Raimondi v. Bianchi

• Citation: 136 A. 320
• Parties: RAIMONDI v. BIANCHI.
• Decision Date: 14 February 1927
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

136 A. 320

RAIMONDI

v. BIANCHI.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Feb. 14, 1927.

Suit by Amiello Raimondi against Ovidio C. Bianchi to restrain the collection of a judgment. Decree advised, restraining sheriff from proceeding to collect the judgment, unless defendant should accept a reduced amount.

Edward A. Schilling, of Newark, for complainant.

Donohue & O'Brien, of Newark, for defendant.

CHURCH, Vice Chancellor. The defendant, Bianchi, obtained a judgment for $2,200 against the complainant in the Essex county court of common pleas, which represented a balance claimed to be due him on a counsel fee, under an express contract, which was denied by complainant.

A bill was filed in this court to restrain the sheriff from collecting the judgment. Application was made for a preliminary restraint, and a motion was made to strike out the bill. The matters were heard before Vice Chancellor Berry, who continued the restraint until final hearing and denied the motion to strike out the bill.

The learned Vice Chancellor says, in his opinion reported in (N. J. Ch.) 134 A. 866:

"Agreements between attorney and client, because of the confidential relation, are always subject to the scrutiny of a court of equity. * * * An attorney at law is a quasi public officer. He is, in fact, an officer of the court and a part of the machinery of the law, and, as such, is charged with the duty of assisting in its administration. Like Cresar's wife, he should be above suspicion. Too often the accusing finger is pointed at members of the Bar without just cause. Because of these facts, and in view of the recognized high standing of the legal profession as a class, both courts and lawyers should welcome an inquiry into the fairness of transactions between attorney and client, and courts should never hestitate to condemn where the conduct of the attorney has been unconscionable. In no other way can the high reputation of the legal profession, of which its members are justly proud, be maintained."

The right to consider the reasonableness of this fee is therefore res adjudicata, as far as this court is concerned.

The defendant contends that it has not been established that any fraud was practiced by the attorney upon the client. This, it seems to me, is not the ground upon which our courts have considered and decided such cases. It is not necessary to show actual fraud. On the broad ground of public policy, the court, because of the fiduciary relation existing between attorney and client, will consider the reasonableness of the fee and the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement regarding it; and the burden of proof is on the attorney to show the absolute reasonableness of the charge.

In Dunn v. Dunn, 42 N. J. Eq. 431, at page 437 (7 A. 842), the court says:

"In Condit v. Blackwell, 7 C. E. Green [22 N. J. Eq.] 481, 485, 'This fiduciary relation then existing between these parties, the validity of this transaction, must be determined by rules of law which are not applicable to ordinary cases. The confidence which the relation of attorney and client begets between the parties, and the influence which the attorney thereby acquires, has led to a very close scrutiny of all transactions between them, and the law then often interposes to set aside contracts which, between other parties, would be subject to no exception. In such case, the burden of establishing the perfect fairness, adequacy and equity of the negotiation is thrown upon the attorney, and in the absence Of such proof, courts of equity treat the case as one of constructive fraud. * * * The transaction must be characterized by the utmost good faith. There must be no misrepresentation, and an entire absence of concealment or suppression of any fact within the knowledge of the agent which might influence the principal; and the burden of establishing the perfect fairness of the contract is on the agent.'

"As I have said above, it is not on the ground of actual fraud that courts interfere, but simply because of the fiduciary relation that is shown to have existed, and it not being made to appear that the transaction, whether a gift or contract, was perfectly fair and just. Weeks, in his work on Attorneys at Law, says: 'The rule is on the ground of public policy, not a fraud, and prevails although the attorney may be innocent of any intention to deceive, and act in good faith.' * * *

"Such is the rule in these cases, than which no principle is more universally approved. I must follow it. I think that an application of the...