Railroad Company v. National Bank

Decision Date01 October 1880
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

102 U.S. 14
102 U.S. 14
26 L.Ed. 61
October Term, 1880

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

This was an action by The National Bank of the Republic of New York against The Brooklyn City and Newtown Railroad Company.

The case, as made by an agreed statement of facts, is this:——

The company, a corporation organized under the laws of New York, executed, at Brooklyn, in that State, May 9, 1873, its promissory note for the sum of $5,000, payable four months after date to the order of William V. LeCount, its treasurer, at the Atlantic State Bank of Brooklyn. It was indorsed in blank, first by him, and then by Palmer & Co., a firm composed of Thomas Palmer, Jr., and Anson S. Palmer, the former being the president and the latter the financial agent of the company, and together owning the larger portion of its stock. It was made for the purpose only of raising money thereon for the company. Neither LeCount nor Palmer & Co.

Page 15

received any consideration for their respective indorsements. The note thus indorsed was, with others, placed by the company in the hands of Hutchinson & Ingersoll, a firm of note-brokers in Wall Street, for negotiation and sale.

Prior to the execution of the note Hutchinson & Ingersoll had frequently borrowed money from the bank. They, however, kept no account, and had no transactions with it, other than those to which reference will now be made.

In the month of October, 1872, the bank first made them a call loan at seven per cent interest, of $25,000, on collaterals. Subsequently, in 1873, it made to them other call loans on collaterals, at the same rate of interest, as follows: March 11, $15,000; March 15, $10,000; April 11, $10,000; May 16, $10,000; May 20, $20,000; May 23, $10,000; June 4, $15,000; June 6, $12,000; June 12, $10,000; June 19, $36,000; and July 11, $10,000. Each of these loans was a separate one, upon a particular and distinct lot of collaterals. Hutchinson & Ingersoll were in the habit of borrowing money from various banks and from individuals or firms upon specific lots of collaterals.

The loan of $36,000 on 19th June, 1873, was upon several notes as collateral security, among them the above-described note for $5,000, executed May 9, 1873. All the loans by the bank, prior to the one of $36,000, had been paid off before that loan was made.

The loan of $10,000 on 11th July, 1873, was upon the following notes as collateral security: Two notes of Howes, Hyatt, & Co. for $2,605.98 and $3,540.15, and two of H. L. Ritch & Co. for $3,320.17 and $2,146.92.

On the 22d of July, 1873, Howes, Hyatt, & Co. having become insolvent, Hutchinson & Ingersoll executed and delivered to the bank, at its request, antedated to June 19, 1873 (which was the date of the $36,000 loan), a written instrument, whereby they agreed with the bank 'that all securities, bonds, stocks, things in action, or other property or evidences of property whatsoever, which have been or may at any time hereafter be deposited or left by us or on our account, with said bank, whether specifically pledged or not, may be held by said bank, and shall be deemed to by and are hereby pledged

Page 16

as security for the payment of any and every indebtedness, liability, or engagement on our part, held by said bank, and that on the non-payment, when due and payable, of any sum or sums of money which have been or may hereafter be by said bank lent, paid, or advanced to or for the account or use of us, or for which we are or may become in any way liable or indebted to said bank, the said bank, or its president or cashier, may immediately thereupon, or at any time thereafter, sell, &c., . . . and apply the net proceeds of sale to the payment of any sum or sums due and payable from us to said bank, and hold any surplus of such net proceeds, together with any and all remaining securities, property or evidences of property, then held by said bank and not sold, as security for the payment of any and all other of our then existing and remaining liabilities and engagements to said bank.'

When that writing was executed, no agreement was made to extend the loan, or to refrain from calling it in.

The bank knew that Hutchinson & Ingersoll were note-brokers, but until Aug. 8, 1873, had no knowledge or information of the connection of the Palmers with the railroad company, or of the circumstances attending the making or indorsement of the note in suit, or of the purpose thereof, or of any relations, dealings, or communication between Hutchinson & Ingersoll, and the parties to the note (except that they knew Hutchinson & Ingersoll to be note-brokers), or that the note was anything else than ordinary business paper, or that there was any question as to the right of said Hutchinson & Ingersoll to pledge or negotiate it. Nor did the railroad company know or suspect that the firm had parted with or hypothecated said note until Aug. 15, 1873.

The company, by reason of certain advances made to its use, by Hutchinson & Ingersoll, became indebted to the latter, on the 8th of August, 1873, in the sum of $600. On the fifteenth day of August, 1873, it tendered that sum to the firm, and demanded a return of the $5,000 note. During the same month it made a like tender to the bank, and demanded the note.

The $36,000 loan was paid in full out of the collaterals given to secure its payment, as they respectively matured, without resorting to the note in suit, the first payment of $4,580 being

Page 17

July 22, 1873, and the last payment being April 4, 1874, leaving the $5,000 note in the bank's possession.

Hutchinson & Ingersoll are insolvent. The collaterals collected exceeded the $36,000 loan by $2,403.61.

On the $10,000 loan of July 11, 1873, there was a balance due the bank, Nov. 21, 1876, of $5,136.68 after exhausting all collaterals in its possession which had been specially pledged to secure that loan, and crediting the amount, with interest collected, of a certain judgment to be now referred to.

