anxiety. She operates ECA at the end of a cul-de-sac in a Salt Lake City suburb. When she launched ECA in 2013, some neighbors feared it would increase noise and traffic in the neighborhood. Several neighbors distributed flyers and petitioned their local community council in an attempt to stop ECA from opening. But they were ultimately unsuccessful.

¶7 George Fishler was one of these neighbors. He owns the home directly south of ECA. After his initial efforts to stop ECA failed, he began protesting the facility directly. To that end, he put two sets of signs in his yard, one reading "TROUBLED TEEN MONEY MACHINE BECOME DISABLED FOR ONLY $10,000/MONTH" and the other reading "DELIVER US FROM EVA." He pointed one set toward the street and the other toward ECA. He also began flipping off and swearing at employees, clients, and anyone else involved with ECA.

¶8 This behavior continued for the next four years. Throughout this period, Ms. Ragsdale claims Mr. Fishler would flip her off whenever she left ECA. She also claims that over time, he became more assertive, coming out of his garage to say things like "fuck you," "fuck off," or "go fuck yourself," or waiting in his car to accost Ms. Ragsdale as she left ECA. Ms. Ragsdale also claims Mr. Fishler would call her and the young women staying at ECA "fucking bitches," "little bitches," "little assholes," and would tell them to "run away, little assholes." Many of these interactions happened when Ms. Ragsdale was the only person in Mr. Fishler's presence. And on several occasions, Mr. Fishler's conduct prompted Ms. Ragsdale to call the police.

¶9 In June 2017, Ms. Ragsdale sought a civil stalking injunction against Mr. Fishler under Utah Code section 77-3a-101(2) (2017).² The district court issued an ex parte injunction on June 19, 2017. Mr. Fishler then requested an evidentiary hearing under Utah Code section 77-3a-101(6) (2017), which the district court held on July 27 and August 2, 2017.

¶10 At this hearing, Ms. Ragsdale testified about Mr. Fishler's conduct and the emotional distress she experienced as a result. She testified that she suffered anxiety, sleeplessness, and nausea, and installed automatic locks on ECA's doors out of fear of Mr. Fishler. In response, Mr. Fishler argued that his conduct amounted to a peaceful protest against ECA. This protest, he claimed, did not meet the statutory definition of stalking and was protected by the First Amendment.

¶11 Ms. Ragsdale also requested that the district court expand its ex parte injunction. In so doing, she submitted a proposed injunction with four distinct provisions. The first was a "Personal Conduct Order" barring Mr. Fishler from conduct that meets the legal definition of stalking. The second was a "No Contact Order" preventing Mr. Fishler from contacting Ms. Ragsdale, her coworkers, and her clients as they entered or exited ECA. The third was a "Stay Away Order" directing Mr. Fishler to stay away from ECA. And the fourth was a form of miscellaneous relief, titled "Other Orders," requiring Mr. Fishler to take down his derogatory yard signs.

¶12 Following the hearing, the district court denied Ms. Ragsdale's request for a permanent injunction. It held that even though Mr. Fishler's conduct was "offensive, upsetting, rude[,]" and "abhorrent," it did not constitute stalking. According to the district court, Mr. Fishler did not direct his conduct at Ms. Ragsdale but toward ECA as a business. And even if he had, the district court held, his conduct would not cause a reasonable person in Ms. Ragsdale's circumstances to suffer fear or emotional distress. "In this day and age," explained the district court, "exposure to pejorative gestures and profanity should not cause the type of significant mental or emotional distress envisioned by the [stalking] statute." The district court also denied Ms. Ragsdale's injunction on the grounds that Mr. Fishler's conduct was protected by the First Amendment.

¶13 Afterwards, Mr. Fishler moved for attorney fees under the civil stalking statute. In between the evidentiary hearing and this motion, the judge who denied Ms. Ragsdale's injunction retired, and a new judge was assigned to rule on Mr. Fishler's fee request. This new judge noted she was "at somewhat of a disadvantage" in ruling on Mr. Fishler's motion, because she did not preside over the evidentiary hearing and was making her decision from a "cold record." After oral argument, the district court denied this request, finding that the equities weighed in favor of denial because the case had been "fact-sensitive," "complicated," and did not lack "all merit."

¶14 Both parties now appeal. We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).

Standards of Review

¶15 The parties raise four issues on appeal. First, we must decide whether the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Fishler did not direct his conduct at Ms. Ragsdale. We review this conclusion for correctness.³

¶16 Second, we must decide whether the district court erred in finding that Mr. Fishler's conduct would not cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or emotional distress. Although this is a question of fact that we review for clear error, we review the district court's interpretation of the underlying legal standard for correctness.⁴

¶17 Third, we must determine whether the district court incorrectly denied Ms. Ragsdale's injunction on the grounds that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects Mr. Fishler's conduct. We review the interpretation of the federal constitution for correctness.⁵

¶18 Finally, we must decide if the district court erred in denying Mr. Fishler's motion for attorney fees. When a statute "grants discretion to [district] courts to assess attorney fees, if appropriate, after considering the facts of the case," we review that assessment for abuse of discretion.⁶

Analysis

¶19 This case presents four issues. Ms. Ragsdale raises three in her direct appeal and Mr. Fishler raises one on cross-appeal.

¶20 First, Ms. Ragsdale claims the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Fishler's conduct was not "directed at" her, but toward ECA as a business.⁷ We agree. The district court based its conclusion on a misunderstanding of the stalking statute. So we reverse and remand for application of the correct standard.

¶21 Second, Ms. Ragsdale claims the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Fishler's conduct would not cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or emotional distress. Again, we agree. The district court did not properly assess the impact of Mr. Fishler's conduct on a reasonable person in Ms. Ragsdale's circumstances. So we reverse and remand on this issue as well.

¶22 Third, Ms. Ragsdale claims the district court incorrectly denied her injunction on the grounds that Mr. Fishler's conduct is "political speech" protected by the First Amendment. We reverse here as well. Although Mr. Fishler is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, that protection does not exempt him from being enjoined from conduct that meets the definition of stalking. So we remand with instructions for the district court to conduct a new First Amendment analysis consistent with this opinion.

¶23 Finally, Mr. Fishler argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for attorney fees under the civil stalking statute. Because we...