Raimondi v. Bianchi
| Decision Date | 06 February 1928 |
| Docket Number | No. 103.,103. |
| Citation | 140 A. 584 |
| Parties | RAIMONDI v. BIANCHI. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Appeal from Court of Chancery.
Suit by Amiello Raimondi against Ovidio C. Bianchi to enjoin proceeding on a judgment at law. Prom a final decree (136 A. 3201 requiring defendant to accept less than his judgment called for, or to be enjoined from collecting it, defendant appeals. Reversed.
See, also, 134 A. 866.
Donohue & O'Brien, of Newark (James P. X. O'Brien, of Newark, of counsel), for appellant.
E. A. & W. A. Schilling, of Newark, for respondent.
The respondent was indicted by the grand jury of Essex county for arson and burning a building with intent to defraud insurance companies. He retained appellant to defend him, and was represented at the trial in the quarter sessions court by him. Such trial resulted in an acquittal of respondent of the charge of arson and a disagreement of the jury upon the charge of burning with intent to defraud insurers.
Appellant asserted that respondent had entered into an agreement to pay him the sum of $2,500, for representing him at such trial and in such proceedings, of which total sum $300 had been paid. Upon refusal to pay the balance of $2,200, appellant brought suit against respondent in the Essex common pleas court declaring upon an express contract and respondent denying such contract. Appellant was successful in such action, which resulted in a verdict and judgment in his favor for $2,200.
A rule to show cause why such verdict should not be set aside and a new trial had was allowed and argued, and such rule was discharged, and appellant thereupon sought to enforce his judgment by the issuance of an execution.
Thereupon the appellant filed a bill of complaint in the Court of Chancery setting up these facts and alleging that the contract was made by the parties while the relationship of attorney and client existed between them, and should have been characterized by utmost fairness and good faith, and was presumed to be fraudulent, unless otherwise proven to the contrary; that, at the time said contract was entered into, the respondent was in great mental distress, and in danger of loss of his liberty; that appellant failed to give respondent all the information and advice which it was his duty to give, and dealt with him surreptitiously, concealing from him that he could only be convicted under one of the counts in the indictment against him; that such agreement was not made in good faith, but upon misrepresentation, concealment, and suppression of facts known to the appellant, and that at the trial at law the appellant failed to establish that the compensation contract was fair, just, honest, and honorable.
Respondent in his bill prayed that appellant be restrained from proceeding upon his judgment at law and upon the execution issued thereunder, and that the sheriff and all other persons acting for or upon behalf of him be restrained and enjoined from taking any further proceedings upon said judgment or execution, and that the Court of Chancery find and determine what sum of money was due and owing from the respondent to the appellant, and that, upon payment of the sum so found, the judgment of the court of common pleas of Essex county be declared to be paid and satisfied.
Upon an application for an injunction pendente lite, a restraining order issued.
Appellant filed an answer admitting the proceedings in the court of law and charging that the contract was made when respondent was in clear and understanding mind, and understood thoroughly his position and the contract he was making; that nothing was concealed from him, and that the transaction was characterized by the utmost fairness and good faith; that the respondent was guilty of fraud and deceit in his transactions with the appellant, and was barred from relief, in that, because of such fraud and deceit, he procured the services of appellant, and deprived appellant of payment therefor; that resp...
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LiVolsi, Application of
...equity courts were not permitted to step in after a law court had already adjudicated a fee dispute. See Raimondi v. Bianchi, 102 N.J.Eq. 254, 140 A. 584 (E. & A. 1928). The rationale behind this broad power exercised by equity courts over attorney-client fee disputes was explained by Justi......
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Steiner v. Stein
...N.J.Eq. 437, 79 A. 260 (Ch. 1911); Raimondi v. Bianchi, 100 N.J.Eq. 448, 136 A. 320 (Ch. 1926), reversed on other grounds 102 N.J.Eq. 254, 140 A. 584 (E. & A. 1928); Grimm v. Franklin, 102 N.J.Eq. 198, 140 A. 236 (Ch. 1928); Sinisi v. Milton, 107 N.J.Eq. 179, 151 A. 907 (E. & A. 1930); Lewi......
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Sun Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark v. Rashkes
...See, also, Proff v. Shirvanian, 110 N. J.Eq. 639, 160 A. 844; Raimondi v. Bianchi, 100 N.J.Eq. 238, 134 A. 866, reversed 102 N.J.Eq. 254, 140 A. 584. In Kelley v. Repetto, 62 N.J.Eq. 246, 49 A. 429, 431, the court said: "His [the attorney's] relation to her was fiduciary, requiring from him......
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Hughes v. Eisner
...v. Schwinghammer, 78 N.J.Eq. 437, 79 A. 260 (Ch.1911); Raimondi v. Bianchi, 100 N.J.Eq. 448, 136 A. 320 (Ch.1926), reversed 102 N.J.Eq. 254, 140 A. 584 (E. & A.1928); Crimm v. Franklin, 102 N.J.Eq. 198, 140 A. 236 (Ch.1928), affirmed 110 N.J.Eq. 573, 146 A. 914 (E. & A.1929); Proff v. Shirv......