Rainbow Glass Co. v. Local Union No. 610
| Decision Date | 17 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-1110,81-1110 |
| Citation | 663 F.2d 814 |
| Parties | 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3038, 92 Lab.Cas. P 13,120 RAINBOW GLASS COMPANY, Appellant, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 610, Affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Suelthaus, Krueger, Cunningham, Yates & Kaplan, P. C., Lawrence P. Kaplan, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Clyde E. Craig, Barbeau A. Roy, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before HENLEY and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and NICHOL, * Senior District Judge.
Rainbow Glass Company (the Company) brought suit to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The district court 1 granted summary judgment for appellee Local 610 on its counterclaim seeking enforcement of the arbitrator's award. The Company now appeals from this order. We affirm.
The Company and Local 610 negotiated and executed a collective bargaining agreement effective August 1, 1979 through July 31, 1982. 2 Article VIII, Section 7 of the seniority provisions of this agreement provides:
All new employees shall be on a probationary period for the first thirty-one (31) calendar days of employment ....
Any new employee must work thirty (30) cumulative work days within any ninety (90) (day) calendar period and upon completion thereof, shall be considered a regular employee and placed on the seniority list ....
During negotiation of this bargaining agreement, the Company proposed discounted wage rates for probationary employees. The parties agreed on the following provision, which is contained in the current agreement:
ARTICLE IX WAGES
New employees hired as probationary employees with the purpose of adding such employee to the seniority list may be paid seventy percent (70%) of the hourly rate for the first twelve (12) months; eighty percent (80%) of the hourly rate for the second twelve (12) months; and, after two (2) years' employment must be paid the full hourly rate of pay.
Casual employees that the Company does not specifically indicate will be on probation, with the prospect of gaining seniority must be paid the prevailing hourly rate of pay ....
Pertinent language concerning seniority rights in the previous bargaining agreement, which was effective from August 1, 1976 through July 31, 1979, provided that "beginners shall obtain seniority after thirty (30) days of employment."
The grievant in the instant case, Edward Copeland, filed a grievance on January 22, 1980, 3 alleging that the Company had violated the provisions of Article VIII, Section 7 of the current agreement and claiming seniority from November 12, 1979. 4 Copeland had been employed by the Company as a temporary driver since the early 1960's. In this capacity he worked a few days at a time when the Company needed an extra driver or a replacement for a regular, full-time employee. In August, 1978 he began working steadily and was paid the full wage rate specified in the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time. The Company, however, never paid any fringe benefits for Copeland. 5
At the grievance hearing and in a post-hearing brief, the Union relied on the Article VIII, Section 7 seniority provision to support Copeland's claim of seniority. The Company relied on the Article IX wage provisions to support its claim that Copeland was a casual employee not entitled to seniority.
The arbitrator initially noted that the provisions cited by the Company and Local 610 were conflicting, but concluded that it was unnecessary to resolve the apparent conflict because "the quoted sections of Article VIII and Article IX refer and apply only to those employees hired after the effective date of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement ...." After pointing out that Copeland was not a "new employee" on the effective date of the current agreement and that the quoted provisions consequently were not determinative of his seniority rights, the arbitrator stated: "(I)f Grievant did, in fact, have seniority rights, such rights had to be gained prior to the current contract because there is no provision granting Grievant such rights under the current agreement ...." The arbitrator added:
In August of 1978, clearly the status of Grievant's employment changed from a part time employee to a full time employee. Thus, to that extent, at least, Grievant was a 'beginner' ... and came under the language of Article XXI (). Thus, after 30 days, Grievant was entitled to be placed on the seniority list, even though he was considered a 'temporary employee' for fringe benefit rights, and did not receive same. 6
On appeal from the order of the district court enforcing the arbitration award, the Company contends that the court erred in upholding the award because it was not drawn from the essence of the current collective bargaining agreement, but rather, was based on an expired labor contract. In support of its position, the Company asserts that the arbitrator's statement that "there is no provision granting Grievant (seniority) rights under the current agreement" in effect decided the question of seniority rights against Copeland. Appellant argues that the arbitrator could not award seniority rights to Copeland under the prior labor agreement because he had the authority to act only under the current bargaining agreement, which he was charged to interpret. Additionally, the Company contends that an award under the previous labor agreement is unenforceable because the parties are no longer bound by the terms of that agreement, and the term on which the arbitrator's award is based was deleted during negotiations of the current agreement.
Appellee Local 610 initially notes that the arbitrator was empowered under the current contract to resolve differences "as to the meaning or application of the provisions" of the current contract. Appellee's argument that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the current bargaining agreement is concisely stated in one paragraph of its brief.
The Company fails to recognize ... the critical distinction recognized by the Arbitrator between the initial creation of Grievant's seniority rights under the prior agreement and the maintenance of those rights under the current agreement. When the Arbitrator found that 'there is no provision granting Grievant such rights under the current agreement' (emphasis added), he was precisely basing that conclusion on his analysis of language in the current agreement which addresses the initial accrual of seniority rights only in terms of new employees. Because in his view, the seniority provisions of the current agreement did not literally apply to Grievant, he was compelled to look to the terms of the prior agreement, under which Grievant's seniority first accrued, to determine the intent of the parties with respect to Grievant's present seniority rights under an agreement whose terms did not expressly speak to Grievant's situation.
In support of its position that the arbitrator's consideration of an expired collective bargaining agreement does not invalidate his award, Local 610 argues that it was necessary to examine extrinsic evidence, that is, the earlier contract, because the silence of the current agreement on a subject expected to be addressed in that agreement created an ambiguity.
Judicial review of an arbitration award is limited to a determination whether the arbitrator acted within the authority granted him by the collective bargaining agreement. Drivers & Helpers Local 554 v. Young & Hay Transportation Co., 522 F.2d 562, 567-68 (8th Cir. 1975). It is not within the scope of this court's review to pass upon the merits of the arbitrator's decision. Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Ass'n v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 597 F.2d 1155, 1157 (8th Cir. 1979). Rather, the court must affirm the district court's...
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