Raigosa v. Zafirakopoulos

• Decision Date: 12 December 2018
• Docket Number: Docket No. O–500–18,2018–02071
• Citation: 167 A.D.3d 748,89 N.Y.S.3d 322
• Parties: In the Matter of Margoth RAIGOSA, Appellant, v. Stelios ZAFIRAKOPOULOS, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

167 A.D.3d 748

89 N.Y.S.3d 322

In the Matter of Margoth RAIGOSA, Appellant,

v.Stelios ZAFIRAKOPOULOS, Respondent.

2018–02071

Docket No. O–500–18

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted - October 9, 2018

December 12, 2018

Jorge Vasquez's New York Litigators, Inc., Elmhurst, N.Y. (Jorge A. Vasquez of counsel), for appellant.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, JEFFREY A. COHEN, ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Lauren Norton Lerner, Ct. Atty. Ref.), dated January 11, 2018. The order, without a hearing, granted the respondent's application to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Queens County, for a hearing to determine whether the Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Family Court Act § 812(1)(e), a new determination thereafter of the respondent's application to dismiss the petition, and further proceedings thereafter, if warranted.

On January 8, 2018, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8 seeking, inter alia, an order of protection against the respondent. The petitioner alleged that the petitioner and the respondent "have an intimate relationship," as they were living together as roommates. At a subsequent court appearance, the respondent made an application to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the parties did not have an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e). The Family Court, without a hearing, found that the parties did not have an intimate relationship because their relationship was not sexual in nature and granted the respondent's application. The petitioner appeals.

The Family Court is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction and "cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute" ( Matter of Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 N.Y.3d 364, 366, 859 N.Y.S.2d 594, 889 N.E.2d 471 ). Pursuant to Family Court Act § 812(1), the Family Court's jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed acts that occur "between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household" (see Matter of Winston v. Edwards–Clarke, 127 A.D.3d 771, 772, 6 N.Y.S.3d 566 ; Matter of Seye v. Lamar, 72 A.D.3d 975, 976, 900 N.Y.S.2d 112 ).

Effective July 21, 2008 (see L 2008, ch 326, § 16), the Legislature expanded the definition of "members of the same family or household" to include, among others, "persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time" ( Family Ct. Act § 812[1][e] ; see Matter of Winston v. Edwards–Clarke, 127 A.D.3d at 772, 6 N.Y.S.3d 566 ; Matter of Seye v. Lamar, 72 A.D.3d at 976, 900 N.Y.S.2d 112 ). The Legislature also expressly excluded from the definition of "intimate relationship" a "casual acquaintance" and "ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts" ( Family Ct. Act § 812[1][e] ). Beyond those delineated exclusions, the Legislature left it to the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular relationship constitutes an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(...