Railroad Company v. Georgia

Decision Date01 October 1878
Citation98 U.S. 359,25 L.Ed. 185
PartiesRAILROAD COMPANY v. GEORGIA
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia.

This case came before the Superior Court for Fulton County, Georgia, on an 'affidavit of illegality' filed by the Atlantic and Gulf Railroad Company in regard to an execution for taxes which had been issued by the comptroller-general of the State, in pursuance of an act of the General Assembly, approved Feb. 28, 1874, entitled 'An Act to amend the tax laws of this State, so far as the same relate to railroad companies, and to define the liabilities of such companies to taxation, and to repeal so much of the charters of such companies, respectively, as may conflict with the provisions of this act.' The affidavit averred that the company, by the original charters granted to the Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad Company, and to the Atlantic and Gulf Railroad Company, or by the act consolidating them under the name of the last company, was not liable to be taxed more than one-half of one per cent on its annual net income, and that said act of Feb. 28, in so far as it authorized the levy and collection of a higher tax on its property, was in violation of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void.

The court overruled the affidavit, and gave judgment 'that the execution proceed.' That judgment having been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, the company sued out this writ of error.

The remaining facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

The case was argued by Mr. Robert Falligant and Mr. W. S. Chisholm for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Robert N. Ely, Attorney-General of Georgia, and Mr. Robert Toombs, for the defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.

The single question presented in this case is whether the act of the legislature of Georgia, approved Feb. 28, 1874, whereby it was enacted that the property of all railroad companies in the State should be taxed as other property of the people of the State, impairs the obligations of the contract contained in the charter of the plaintiff in error. The question compels consideration of the inquiry, what was the contract into which the State entered with the company, and what are the rights which the company holds under it.

Prior to the eighteenth day of April, 1863, there were two railroad companies in the State, one incorporated on the twenty-fifth day of December, 1847, as the 'Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad,' and the other incorporated on the twenty-seventh day of February, 1856, with the name, 'The Atlantic and Gulf Railroad Company,' the same name now borne by the plaintiffs. The charter of each of these companies contained a grant of all the rights, privileges, and immunities which had been granted to, or were held and enjoyed by, any other incorporated railroad company or companies, or which had been granted to the Central Railroad and Banking Company, or to the Georgia Railroad Company, or to either of them. Both these latter companies had been incorporated prior to 1840, and each held by its charter the privilege or immunity of not being subject to be taxed higher than one-half of one per cent upon its annual net income in the one case, and in the other, on the net proceeds of its investments. Consequently the Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad Company, and the Atlantic and Gulf Railroad Company, severally acquired by their charters an exemption from taxation at any higher rate, or in any different manner. And such an immunity they severally continued to hold down to 1863. This, we think, admits of no reasonable doubt. If their rights are now the same as they were when the original charters of the two companies were first granted, it is quite clear the provisions of the taxing act of 1874 could not be applied to them without impairment of the contracts they had with the State. Neither of the companies, however, is now existing under or by virtue of its original charter. On the eighteenth day of April, 1863, the legislature of the State passed an act whereby they were empowered to consolidate their stocks upon such terms as might be agreed upon by the directors and ratified by a majority of the stockholders; and the act enacted, that when so consolidated they should be known as 'The Atlantic and Gulf Railroad Company,' with a proviso that nothing therein contained should relieve or discharge either of them from any contract theretofore entered into by either, but that this company should be liable on the same. By the second section it was enacted that the stockholders of said consolidated railroad companies, by such corporate name, and in such corporate capacity, should be capable in law to have, purchase, and enjoy such real and personal estate, goods, and effects as might be necessary and proper to carry out the objects therein specified, and to secure the full enjoyment of all the rights therein and thereby granted, and by said name to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, in any court of competent jurisdiction; to have and use a common seal, and the same to alter at pleasure; to make and establish by-laws, and generally to exercise corporate powers.

The third section of the act declared that the several immunities, franchises, and privileges granted to the said Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad Company, and the Atlantic and Gulf Railroad Company, by their original charters and the amendments thereof, and the liabilities therein imposed, should continue in force, except so far as they might be inconsistent with the act of consolidation.

The fifth section repealed all laws and parts of laws militating against the act.

It is conceded that under this act a consolidation took place. It is, therefore, a vital question, What was its effect? Did the consolidated companies become a new corporation, holding its powers and privileges as such under the act of 1863? Or was the consolidation a mere alliance between two pre-existing corporations, in which each preserved its identity and distinctive existence? Or, still further, was it an absorption of one by another, whereby the former was dissolved, while the latter continued to exist? The answer to these inquiries must be found in the intention of the legislature as expressed in the consolidating act. We think that intention was the creation of a new corporation out of the stockholders of the two previously existing companies. The consolidation provided for was clearly not a merger of one into the other, as was the case of Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665. Nor was it a mere alliance or confederation of the two. If it had been, each would have preserved its separate existence, as well as its corporate name. But the act authorized the consolidation of the stocks of the two companies, thus making one capital in place of two. It contemplated, therefore, that the separate capital of each company should go out...

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