Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 00-2128-KHV.,CIV. A. 00-2128-KHV. |
| Parties | Diana RAHN, Plaintiff, v. JUNCTION CITY FOUNDRY, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Walter P. Robertson, Junction City, KS, Martin M. Meyers, Stephen C. Thornberry, The Meyers Law Firm, LC, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiff.
Joseph M. Backer, Boggs, Backer & Bates, LLC, Kansas City, MO, William S. Robbins, Jr., Watkins, Boulware, Lucas, Miner, Murphy & Taylor, LLP, Kansas City, MO, for defendant.
Diana Rahn filed suit against her former employer, Junction City Foundry, Inc. Plaintiff alleged that defendant subjected her to a hostile work environment and constructively discharged her in retaliation for complaining about its discriminatory conduct, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. as amended. On March 16, 2001, a jury found defendant liable on both claims. On the hostile work environment claim the jury awarded plaintiff $1,000 in actual damages and $30,000 in punitive damages. On the retaliation claim the jury awarded plaintiff $16,000 in compensatory damages, $2,030 in back pay, and $100,000 in punitive damages. This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law At The Close Of Plaintiff's Evidence (Doc. # 98) filed March 14, 2001 and Defendant's Motion For Judgment As A Matter of Law At The Close Of All The Evidence (Doc. # 102) filed March 16, 2001, both of which the Court took under advisement at the time they were filed. The matter is also before the Court on Defendant's Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter of Law Or, In The Alternative, Motion For New Trial Or Remittitur (Doc. # 111) filed March 30, 2001, Plaintiffs Motion For Attorneys Fees Pursuant To 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Doc. # 108) filed March 29, 2001, and Defendant's Motion For Leave to File Surreply To Plaintiff's Reply Suggestions In Support Of Motion For Attorney's Fees (Doc. # 125) filed June 29, 2001. For reasons set forth below, the Court finds that defendant's motions should be overruled, except that in light of the Court's ruling, defendant should be given the opportunity to fully respond to plaintiff's motion for attorneys fees.
Judgment as a matter of law "should be cautiously and sparingly granted." Rule 50(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Zuchel v. City & County of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 734 (10th Cir.1993). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate "only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the nonmoving party." Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146, 1149 (10th Cir.1991). Such judgment is proper only when "the evidence so strongly supports an issue that reasonable minds could not differ." Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987). In determining whether judgment as a matter of law is proper, the Court may not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury. See Lucas v. Dover Corp., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir.1988). Nevertheless, the Court must find more than a mere scintilla of evidence favoring the nonmovant; the Court must find that "evidence was before the jury upon which it could properly find against the movant." Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1988). The Court must affirm the jury verdict if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it contains evidence upon which the jury could properly return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir.1996). The Court must enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party, however, if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis ... with respect to a claim or defense ... under the controlling law." Id. at 1546-47 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)). A legally sufficient basis requires more than a "scintilla of evidence" favoring the nonmoving party. Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1547.
The decision to grant a motion for new trial is committed to the trial court's sound discretion. See Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 108 F.3d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir.1997). In considering a motion for new trial, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. See Joyce v. Davis, 539 F.2d 1262 (10th Cir.1976). "The verdict must demonstrate trial errors which constitute prejudicial error or that the verdict is not based on substantial evidence." White v. Conoco, Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1443 (10th Cir.1983). The Court should "exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for `error' and ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial." McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (quotations and citations omitted).
The decision whether to give a particular jury instruction is within the sound discretion of the Court. The instructions as a whole must provide correct statements of the governing law and provide the jury with an ample understanding of the issues and applicable legal standards. See Allen v. Minnstar, 97 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir.1996). The question is not "whether the charge was faultless in every particular, but whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duties to determine these issues." Mason v. Okla. Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir.1997) (quotations and citations omitted); see Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F.3d 1559, 1564 (10th Cir.1993) ().
At trial the parties painted dramatically different pictures of plaintiff's conduct and that of her co-workers and supervisors. Plaintiff presented evidence that she was a conscientious employee; that co-workers targeted her with inappropriate sexual comments and vulgar conduct, that management inadequately responded to her complaints; and that after she complained, co-workers and supervisors treated her in a manner which ultimately forced her to resign. Defendant portrayed plaintiff as a vulgar woman who wore tight clothing with sexually suggestive slogans, flagrantly engaged in sexual banter in the workplace and encouraged others to do likewise, and made only token complaints. The jury heard the evidence over four days of trial, and after deliberating for several hours, adopted plaintiff's version of events. The evidence at trial must therefore be viewed in light of the jury's decision.
Defendant hired plaintiff on September 9, 1997. She initially worked in the core room with Terry Curtis as her supervisor. Curtis reported to plant manager Joe Teeter, who reported to Steve Didion, defendant's president. Sandra Wheeler, defendant's personnel manager, reported directly to Didion. Defendant transferred plaintiff to the molding lines in February 1998 and ultimately assigned her the job of muller operator. In this position, plaintiff began to interact with David Knox, Dennis Dezotell and other grinders. Curtis continued to serve as her supervisor.
Plaintiff testified that beginning in March or April 1998, Dezotell and Knox made numerous sexually inappropriate comments to her. Dezotell told plaintiff something to the effect of "show me your tits and I'll show you my dick." Plaintiff told him to get away from her. On another occasion, Dezotell told plaintiff that he knew how she could make some money and took her to Knox, who asked plaintiff if he could buy her underwear for $20. This comment shocked and embarrassed plaintiff, and within a day or two she reported it to Curtis. She also reported it to Wheeler. Meanwhile, other workers repeated the comment frequently in plaintiff's presence.
Knox made many other inappropriate sexual comments to plaintiff. For example, he offered plaintiff money to watch him masturbate. This offer embarrassed plaintiff and she returned to her work station. Plaintiff repeatedly complained to Curtis about this and other comments. Sometime in late summer, Knox told co-workers that at home he had a blow-up doll named Diana (plaintiff's first name). Knox offered plaintiff money to wash his windows naked and lie in his bed naked. One day when plaintiff was absent from work, Knox told co-workers (including Gary Joseph) that he had plaintiff tied up in his basement and that he had been having sex with her. After Joseph told plaintiff about this, she complained to Curtis about it.
Knox and others in the grinding department also accused plaintiff of having sexual relations with Joseph. Knox made lewd comments to Joseph about plaintiff, e.g., asking if he could smell Joseph's penis because he knew that Joseph had had sexual relations with plaintiff.
Workers at Junction City Foundry manufactured a cast iron penis. Mike Havens, one of plaintiff's fellow employees, put it on plaintiff's fork lift and she took it back to her work station at the muller. The cast iron penis offended plaintiff and she showed it to Curtis, who said that he would take care of it. Plaintiff later told Wheeler about it.1
Plaintiff testified that in May or June of 1998, other workers called her to a picnic table outside the plant, where she found another cast iron penis wrapped in paper towels. She left it sitting there. Joe Clemmons, a co-worker, took the penis to plaintiff's work station. He told her that Knox had said that that was what he [Knox] looked like and that he had it made so that plaintiff...
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