Ragsdale v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 08 October 1884
• Docket Number: 11,581
• Citation: 97 Ind. 458
• Parties: Ragsdale et al. v. Mitchell
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

97 Ind. 458

Ragsdale et al. v. Mitchell

No. 11,581

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 8, 1884

From the Lawrence Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the complaint.

G. W Friedley, E. D. Pearson and S.D. Luckett, for appellants.

M. F Dunn and G. G. Dunn, for appellee.

OPINION

Elliott, C. J.

The appellee's complaint alleges that he purchased at public sale certain lands; that the sale was made by Davis Harrison, assignee of William Ragsdale, bankrupt; that under the order of the United States Circuit Court the money was to be applied, first, upon the debt of the North-Western Mutual Insurance Company as a prior lien; and, secondly, upon the debt of the appellee, whose claim had been declared a preferred lien, on the ground that it was for the purchase-money of the land; that the amount of the preferred liens named was $ 16,000, and that the land sold for $ 12,000, leaving unpaid a part of the appellee's debt. It is further alleged that the "plaintiff now holds the land in law and equity discharged of and free from all claims and liens of said Ragsdale and wife," and that the wife claims an inchoate interest in the land.

The title of the appellee is specifically described, and as he can only recover according to the allegations of his pleading, he must recover upon the title pleaded. It may not be necessary to specifically describe a title, but when the pleader does describe one title, and does describe it specifically as the only title upon which he relies, his recovery must be had upon his title as laid. Stephen Pl. 304; Sedg. & Wait Trial of Title, section 343. According to the statements of the complaint, the title which the plaintiff purchased was such, and such only, as the sale and conveyance by the assignee could transfer, and if this title is sufficient to cut off the rights of the wife, then the complaint is good, otherwise it is not; for as this is the title specifically described and exclusively relied on, the recovery must be had upon that or not at all.

A conclusion of law thrown into a complaint can not control the specific statements of facts; nor can a conclusion from facts stated in general terms control; on the contrary, the specific statement rules the pleading. Reynolds v. Copeland, 71 Ind. 422; Richardson v. Snider, 72 Ind. 425 (37 Am. R. 168); State v. Wenzel, 77 Ind. 428, vide authorities, p. 430; McMahan v. Newcomer, 82 Ind. 565; Keepfer v. Force, 86 Ind. 81; Petty v. Trustees, etc., 95 Ind. 278.

The statement that the appellee holds "the land in law and equity discharged of and free from all claims and liens of said Ragsdale and wife," is a mere general conclusion of law, and does not exert a controlling influence upon the pleading. Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 96; Platter v. City of Seymour, 86 Ind. 323; Boyd v. Olvey, 82 Ind. 294; Kimble v. Christie, 55 Ind. 140.

The facts pleaded do not show that the appellee has a right to hold the land free from all claims of the appellants. The rights of Mrs. Ragsdale were not divested by the sale made by the assignee of her husband; on the contrary, that sale vested in her the right in the land cast upon her by the statute as the wife of the bankrupt. Roberts v. Shroyer, 68 Ind. 64; Jackman v. Nowling, 69 Ind. 188; Ketchum v. Schicketanz, 73 Ind. 137; McCracken v. Kuhn, 73 Ind. 149; Haggerty v. Byrne, 75 Ind. 499; Leary v. Shaffer, 79 Ind. 567, vide p. 570; Keck v. Noble, 86 Ind. 1; Mattill v. Baas, 89 Ind. 220. The appellee could not and did not acquire a title superior to that of Mrs. Ragsdale by the sale made by the assignee, and, therefore, can not divest her of all right and interest by force of the title derived from that source. All that the conveyance of the assignee transferred was the title of the husband; it did not carry that of the wife.

The judgment of the United States Court, ordering the sale of the property and directing how the proceeds should be distributed, did not destroy the rights of Mrs. Ragsdale, for the very plain reason that she was not a party to the proceeding. We suppose it to be perfectly clear that the rights of a wife are not affected by a judgment rendered in a suit to which she was not a party.

We have shown that the sale made by the assignee of the husband did not divest her title, and have also shown that her rights were not impaired by the judgment of the Federal Court; she has, therefore, still some title to the land. As she has, as appears from the facts pleaded, title to the estate she claimed, it is difficult to perceive any ground upon which the action can be maintained. It is not necessary to decide what her title or interest is; it is enough to defeat such an action as this to show that she has some title. It can not be possible that title can be quieted upon a complaint showing on its face that the defendants have an interest in the land, since this would be to vest all title in the plaintiff, although it appears that the defendant has also some interest in the land which he has a right to have preserved and protected.

The action to quiet title provided by the statute is an extension of the equity doctrine, which settled titles under a proceeding called a bill of peace. Curtis v Sutter, 15 Cal. 259; Green v. Glynn, 71 Ind. 336. Under the equity rule, a bill of peace would lie only where the complainant was in possession; but under the statute an action may be maintained by an owner...