In 1874, the bank sued Palmer & Co., as indorsers upon the note in suit, in the Supreme Court of New York. The case was sent to a referee, who rendered judgment in favor of the bank for $601, which seems to be the amount due from the railroad company to Hutchinson & Ingersoll. That judgment, with the costs, was satisfied.

The present action is by the bank against the railroad company to recover the amount of the $5,000 note executed by the latter on the 9th of May, 1873, and placed in the hands of Hutchinson & Ingersoll for sale for the benefit of the company. It was agreed that, if the company is liable to the bank upon that note, the amount would be as of Nov. 21, 1876, $5,136.68.

The court below gave judgment for the bank, and the company sued out this writ.

Mr. William Dorsheimer for the plaintiff in error.

The matter is res judicata, for there was a determination, by the Supreme Court of New York, upon the same subject-matter in a controversy between the same parties or their privies. It is true that the defendants there were not the makers of the note. Although makers and indorsers may have independent interests, yet they, in this instance, are privies. The note never had any valid inception. The making and indorsing were alike without consideration. Neither the maker nor the indorsers could incur any liability on the note, except such as might arise from the unauthorized action of Hutchinson & Ingersoll in pledging it to the bank.

The term 'privies' is not confined to persons interested in real estate (3 Tomlin, Law Dict. 218; 2 Bouv. 382), nor is it true that only the same parties, eo nomine, are bound by a judgment. Green v. Clark, 5 Den. (N. Y.) 497; s. c. 13 Barb.

Page 18

(N. Y.) 57; Kent v. Hudson River Railroad Co., 22 id. 278; Taylor v. Spader, 48 N. Y. 664. The expression 'parties' is not confined to the parties to the record. It includes all those who have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit. Bates v. Stanton, 1 Duer (N. Y.), 87; Ehle v. Bingham, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 494.

Even if the judgment be not construed as res judicata, in the strict sense, the bank is estopped from proceeding further with this action. It selected its own tribunal, abided by the judgment there rendered, and entered satisfaction of it, after accepting the money which the court determined to be the whole amount due upon the note. The claim was extinguished by that acceptance and satisfaction. Woodworth v. Spofford, 2 McLean, 168; Sedam v. Williams, 4 id. 51; King v. Hoare, 13 Mees. & W. 449; Farrell v. Hibbard, 3 N. H. 318.

This case was tried upon similar pleadings, and the same state of facts as that, with the single exception of the paper signed July 22, 1873, which would not have varied the result there, and in no way strengthens the case here. It was signed long after both loans had been made, was without consideration, and no action was taken upon it. The bank did not agree to extend the loan, nor did it refrain from calling it in. It must be conceded that, under the adjudications in New York, the bank was not in that case entitled to recover more than the sum awarded, unless it had a lien upon all the securities of Hutchinson & Ingersoll, which was termed in the decision a 'banker's lien.' Its relations with them were not those of banker and customer, and such a lien could not, therefore, attach. They were not depositors or dealers with the plaintiff, and kept no account there. In the cases where the question of such a lien has arisen, the party asserting it was a banker quoad the person from whom the security had been acquired. In some of them, the lien was claimed under special circumstances, as on a pledge, but no banker's lien can arise, unless the relation of banker and customer exists. The banker in England is the general financial agent of the customer. Even there the lien would not apply to a case...

To continue reading

Request your trial
229 cases
  • Robertson v. H. Weston Lumber Co.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • February 21, 1921
    ... ... Robertson, State Revenue Agent, against the H ... Weston Lumber Company. From a judgment for defendant on ... demurrer, complainant appeals ... Mallery, 54 Miss. 499; City of Jackson v. National ... Bank & Trust Co., 112 Miss. 537. Estoppel has been held ... to ... it was cut and removed. If, for instance, a railroad should ... be built through or near to such tract of land, that might of ... ...
  • Robertson, State Revenue Agent, v. H. Weston Lumber Co.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • January 1, 1920
    ... ... Robertson, State Revenue Agent, against the H ... Weston Lumber Company. From a judgment for defendant on ... demurrer, complainant appeals ... v. Mallery, 54 Miss. 499; City of ... Jackson v. National Bank & Trust Co., ... 112 Miss. 537. Estoppel has been held to operate ... it was cut and removed. If, for instance, a railroad should ... be built through or near to such tract of land, that might of ... ...
  • Independent School Dist. of Sioux City v. Rew
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • September 23, 1901
    ... ... have done so or not. Lyon Co. v. Keene Five Cent Sav ... Bank, 100 F. 337, 338, 40 C.C.A. 391, 392; Newgass ... v. City of New ... his action upon them in the national courts ... In this ... state of the case, counsel for the ... 62, 65, 36 U.S.App. 152, ... 156, 30 L.R.A. 193; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 ... Wall. 357, 368, 21 L.Ed. 627; Myrick v ... ...
  • Bank of Conway v. Stary
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 18, 1924
    ...dealings of merchants and mariners in all the commercial countries of the civilized world. 3 Kent, 2; Brooklyn City, etc., v. Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 14, 26 L. Ed. 61, 68. Of this system we are required to take judicial notice. Sections 7938-7952, C. L. 1913. “This lex mercatoria or common law......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT