Ragsdale v. State, 89657

• Decision Date: 15 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 89657,89657
• Citation: 720 So.2d 203
• Parties: 23 Fla. L. Weekly S544 Edward Eugene RAGSDALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 203

720 So.2d 203

23 Fla. L. Weekly S544

Edward Eugene RAGSDALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 89657.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 15, 1998.

Todd G. Scher, Chief Assistant CCR, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Southern Region, Miami, and Jennifer M. Corey, Assistant CCR, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Middle Region, Tampa, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Edward Eugene Ragsdale appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to vacate judgment and sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we affirm in part and reverse in part the order denying relief.

In 1986, Edward Eugene Ragsdale and Leon Illig were arrested for the armed robbery and first-degree murder of Ernest Mace (the victim). The victim had been badly beaten and his throat had been slit. Illig pleaded nolo contendere and received a sentence of life imprisonment. Illig invoked the Fifth Amendment when called to testify at Ragsdale's trial. Ragsdale admitted striking the victim and cutting him with a knife but asserted that Illig inflicted the fatal cut. Three individuals testified at trial that Ragsdale admitted he had committed the murder.

Ragsdale was convicted as charged and the jury recommended death by an eight-to-four vote. The trial judge followed that recommendation, finding no factors in mitigation and three factors in aggravation: (1) that the murder was committed while Ragsdale was on parole (under sentence of imprisonment); (2) that the murder was committed during a robbery and for monetary gain; and (3) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. The facts of the crimes are set forth in more detail in Ragsdale v. State, 609 So.2d 10 (Fla.1992).

After our opinion in Ragsdale, a dispute arose between Ragsdale and the state attorney regarding Ragsdale's public records request. The state attorney provided Ragsdale with certain records but claimed exemptions as to others. After reviewing the materials in camera, the trial judge denied Ragsdale's request for the remaining documents in a one-paragraph order.

After a hearing before the trial court on the issue of whether Ragsdale was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any of the issues raised in the 3.850 motion, the trial judge denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. After the trial judge entered the order denying relief, Ragsdale moved to disqualify the judge based on the judge's allegedly biased comments in the order. The motion was denied.

This appeal followed, in which Ragsdale raises a total of twenty-one claims. ¹ We conclude that the majority of these claims were properly denied as being either procedurally barred or clearly without merit. ² The following claims merit discussion.

First, Ragsdale argues that he has been denied access to public records. During the course of its investigation in this case, the State obtained documents from other agencies. ³ When Ragsdale filed his public records request, the State claimed a number of exemptions regarding those documents as well as for notes and drafts of its own. After Ragsdale filed a motion to compel regarding these documents, the trial judge held a hearing regarding the status of the records request and conducted an in camera review of the contested records. The judge determined that all records had properly been withheld. Ragsdale argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to order the State to provide Ragsdale with access to these records because the State had no standing to raise these exemptions on behalf of the other agencies and was inappropriately withholding documents of its own. According to Ragsdale, only those agencies who acted as custodian of the records had standing to assert the exemptions; that is, once the records came into the hands of the State the exemptions no longer applied to those records. As such, Ragsdale contends that the trial judge erred in denying this claim without an evidentiary hearing.

We first note our recent holding in Johnson v. Butterworth, 713 So.2d 985 (Fla.1998), in which we stated that attorney's notes and other such preliminary documents are not public records and are never subject to public records disclosure. Id. at 987. Based on that conclusion, we find the trial judge correctly found that the notes and drafts prepared for the State's use in litigating this case are not public records.

As to the standing argument, we conclude that the applicability of a particular exemption is determined by the document being withheld, not by the identity of the agency possessing the record. In City of Riviera Beach v. Barfield, 642 So.2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), documents were given by one agency to another during an active criminal investigation. In seeking access to those records, the petitioner made the same argument as that made here, i.e., that the transfer of a document from one agency to another nullifies the exempt status of the record. In rejecting this argument, the Barfield court stated:

We conclude that when a criminal justice agency transfers protected information to another criminal justice agency, the information retains its exempt status. We believe that such a conclusion fosters the underlying purpose of section 119.07(3)(d), which is to prevent premature public disclosure of criminal investigative information since disclosure could impede an ongoing investigation or allow a suspect to avoid apprehension or escape detection. In determining whether or not to compel disclosure of active criminal investigative or intelligence information, the primary focus must be on the statutory classification of the information sought rather than upon in whose hands the information rests. Had the legislature intended the exemption for active criminal investigative information to evaporate upon the sharing of that information with another criminal justice agency, it would have expressly provided so in the statute.

642 So.2d at 1137 (second emphasis added) (citation omitted). Although the information sought in this case is not information currently being used in an active criminal investigation, the rationale is the same; that is, that the focus in determining whether a document has lost its status as a public record must be on the policy behind the exemption and not on the simple fact that the information has changed agency hands. Thus, if the State has access to information that is exempt from public records disclosure due to confidentiality or other public policy concerns, that information does not lose its exempt status simply because it was provided to the State during the course of its criminal investigation.

This does not mean, however, that exculpatory information is not obtainable by a defendant when a record is not public. To the contrary, as we noted in Johnson, the State must still disclose a document to a defendant if it contains exculpatory information. Johnson; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

In this case, a close question existed as to whether some of the claimed exemptions were correctly claimed by the State. Consequently, the trial judge reviewed the information in camera and then denied Ragsdale's motion to compel after determining that no exculpatory information was contained therein. Nevertheless, Ragsdale asserts that the trial judge failed to conduct a proper hearing as required by Walton v. Dugger, 634 So.2d 1059 (Fla.1993). The issue in Walton was whether a public records dispute was cognizable in a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. In concluding that such an issue was properly raised in a rule 3.850 motion, we stated that the appropriate course of action was for the trial judge to have conducted a hearing regarding disclosure objections and, where doubt existed as to whether a particular document must be disclosed, to have conducted an in camera review of that document. The judge in this case complied with all of those requirements.

Ragsdale asserts that the trial judge's in camera review was insufficient because the trial judge merely "perused" the materials. ⁴ After having reviewed the materials, we agree that the motion was properly denied.

Next, Ragsdale asserts that the trial judge should have recused himself in this case because, in the order denying rule 3.850 relief, the trial judge stated that certain claims were "bogus" and "a sham," and labeled a cumulative error claim as "nothing but abject whining." Ragsdale contends recusal is warranted because these comments reflect that the trial judge is biased and prejudiced against him and his counsel.

A review of the trial judge's order reflects that the trial judge carefully set forth his reasons for denying each claim. On seven of the twenty-three claims the judge evaluated, he set forth the reasons why the claim was without merit and then stated that the "claim is bogus and a sham and is hereby denied." On the cumulative error claim, he stated: "The defendant claims that the cumulative effect of the trial court and counsel's errors require post-conviction relief. This claim is vague, fails to state a basis for relief and is nothing but abject whining. The claim is hereby denied." When reading these comments in context, it becomes clear that the trial judge was simply stating that these particular claims were, in his opinion, not only without merit but frivolous as well. Additionally, the remarks regarding the cumulative error claim were made in conjunction with the judge's finding that the claim was vague and failed to state a basis for relief. We cannot say, on this record, that the trial judge's remarks warrant recusal. We strongly caution, however, that judges must refrain from making comments that might cause a litigant to fear...