Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Minn. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.

• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: KNUTSON
• Citation: Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Minn. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 98 N.W.2d 60, 256 Minn. 227 (Minn. 1959)
• Decision Date: 17 July 1959
• Docket Number: No. 37676,37676
• Parties: , 30 P.U.R.3d 372 RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF State of MINNESOTA, Complainant, Respondent, v. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Appellants.

Page 60

98 N.W.2d 60

256 Minn. 227, 30 P.U.R.3d 372

RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF State of MINNESOTA Complainant, Respondent, v. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al Appellants.

No. 37676.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 17, 1959.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The district court, on an appeal from an order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission under M.S.A. § 216.25, is not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law where the issue of confiscation is not involved, but it is desirable that such findings of fact be made.

2. Due process requires not only an opportunity to present evidence but an opportunity to be heard either by oral argument or written briefs.

3. Before new rates can be prescribed by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission under M.S.A.1953, § 216.21, a finding that existing rates are unreasonable or discriminatory is essential. Facts must also be found supporting the conclusion that existing rates are unreasonable or discriminatory.

4. Comparison of intrastate rates in this state with rates in other states, without a showing of similarity in operating conditions, is insufficient to support a finding that rates here are unreasonable or discriminatory. Such comparisons may have some probative value if accompanied by a showing of similarity of operating conditions and if it is shown that they apply to the same type of haul.

Gene F. Bennett, Minneapolis, Curtis H. Berg, St. Paul, Charles H. Clay, L. C. Corcoran, Minneapolis, Frank S. Farrell, St. Paul, Don McDevitt, Chicago, Ill., W. T. Patterson, Winnipeg, Manitoba, L. E. Pierce, Kansas City, Mo., Franklin B. Stevens, Duluth, Edgar Vanneman, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for appellants.

Miles Lord, Atty. Gen., Robert J. Stenzel, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

KNUTSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Ramsey County affirming an order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission prescribing a scale of maximum reasonable rates for single and joint line application of shipments of sand, gravel, crushed rock and related commodities, and agricultural limestone by railroad in Minnesota intrastate commerce.

This proceeding was initiated by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Minnesota in order to investigate the rates on sand, gravel, crushed rock, crushed stone, agricultural limestone, and related articles charged by the railroads in this state. After a hearing at which oral testimony was taken, the commission issued its order prescribing a maximum scale of rates for single and joint line application on sand, gravel, crushed rock and related commodities, and agricultural limestone.

The railroads then appealed to the District Court of Ramsey County, and a transcript of the testimony before the commission and certain exhibits which were introduced before the commission were submitted to the district court. In addition, certain additional exhibits were submitted. The district court ordered that the order of the commission be affirmed. The railroads then moved that the district court make findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the court refused to do for the reason that it was the court's opinion that 216.25, findings of fact and conclusions of 216.25, findings of fact and conclusions of law were not required.

The railroads have now appealed to this court from the judgment of the district court. The issues asserted on this appeal are: (1) That the district court erred in not making findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) that the commission erred in denying the railroads the right to file a written brief; (3) that the commission did not find that the present rates on the commodities involved were unreasonable or discriminatory and the findings made by the commission do not warrant any inference to that effect; (4) that the findings of fact of the commission are not supported by the evidence; (5) that the commission failed to take into consideration the factors required to be considered by M.S.A.1953, § 216.54, in arriving at the joint rates; and (6) that the evidence will not support a finding that the present rates on the commodities here involved are unreasonable or discriminatory.

1. The railroads contend that the district court erred in not making findings of fact and conclusions of law and that, as a result, the railroads were denied the review of the order of the commission to which they were entitled.

The order of the district court was brief, and its last sentence reads:

'It is hereby ordered that the orders of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission referred to above, from which this appeal is taken, are hereby in all things affirmed.'

The railroads thereafter requested the court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. This motion was denied, and the district court, in its memorandum accompanying the order denying the motion, said:

'The Statute, Section 216.25, on appeals from the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, does not require the Court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law, but only to make an order affirming or vacating the order appealed from. * * *

'This Court has determined that the orders were lawful and reasonable. Hence, the order.'

Section 216.25, as far as pertinent to the contentions of the railroads, reads:

'* * * and thereupon (after an appeal from the commission) the district court shall have jurisdiction over the appeal and the same shall be entered upon the records of the district court and shall be tried therein according to the rules relating to the trial of civil actions so far as the same are applicable. * * * No further pleadings than those filed before the commission shall be necessary (in the district court). Such findings of fact shall be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated, and the order shall be prima facie reasonable, and the burden of proof upon all issues raised by the appeal shall be on the appellant. If the court shall determine that the order appealed from is lawful and reasonable, it shall be affirmed and the order enforced as provided by law. If it shall be determined that the order is unlawful or unreasonable, it shall be vacated and set aside.' (Italics supplied.)

This statutory provision has received considerable attention by this court regarding the scope of review, ¹ but we have not heretofore been confronted with the precise question now presented with the one exception of rate cases involving confiscation. We have held that findings of fact and conclusions of law in such cases must be made by the district court as well as the commission. ²

In view of the fact that the railroads have not raised the question of confiscation, either at the commission or district court level, our inquiry is confined to cases involving the reasonableness of the established rates or, more precisely in this case, the unreasonableness of rates existing before the change. The statute in such cases only requires the district court to determine whether the order of the commission is lawful and reasonable, and, once that is determined, the district court need only affirm if that be the case. There is no mention in the statute of any necessity for findings by the trial court; hence, in view of what we said in Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Verschingel, 197 Minn. 580, 582, 268 N.W. 2, 4, 709--

'* * * Where the statute Specifically calls for findings of fact, the decision, whether of the commission or the district court, cannot stand unless such findings are made' (italics supplied) there appears to be no absolute requirement that such findings be made. From a reading of the numerous cases concerning this statute and its predecessor statutes, it appears that the district courts in the past quite frequently have made their own findings, which in view of this holding are not necessary but are most helpful to this court in a review of such a matter as is now before us. It is desirable that they continue to do so.

The railroads rely to some extent on that portion of § 216.25 which reads:

'* * * and shall be tried therein (the district court) according to the rules relating to the trial of civil actions so far as the same are applicable.'

The railroads assert that Rule 52.01 of Rules of Civil Procedure becomes applicable by virtue of the above language. Rule 52.01 provides in part as follows:

'In all actions Tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment; * * *.' (Italics supplied.)

The inapplicability of this rule to the proceedings in the district court is obvious. In the first place, this proceeding was not an action 'tried upon the facts,' but it was a proceeding in which the district court's only functions are to determine (1) whether the commission's findings of fact were reasonably supported by the evidence, and (2) whether in the light of such facts the order was reasonable and lawful. ³ A review of a matter of this kind is not an action tried upon the facts without a jury in that the function of the district court is appellate in reviewing the findings of a commission. ⁴ It follows that the action of the trial court in affirming the order of the commission without findings of fact and conclusions of law was not reversible error.

2. The railroads next contend that they were denied a hearing pursuant to M.S.A. 1953, § 216.21, and Rule XIV(1) of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission Rules of Practice in that, although they requested an opportunity to submit a written brief, they were denied that right at the close of the testimony before the commission.

The denial of the request of the railroads took place at the close of the testimony before the commission when the following exchanges took place:

'Mr. Clay: I'd also like to ask for permission to file a brief on this matter.

'Mr. Radke: Well, Mr. Chairman, if they are going...