Raiford v. State

• Decision Date: 08 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 100,100
• Citation: 296 Md. 289,462 A.2d 1192
• Parties: Jessie Gregory RAIFORD v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 289

296 Md. 289

462 A.2d 1192

Jessie Gregory RAIFORD v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 100.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 8, 1983.

Arthur A. DeLano, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on brief), for appellant.

W. Charles Rogers, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.

COUCH, Judge.

Having been tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore and convicted of robbery, Jessie Gregory Raiford (appellant) was sentenced pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol., 1980 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 643B(c), ¹ to twenty-five years. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in Raiford v. State, 52 Md.App. 163, 447 A.2d 496 (1982). We granted Raiford's petition for a writ of certiorari so that we could consider the important constitutional issue here involved. The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in imposing a mandatory sentence under the provision of Art. 27, § 643B(c). Because we disagree with the Court of Special Appeals, we shall reverse in part and remand for a new sentencing proceeding. In light of the nature of the issue raised, we find it unnecessary to recite the underlying facts of the crime giving rise to Raiford's conviction. Subsequent to the 1981 robbery conviction, the State sought imposition of a mandatory twenty-five year sentence pursuant to Art. 27, § 643B(c) based upon the following prior convictions:

"1. Charge: Robbery

Charging Document Number # 4303

Disposition/date: December 1, 1967

three years Department of Correction

2. Charge: Robbery

Charging Document Number # 4304

Disposition/date: December 1, 1967

three years Department of Correction

3. Charge: Rape

Charging Document # 7604

Disposition/date: June 11, 1970

twenty years Department of Correction".

At the time of the 1967 convictions, Raiford was seventeen years old and was tried as an adult pursuant to Code (1957, 1966 Repl.Vol.), Art. 26, §§ 51-71, and Art. 4, § 240(b), of the Charter and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City which exempted Baltimore City from the general statewide juvenile age limit of eighteen. This statutory exception was subsequently held to be "in contravention of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States...." See Long v. Robinson, 316 F.Supp. 22, 30 (D.Md.1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir.1971). The District Court further concluded, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, that "[t]his decision shall apply to all cases not finally decided on May 15, 1969, the date of the filing of [Long's] suit." 316 F.Supp. at 31 (footnote omitted).

Subsequently, in Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922, 93 S.Ct. 3054, 37 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1973), the Fourth Circuit held that Long v. Robinson should be applied retroactively, stating in pertinent part:

"We think the question of retroactivity is controlled by our decision in Kemplen v. State of Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir.1970). It is true, as the state contends, that the unconstitutional treatment of petitioners does not relate to the accuracy of the fact finding function of the judicial process. But as we said in Kemplen, the normal waiver proceeding is a critical point in the criminal proceedings against a juvenile. It is 'the only opportunity an accused has to plead the defense of his diminished responsibility as a juvenile.' Kemplen, at 177. To deny juveniles in Baltimore the opportunity of such a defense and to allow it to all other juveniles in Maryland seems to us so fundamentally unfair as to impeach the validity of the 'adult' proceedings and render unreliable the guilty verdicts obtained in these proceedings. We hold, therefore, that Long v. Robinson, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir.1971), is to be retroactively applied." (Footnote omitted).

In Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975), this Court rejected Woodall v. Pettibone and declined to apply Long v. Robinson retroactively. Wiggins had been indicted and convicted of a series of burglaries which occurred in 1960. Although he was under age 16 at the time of two of the incidents, he was tried as an adult offender in the Criminal Court of Baltimore pursuant to a waiver order. Wiggins was then incarcerated as an adult felon. Subsequently, he filed a bill of complaint asking that his convictions be declared null and that the records of said convictions be expunged. The circuit court ruled against Wiggins, as did the Court of Special Appeals, Wiggins v. State, 22 Md.App. 291, 324 A.2d 172 (1974), and this Court. We concluded that "the purpose of the Long [v. Robinson] rule was to ensure that thenceforth all individuals in Maryland under the age of 18 years would be dealt with on the same basis, regardless of the geographical location of their alleged violations of the criminal law of the State." 275 Md. at 710-11, 344 A.2d at 92. Relying on Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), we reasoned that inasmuch as the ruling of Long v. Robinson did not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process, there was no constitutional reason for retroactive application. Writing for the majority of the Court, Judge Smith stated in relevant part:

