Raiche v. Scott

• Decision Date: 31 October 2014
• Docket Number: 2012–190–Appeal.,Nos. 2012–189–Appeal,s. 2012–189–Appeal
• Citation: 101 A.3d 1244
• Parties: Timothy RAICHE d/b/a T. Raiche Builders v. Timothy W. SCOTT et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

101 A.3d 1244

Timothy RAICHE d/b/a T. Raiche Builders

v.Timothy W. SCOTT et al.

Nos. 2012–189–Appeal

2012–190–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 31, 2014.

Michael P. Lynch, Esq., Westerly, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Jacobs, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

These cases came before the Supreme Court on October 2, 2014, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in these appeals should not be summarily decided.¹ After a bench trial, a justice of the Superior Court declared that the defendants, Timothy W. and Pamela J. Scott (defendants), owed the plaintiff, Timothy Raiche (plaintiff) d/b/a T. Raiche Builders, $5,455.50 in damages and further found that the defendants were responsible for prejudgment interest on the amount of an offer of judgment that had been deposited in the Registry of the Superior Court, in accordance with Rule 68(b)(3) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants timely appealed the trial justice's decision to award prejudgment interest on the amount of the offer of judgment. The plaintiff cross-appealed the trial justice's damages award. For the following reasons, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and, thus, deny and dismiss the appeals of both parties and affirm the judgment.

Facts and Travel

The defendants own a home located on Solar Drive in Westerly, Rhode Island. In 2003, they decided to expand and remodel the dwelling. After obtaining a design plan, defendants met with several builders, including plaintiff. On November 20, 2003, defendants entered into a written agreement with plaintiff, in which plaintiff agreed to complete the construction work on defendants' home for $240,000. Construction commenced in January 2004.

During the course of the project, defendants requested certain design changes. For example, it became necessary to install a load-bearing beam, which resulted in additional changes to the kitchen plan. The defendants also requested outside stone work and a redesign of the kitchen's plumbing. Additionally, defendants selected a new lighting plan, which required additional electrical work. Although plaintiff instructed the appropriate subcontractors to implement the changes, the written agreement between plaintiff and defendants mandated that any changes that involved extra costs could only be executed by written orders and any such change order had to include payment terms.² No written change orders were executed between the parties.

After nine months of construction, the project was completed. In November 2004, plaintiff submitted an invoice to defendants, indicating a total of $318,242.80 in charges. The defendants' previous payment of $189,500 was credited, leaving a balance of $128,742.80. The plaintiff acknowledged that this amount should have been reduced by $2,540—a cost listed inadvertently—and reduced the bill accordingly. Payment was not forthcoming.

On June 2, 2005, plaintiff filed suit asserting that defendants breached the contract and were unjustly enriched in failing to pay the remaining balance. On October 2, 2008, defendants presented an offer of judgment to plaintiff in accordance with Rule 68.³ The defendants' offer of judgment stated: “[defendants,] pursuant to Rule[s] 67 and 68 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, deposit the sum of $50,000 into the Registry of Court as an Offer of Judgment for the balance of the contract due and owing to * * * [p]laintiff[.]” On October 6, 2008, plaintiff accepted the offer of judgment, but only as part payment in accordance with Rule 68(b)(3). The plaintiff's acceptance stated: “[plaintiff], pursuant to Rule 68(b)(3) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, does accept the tender of [d]efendant[s], dated October 1, 2008 * * * as part payment only and will continue to proceed with the within action on the sole issue of the amount of damages.” Approximately one year later, on October 30, 2009, plaintiff collected the $50,000 offer of judgment that had been deposited in the Superior Court Registry.

In September 2010, a Superior Court bench trial was held to determine the amount of damages incurred by plaintiff. In assessing the amount of damages, the trial justice conducted a thorough review of the evidence under a breach-of-contract analysis as well as an unjust-enrichment analysis. He concluded that, pursuant to the contract between the parties, plaintiff was entitled to $240,000 for construction work on the project. As defendants had already paid plaintiff $189,500 and deposited $50,000 into the Superior Court Registry, the trial justice found that plaintiff was entitled to $500. The trial justice also found, under an unjust-enrichment theory, that plaintiff was entitled to $4,955.50 for electrical work in connection with the new lighting plan, work that was not anticipated in the written agreement.⁴ Thus, the trial justice awarded plaintiff $5,455.50, plus interest and costs.

