Rainbow Resources, Inc. v. Calf Looking, CV-81-94-GF.

• Decision Date: 10 August 1981
• Docket Number: No. CV-81-94-GF.,CV-81-94-GF.
• Parties: RAINBOW RESOURCES, INC., Plaintiff, v. Honorable Gerald CALF LOOKING, Judge of the Blackfeet Tribal Court, Gloria Gervais, Clerk of the Blackfeet Tribal Court, and Fred Bull Calf, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Montana

521 F. Supp. 682

RAINBOW RESOURCES, INC., Plaintiff, v. Honorable Gerald CALF LOOKING, Judge of the Blackfeet Tribal Court, Gloria Gervais, Clerk of the Blackfeet Tribal Court, and Fred Bull Calf, Defendants.

No. CV-81-94-GF.

United States District Court, D. Montana, Great Falls Division.

August 10, 1981.

J. Clayton LaGrone, Kent L. Jones, Mark Blongewicz, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Collingsworth & Nelson, P. C., Tulsa, Okl., Richard L. Beatty, Aronow, Anderson, Beatty & Lee, Shelby, Mont., for plaintiff.

Philip E. Roy, Browning, Mont., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

HATFIELD, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Rainbow Resources, Inc., has brought the present action asking this court to issue an order restraining the defendants from enforcing a Temporary Restraining Order issued in the Blackfeet Tribal Court on July 7, 1981, and from further proceeding in any way with Civil Case No. 81 CA 282, denominated Fred Bull Calf, et al. v. Rainbow Resources, Inc., now pending before that court. Defendants in the present action have countered by filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff, Rainbow Resources, has failed to establish that it will suffer irreparable injury and (2) that there is an action pending between the same parties in a court of competent jurisdiction (i. e., the Blackfeet Tribal Court) which arises from the same set of operative facts.

Jurisdiction vests in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In that regard, this court is acutely aware of the delicate ground upon which it treads in determining that jurisdiction lies with it rather than with the Blackfeet Tribal Court. The United States Supreme Court set forth the framework by which a federal district court is to determine if it has jurisdiction of a controversy arising on Indian lands and which involves Indian persons in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). Evaluation of the factual setting from which the present controversy arises, in light of the parameters espoused in Martinez, leads this court to conclude that it does have jurisdiction over the action as presented.

Understanding of the ultimate disposition of the present controversy requires clarification of the factual situation from which it arises. Plaintiff, Rainbow Resources, Inc., a company engaged in oil exploration and production, entered into a lease with defendant, Fred Bull Calf (along with twenty-nine (29) other unnamed heirs to Blackfeet Allotment # 1002), on May 19, 1976, which granted plaintiff the right to explore for, produce, market and sell oil and gas from the affected lands for a period of five (5) years and so long thereafter as oil and gas was produced in paying quantities. The lease was issued under the approval of the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 396.

Under Paragraph 3(g) of the lease, the parties agreed "to abide by and conform to any and all regulations of the Secretary of Interior now or hereafter in force relative to such leases including 30 C.F.R. § 221." Such regulations, specifically 30 C.F.R. § 221.34(a), provide that once the area supervisor of the United States Geological Survey¹ has determined that a well is not "useful for the purpose of the lease", the well must be plugged and abandoned and "equipment shall be removed and premises at the well site shall be properly conditioned immediately after plugging operations are completed on any well." Subpart (c) of that same regulation provides that "drilling equipment shall not be removed from any suspended drilling well without first securing the written consent of the supervisor."

Plaintiff maintains that a well which it had begun in October of 1979 was completed as a dry hole in June or July of 1980, and since no production from the well existed, under its own terms the lease expired as of May 19, 1981. Plaintiff contends that as such it had the right to remove all or any equipment which had been placed on the leased premises for the purposes of development of the lease within ninety (90) days of that termination date provided it obtained authorization from the United States Geological Survey as required by 30 C.F.R. § 221.34. The required authorization was obtained on July 28, 1981.

In light of the suspension of drilling operations on the well in issue, defendant Fred Bull Calf filed a petition for injunction and temporary restraining order in the Blackfeet Tribal Court on June 12, 1981. On July 7, 1981 an order was entered by defendant, The Honorable Gerald Calf Looking, in his capacity as Tribal Court Judge, restraining the plaintiff in the present action, Rainbow Resources, from removing any equipment from the leased premises.

The events which transpired prompted plaintiff Rainbow Resources to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, asking it to declare, in essence, that the Tribal Court was without jurisdiction to issue the Temporary Restraining Order and to order that court from further enforcement of that order. The desired effect being that plaintiff Rainbow Resources would be free to remove its equipment from the leased premises.

This court concludes that the plaintiff, Rainbow Resources, is correct in asserting that subject matter jurisdiction properly lies with this court and not with the Blackfeet Tribal Court. This conclusion is based on this court's interpretation of the rationale underlying the leading case of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). As a sovereign power, an Indian tribe is immune from civil suit absent an express waiver of that immunity by an act of Congress. Id. at 58, 98 S.Ct. at 1677. The Supreme Court in Martinez noted that, in determining the propriety of a cause of action for declaratory and/or injunctive relief under a statute which does not expressly authorize such action, the critical inquiry is whether Congress has made clear its intention to permit the intrusion on tribal sovereignty that such action would entail. Id. at 72, 98 S.Ct. at 1684. The factors to be considered in making this determination are: (1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) ...