Rahaman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: JUDITH E. LEVY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Docket Number: 22-10635
• Decision Date: 23 August 2023
• Citation: Rahaman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 22-10635 (E.D. Mich. Aug 23, 2023)
• Parties: Joy Rahaman, Plaintiff, v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant.

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Joy Rahaman, Plaintiff, v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant.

No. 22-10635

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

August 23, 2023

MAG JUDGE ELIZABETH A.STAFFORD

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [39]

JUDITH E. LEVY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant State Farm Mutual Insurance Company's motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or for summary judgment. (ECF No. 39.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

I. Background

This case is one in a series of lawsuits brought by Plaintiff Joy Rahaman. On September 3, 2016, Plaintiff was involved in a car accident in which she was rear-ended by Jessica Norman. At the time of the accident, Norman was driving a car owned by Randy Saenz. The car was insured under a policy issued to Saenz by Defendant. The policy included “bodily injury” coverage of $25,000 per person. (ECF No. 39-3, PageID.1334, 1344.)

Plaintiff sued Saenz and Norman in Wayne County Circuit Court on May 25, 2017. (See ECF No. 39-4, PageID.1379.) Plaintiff was represented at the time by attorney Kevin Geer.^[1] (Id.) Under Saenz's policy, Defendant was obligated to obtain an attorney to defend Saenz and Norman at its expense. (See ECF No. 39-3, PageID.1345.) On or about June 27, 2017, Defendant retained attorney Michelle Boedeker to represent Saenz and Norman. (ECF No. 39-6, PageID.1412; ECF No. 399, PageID.1428.) Following negotiations between Geer and Boedeker, the parties agreed to settle Plaintiff's third-party negligence claims against Saenz and Norman for $20,000. (ECF No. 39-6, PageID.1412-1413.) Plaintiff signed the associated release on July 31, 2018. (ECF No. 39-7, PageID.1419-1420.) On August 1, 2018, Defendant issued a check to Plaintiff and Geer's firm for $20,000. (ECF No. 39-8, PageID.1422-1425.)

Defendant's records reflect that the check was cashed. (See ECF No. 398, PageID.1425; ECF No. 39-9, PageID.1428.)

Plaintiff, through Geer, also sued her own insurer, IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company, in Wayne County Circuit Court, seeking payment of first-party personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits related to the accident.^[2] See Rahaman v. Ameriprise Ins. Co., No. 349463, 2020 WL 6939740, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2020), leave denied, 507 Mich. 932 (2021). In September 2018, counsel for both parties executed an arbitration agreement. Id. “In November 2018, plaintiff, defendant, and their attorneys participated in an arbitration hearing. The arbitration ended with a $130,000 award in plaintiff's favor and the waiver of future medical benefits.” Id.

Plaintiff subsequently claimed that she never agreed to the arbitration with IDS. Id. However, the trial court granted IDS's motion to enforce the arbitration agreement and denied Plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitration award. Id. at *2. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the state trial court's decision, id. at *2-4, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied Plaintiff leave to appeal. Rahaman v. Ameriprise Ins. Co., 507 Mich. 932 (2021). Plaintiff also filed a pro se complaint against IDS in the Eastern District of Michigan alleging, among other things, that counsel for IDS and Geer conspired to defraud her.^[3] See Rahaman v. Am. Connect Fam. Prop. & Cas. Ins., No. 20-CV-11628, 2021 WL 9563330, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4596305 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2022). This Court dismissed the federal case against IDS with prejudice. See Rahaman, 2022 WL 4596305, at *3-8.

On March 24, 2022, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action against Defendant. (ECF No. 1.) In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, Geer, Boedeker, counsel for IDS, and others conspired against her, and that she did not authorize the lawsuit against Saenz and Norman. (See id. at PageID.13-19.) She also asserts that “[Geer] and Defendant ‘tricked' Plaintiff into signing the check for $20,000.00 under false pretense[s].” (Id. at PageID.18.) As part of this alleged conspiracy, Plaintiff asserts that Boedeker sent Geer an email on March 3, 2017 in which she identified Plaintiff as a Muslim; repeatedly used the n-word; admitted to paying a neighbor to surveil Plaintiff; and claimed Plaintiff was HIV positive, used marijuana and cocaine, had a criminal record, and had a fifth-grade education. (See id. at PageID.13-14; ECF No. 42-1, PageID.1535-1536.) Plaintiff also contends that Defendant put a tracker on her truck in 2016 and has used drones to stalk her for over five years. (ECF No. 1, PageID.28, 30.) In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts sixteen claims against Defendant.^[4]

On November 21, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or for summary judgment. (ECF No. 39.) On November 22, 2022, the Court held an on-the-record status conference to address on-going discovery disputes between the parties. During that conference, the Court instructed Plaintiff to identify the additional discovery she claimed she needed and to explain why the discovery was necessary to respond to Defendant's motion. On November 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed her response to the motion. (ECF No. 42.) On December 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed two notices listing numerous document requests. (ECF Nos. 58, 59.) Defendant subsequently filed a reply (ECF No. 61) and a response to Plaintiff's notices. (ECF No. 63.)

II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “If, on a motion under Rule . . . 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). However, if the motion also requests summary judgment in the alternative, no additional notice to the non-moving party is required. See Wysocki v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 2010).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court may not grant summary judgment if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court “views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2002)). However, “[t]o defeat a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff ‘can no longer rely on the conclusory allegations of [her] complaint.'” Warf v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 713 F.3d 874, 878 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Daily Press, Inc. v. United Press Int'l., 412 F.2d 126, 134 (6th Cir. 1969)).

In its motion, Defendant seeks judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) “and/or” summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. (ECF No. 39, PageID.1254.) Defendant attached fourteen exhibits to its motion, including affidavits from Boedeker and Jason Snyder, an employee of Defendant. (See ECF Nos. 39-1, 39-6, 39-9.) In her response, Plaintiff repeatedly cites to Rule 56 and acknowledges that the motion seeks both judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment. (See generally ECF No. 42.) Therefore, the Court will consider the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 and concludes that no additional notice to Plaintiff is required.

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe Plaintiff's filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011). Despite being “held to less stringent standards,” pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)).

III. Analysis

A. Violation of Seventh Amendment, Civil Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, and Racial Discrimination

In her complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for “violation of seventh amendment,” “civil conspiracy to interfere with civil rights” under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and “racial discrimination.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.19-20, 27-28.) Each of these claims fail.

First, Plaintiff's claim for violations of her right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution cannot succeed because that federal right does not apply to proceedings in state courts. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418, 432 (1996) (stating that the Seventh Amendment “governs proceedings in federal court, but not in state court”). As such, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendant on this claim.

Turning to Plaintiff's claim of conspiracy under § 1985 “[a] civil conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.” Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1985). To establish a claim for civil conspiracy under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must establish “(1) that a single plan existed; (2) that the alleged conspirators shared in the general conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiff of [her] constitutional or federal statutory rights; and (3) that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury.” Barkovic v. Att'y Griev. Comm'n, 289 F.Supp.3d 833, 843 (E.D. Mich. 2017)...