Rainey v. Sci-Coal Twp. Supt
| Decision Date | 17 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 4:CV-13-1806 |
| Parties | EUGENE HOWARD RAINEY, Petitioner v. SCI-COAL TWP. SUPT., Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Brann)
Eugene Howard Rainey, an inmate presently confined at the State Correctional Institution, Coal Township, Pennsylvania (SCI-Coal Twp.), filed this pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. By Memorandum and Order dated August 26, 2013, this Court granted Petitioner's motion for stay and administratively closed his case pending conclusion of Rainey's state court proceedings. See Doc. 8. Petitioner's motion requesting that his action remain stayed was granted by Order dated April 29, 2014. See Doc. 13. This matter was reopened on July 22, 2015 after Petitioner notified the Court that his state court proceedings had terminated.
Rainey was convicted of third degree murder and criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on March 18, 2009 following a jury retrial in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania.1 The Petitioner was tried along with a co-defendant, his brother, George Rainey.2 It is noted that he was acquitted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree. Petitioner was sentenced on April 13, 2009 to an aggregate twenty-five (25) to fifty (50) year term of imprisonment.
Following a direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on October 19, 2010 . See Commonwealth v. Rainey, 15 A.3d 533 (Pa. Super. 2010)(Table). A petition for allowance of appeal was not filed with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
On or about March 18, 2011, Rainey filed a pro se petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).3 After appointment ofcounsel and a May 6, 2011 evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. The Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief by decision dated April 9, 2012.4 See Commonwealth v. Rainey, 48 A.3d 471 (Pa. Super 2012) (Table).
On November 2, 2012, Petitioner filed a second PCRA action which sought relief on the basis of after discovered evidence. The new evidence consisted of statements by three alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting who were willing to testify that Petitioner was not the shooter. Following appointment of counsel, a hearing was convened on February 28, 2013 and after a continuance was granted due to the unavailability of a witness, the hearing concluded on April 17, 2013. Following the hearing, Rainey's second PCRA action was denied.5 An appeal of that determination was denied by the Superior Court on December 24, 2013 (after the July, 2013 filing of this action). See Commonwealth v. Rainey, 93 A.3d 519 (Pa. Super. 2013)(Table).
On November 15, 2014, Rainey filed a third PCRA action asserting ineffective assistance of second PCRA counsel. A hearing was conducted on May 1, 2014 and thereafter relief was denied. The Superior Court affirmed the denialof PCRA relief. See Commonwealth v. Rainey, 2014 WL 10795258 (Pa. Super. Oct. 22, 2014).
By way of background and as summarized by the Superior Court, Petitioner and his brother, George, were arrested and charged with the murder of Dion Williams. Specifically, it was alleged that Petitioner, his brother, and a third individual, Joseph Mallory, were driving and smoking marijuana together in a vehicle on the morning of January 9, 2008. George Rainey, who was driving the car, spotted a car driven by Letika Engram with a front seat passenger, Dion Williams.6 The Rainey car proceeded to follow the Engram vehicle. When the Engram car paused at a stop sign, Petitioner left his car and ran towards the other vehicle. However, Engram sped off before he arrived.
After a high speed chase, the Engram car was eventually blocked in an alley by the Raineys' vehicle, at which point it is asserted that Petitioner again exited his vehicle, ran to the passenger side of the Engram vehicle, removed a handgun from his pocket, and fired three gunshots into the front passenger side fatally wounding Williams. As they fled the scene, George Rainey purportedly asked the Petitioner if he had shot Williams. The Rainey brothers eventually leftPennsylvania together and were subsequently apprehended in the State of Maryland while registered in a hotel under fictitious names.
Petitioner presently seeks habeas corpus relief on the following grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with a weapon; (2) he is factually and legally innocent of all charges; (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance and by allowing trial testimony by a new witness; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (5) newly discovered evidence pertaining to witness recantation, prosecutorial misconduct, and exculpatory identification evidence. Rainey indicates that Claims (1) , (3) , & (4) were raised on his direct appeal.. He adds that Claims (2) &(5) were included in his second PCRA action
"The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).
Specifically, when a federal-law issue has been adjudicated on the merits bya state court, the federal court reverses only when the decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).7 See generally, Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 114 (2009); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234 (3d Cir. 2002); Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has held that the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have independent meaning. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-405 (2000). As explained in Bell, 535 U.S. at 694:
A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the 'contrary to' clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. . . . The court may grant relief under the 'unreasonable application' clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case. . . . The focusof the latter inquiry is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable . . . .
Furthermore, resolution of factual issues by the state courts are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that they are not. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1).
In summary, the appropriate inquiry for federal district courts in reviewing the merits of Section 2254 petitions is whether the state court decisions applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in United States Supreme Court cases, decided the case before them differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts, or unreasonably applied Supreme Court governing principles to the facts of the particular case. See Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 417-18 (3d Cir. 2001) (); Martini v. Hendricks, 188 F. Supp.2d 505, 510 (D. N.J. 2002) (). Findings of fact by the state courts are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that they are not. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Grounds One and Two similarly contend that there was insufficient evidence to support Rainey's conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. See Doc. 1, ¶ 12. Petitioner adds that the Commonwealth failed to prove all elements of both of his underlying crimes. The gist of his argument appears to be that his convictions are inconsistent because the conspiracy charge includes the element of specific intent while the homicide conviction does not. See Doc. 16, p. 17. The Commonwealth counters that there is no basis for federal habeas corpus relief because it "produced ample evidence showing that defendant not only killed the victim by shooting him, but also conspired with his brother to do so." Doc. 29, pp. 9-10.
When addressing the issue of sufficiency of the evidence the standard of review used by a federal court is "whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 390 (1979). The Superior Court in reviewing Petitioner's insufficient evidence claim applied Pennsylvania's standard which is consistent with Jackson. As such, the state court has not applied a standard contrary to clearly established federal law.
Petitioner was acquitted of first degree murder but was convicted of third degree murder. Under Pennsylvania state law, third degree murder is defined as when a person commits a killing which is malicious but neither intentional nor committed during the commission of a felony. Malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's body.
It is initially noted that the Commonwealth produced eyewitness testimony by two persons at trial which established that the Petitioner shot and killed the victim. Malice could clearly be inferred from Eugene Rainey's use of a...
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