Railroad Company v. Jones

• Decision Date: 01 October 1877
• Citation: 24 L.Ed. 506,95 U.S. 439
• Parties: RAILROAD COMPANY v. JONES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

95 U.S. 439

24 L.Ed. 506

RAILROAD COMPANY v. JONES.

October Term, 1877

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

This was an action by Jones against the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, to recover damages for an injury received on the road of the company. Judgment was rendered in his favor, and the company brought the case here.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Enoch Totten for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. Edward C. Carrington and Mr. Campbell Carrington, contra.

MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant in error was the plaintiff in the court below. Upon the trial there, he gave evidence to the following effect:

For several months prior to the 12th of November, 1872, he was in the service of the company as a day-laborer. He was one of a party of men employed in constructing and keeping in repair the roadway of the defendant. It was usual for the defendant to convey them to and from their place of work. Sometimes a car was used for this purpose; at others, only a locomotive and tender were provided. It was common, whether a car was provided or not, for some of the men to ride on the pilot or bumper in front of the locomotive. This was done with the approval of Van Ness, who was in charge of the laborers when at work, and the conductor of the train which carried them both ways. The plaintiff had no connection with the train. On the 12th of November before mentioned, the party of laborers, including the plaintiff, under the direction of Van Ness, were employed on the west side of the eastern branch of the Potomac, near where the defendant's road crosses that stream, in filling flat cars with dirt and unloading them at an adjacent point. The train that evening consisted of a locomotive, tender, and box-car. When the party was about to leave on their return that evening, the plaintiff was told by Van Ness to jump on anywhere; that they were behind time, and must hurry.

The plaintiff was riding on the pilot of the locomotive, and while there the train ran into certain cars belonging to the defendant and loaded with ties. These cars had become detached from another train of cars, and were standing on the track in the Virginia avenue tunnel. The accident was the result of negligence on the part of the defendant. Thereby one of the plaintiff's legs was severed from his body, and the other one severely injured. Nobody else was hurt, except two other persons, one riding on the pilot with the plaintiff, and the other one on the cars standing in the tunnel.

The defendant then gave evidence tending to prove as follows: About six weeks or two months before the accident, a box-car had been assigned to the construction train with which the plaintiff was employed. The car was used thereafter every day. About the time it was first used, and on several occasions before the accident, Van Ness notified the laborers that they must ride in the car and not on the engine; and the plaintiff in particular, on several occasions not long before the disaster, was forbidden to ride on the pilot, both by Van Ness and the engineer in charge of the locomotive. The plaintiff was on the pilot at the time of the accident, without the knowledge of any agent of the defendant. There was plenty of room for the plaintiff in the box-car, which was open. If he had been anywhere but on the pilot he would not have been injured. The collision was not brought about by any negligence of the defendant's agents, but was unavoidable. The defendant's agents in charge of the two trains, and the watchman in the tunnel, were competent men.

The plaintiff, in rebuttal, gave evidence tending to show that sometimes the box-car was locked when there was no other car attached to the train, and that the men were allowed by the conductor and engineer to ride on the engine, and that on the evening of the accident the engineer in charge of the locomotive knew that the plaintiff was on the pilot.

The evidence being closed, the defendant's counsel asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: 'If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff knew the box-car was the proper place for him, and if he knew his position on the pilot of the engine was a dangerous one, then they will render a verdict for the defendant, whether they find that its agents allowed the plaintiff to ride on the pilot or not.'

This instruction was refused, and the defendant's counsel excepted.

Three questions arise upon the record:——

1. The exception touching the admission of evidence.

2. As to the application of the rule relative to injuries received by one servant by reason of the negligence of another servant, both being at the time engaged in the same service of a common superior.

3. As to contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

We pass by the first two without remark. We have not found it necessary to consider them. In our view, the point presented by the third is sufficient to dispose of the case.

Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing what such a person under the existing circumstances would not have done. The essence of the fault may lie in omission or commission. The duty is dictated and measured by the exigencies of the occasion. See Wharton on Negligence, sect. 1, and notes.

One who by his negligence has brought an injury upon himself cannot recover damages for it. Such is the rule of the civil and of the common law. A plaintiff in such cases is entitled to no relief. But where the defendant has been guilty of negligence also, in the same connection, the result depends upon the facts. The question in such cases is: 1. Whether the damage was occasioned entirely by the negligence or improper conduct of the defendant; or,...