A judgment entered on March 7, 2011, requiring defendants to pay $55,455.50, plus interest and costs from the date the action accrued until October 30, 2009, the date plaintiff withdrew the funds from the Superior Court Registry, with interest on the balance from October 30, 2009 until the date of judgment. After a series of orders and an objection by defendants, plaintiff thereafter filed a separate motion seeking to amend the form of the judgment to conform to the trial justice's written decision.

At a subsequent hearing, plaintiff argued that the judgment should reflect that prejudgment interest was due on the $50,000 offer of judgment from November 17, 2004 until October 30, 2009. The defendants argued that prejudgment interest should apply only to the $5,455.50 amount, not the Rule 68 offer-of-judgment amount. The trial justice granted plaintiff's motion to amend, vacated the previous judgment, and asked plaintiff to submit a new judgment.

The trial justice then issued an order on the issue of prejudgment interest, finding that the offer of judgment did not include prejudgment interest and that prejudgment interest was owed on the $50,000 from the date the action accrued to the day it was paid. The trial justice specifically noted that a Rule 68(c) “offer * * * not accepted in full satisfaction shall be deemed withdrawn, i.e., shall not be disclosed to the jury, and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine interest or costs [,]” as support that “the rule assumes that the clerk will need to know what payments were [made] in order to calculate the amount of prejudgment interest.”⁵ Lastly, the trial justice concluded that payment of the offer of judgment to the court registry tolls the accrual of additional interest, but he noted that payment was not made until February 2009. Therefore, the trial justice found that “[p]rejudgment interest shall be calculated on the amount of $55,545.30 from the date of filing of the complaint to October 30, 2009. Additional prejudgment interest shall be calculated on the amount of $5 [,]545.30 from October 30, 2009 to the date of the judgment.” After several attempts, an amended final judgment was entered on March 30, 2011. Both parties timely appealed.

Before this Court is (1) defendants' appeal, asserting that the trial justice erred in awarding prejudgment interest on the $50,000 deposited in the court registry as an offer of judgment; and (2) plaintiff's cross-appeal, asserting that the trial justice erred in awarding only $55,455.50⁶ in damages.

Standard of Review

“When interpreting statutes and court rules, we apply a de novo standard of review.” State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 76 (R.I.2006) (citing Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580, 583 (R.I.2005) ). “In matters of statutory interpretation our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act * * *.” State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I.2013) (quoting Alessi v. Bowen Court Condominium, 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I.2012) ). “[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting Alessi, 44 A.3d at 740 ). “However, the plain meaning approach must not be confused with ‘myopic literalism’; even when confronted with a clear and unambiguous statutory provision, ‘it is entirely proper for us to look to the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 150 (R.I.2006) ). “Therefore, we must ‘consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections.’ ” Id. (quoting Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1002 (R.I.2012) ).

Additionally, “[i]t is well established that the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed unless the record shows that the findings clearly are wrong or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence.” Process Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. DiGregorio, Inc., 93 A.3d 1047, 1051 (R.I.2014) (quoting Wellington Condominium Association v. Wellington Cove Condominium Association, 68 A.3d 594, 599 (R.I.2013) ). “If, as we review the record, it becomes clear to us that ‘the record indicates that competent evidence supports the trial justice's findings, we shall not substitute our view of the evidence for [that of the trial justice] even though a contrary conclusion could have been reached.’ ” Id. at 1052 (quoting Wellington Condominium Association, 68 A.3d at 599 ). “When we review the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury, we accord those findings great deference.” Lamarque v. Centreville Savings Bank, 22 A.3d 1136, 1140 (R.I.2011). “Pure questions of law, however, we review on a de novo...