"As we have indicated, the Fourth Circuit in Woodall concluded that conviction of an individual such as Wiggins under our prior procedure is 'so fundamentally unfair as to impeach the validity of the "adult" proceedings and render unreliable the guilty verdicts obtained in th[o]se proceedings.' We see it somewhat differently. The waiver hearing is not intended as an opportunity for a juvenile 'to plead a defense of his diminished responsibility,' but to afford an opportunity for a judge to determine the fitness of the juvenile for rehabilitative measures giving due consideration to the safety of the public and applying the factors noted in Code (1974) § 3-816(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The waiver proceeding is in no way concerned with the ultimate fact-finding determination of whether the accused did or did not commit the act he is said to have committed. The fact that there has been no waiver is not a matter for consideration in the juvenile proceeding in determining whether the child committed the act in question and thus is delinquent. Likewise, in a trial under adult procedures the fact of waiver is not an element for consideration in determining guilt or innocence. The same evidence presented in a juvenile proceeding or in a regular criminal trial should lead to the same conclusion, although, as we shall point out, at the time of Wiggins' trials his rights might have been more jealously guarded constitutionally in a regular criminal trial than in a trial under juvenile procedure. The basic difference, however, between trial as an adult and trial as a juvenile lies not in the fact-finding processes, but in the procedures looking to rehabilitation after a determination that an individual did in fact commit acts which were violations of the criminal statutes of this State." 275 Md. at 708-09, 344 A.2d at 91.

Raiford contends "that although his 1967 robbery conviction was finally decided prior to the effective date of Long v. Robinson, it should nonetheless not be considered as a valid prior conviction under Article 27, § 643B." To hold otherwise, he argues, would effectively deny his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Had Raiford been tried as a juvenile in 1967, he would not have an adult conviction for purposes of the recidivist statute. ²

The State, on the other hand, argues that "if a conviction is valid, it is valid for all purposes, including use as a prior conviction for purposes of the mandatory sentencing act." Furthermore, the State contends that Raiford is being punished only for his most recent crime and not for his 1967 conviction.

Relying on Wiggins v. State, supra, the Court of Special Appeals stated:

"In rejecting summarily the broad relief requested by Wiggins, the Court, it seems to us, made a clear statement that Long is to have absolutely no effect upon either the prior convictions themselves or upon collateral consequences (such as the application of recidivist statutes) flowing from them." 52 Md.App. at 167, 447 A.2d at 498.

The intermediate appellate court then proceeded to discuss "somewhat analogous" federal cases decided subsequent to Long ³ and concluded:

"If these convictions, valid when entered, are not subject to expungement, do subject the defendant to 'legal disabilities as a result of [them],' and may be used for impeachment purposes, we see no reason why they should be regarded as less than valid and viable convictions for purposes of the mandatory sentence provisions of art. 27, § 643B(c)." 52 Md.App. at 169, 447 A.2d at 499 (emphasis in original).

Although this Court is not bound by the federal court decisions on this matter, we find such authority to be instructive and persuasive. While there is conflicting authority regarding whether or not invalid prior convictions may be used in some instances for impeachment purposes, ⁴ it is well established that they may not be used to enhance punishment. For example, in Grandison v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 580 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 1239, 59 L.Ed.2d 469 (1979), the United States Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus and held that his due process rights were not violated by use of invalid prior convictions for impeachment purposes since the fact-finding process was not impugned. However, that court remanded the case to afford the state sentencing judge the opportunity to file a certificate to establish that the sentence...