Rainey v. Wayne State University, 97-CV-60152-AA.

• Court: United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)
• Writing for the Court: Steeh
• Citation: 26 F.Supp.2d 973
• Parties: Jocelyn E. RAINEY, Plaintiff, v. WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.
• Docket Number: No. 97-CV-60152-AA.,97-CV-60152-AA.
• Decision Date: 10 September 1998

26 F.Supp.2d 973 Jocelyn E. RAINEY, Plaintiff,
v.
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants. No. 97-CV-60152-AA. United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division. September 10, 1998.

Page 974

O'Neal O. Wright, O'Neal O. Wright Assoc., Detroit, MI, for Jocelyn E. Rainey.

William G. Abbatt, Robert C. Brandenburg, Brooks & Kushman, Southfield, MI, for Wayne State University, Peter Williams, Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc., Daimler Benz AG a/k/a Daimler Benz.

OPINION AND ORDER

STEEH, District Judge.

Defendants Wayne State University (WSU) and WSU professor Peter Williams have filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity stemming from the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff has filed a response which does not address sovereign immunity, as it has been interpreted in the federal context, but rather, improperly addresses state law immunity principles. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are set forth fully in the court's order denying in part and granting in part defendants' motions for partial summary judgment on the issues of copyright preemption and profit damages. Those facts are not set forth again here but are incorporated by reference to that opinion.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the court to render summary judgment "forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See F.D.I.C. v. Alexander, 78 F.3d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir.1996). The Supreme Court has affirmed the court's use of summary judgment as an integral part of the fair and efficient administration of justice. The procedure is not a disfavored procedural shortcut. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also

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Kutrom Corp. v. City of Center Line, 979 F.2d 1171, 1174 (6th Cir.1992).

The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "`whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Winningham v. North Am. Resources Corp., 42 F.3d 981, 984 (6th Cir.1994) (citing Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir.1989)). The evidence and all inferences therefrom must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Enertech Elec., Inc. v. Mahoning County Comm'r, 85 F.3d 257, 259 (6th Cir.1996); Wilson v. Stroh Companies, Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir. 1992). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 774 (6th Cir. 1996).

If the movant establishes by use of the material specified in Rule 56(c) that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); see also Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1995). Mere allegations or denials in the non-movant's pleadings will not meet this burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Further, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings to avoid summary judgment. It must support its claim with some probative evidence. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993).

ANALYSIS

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

The Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment prevents suit in federal court by a citizen against his own state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). Eleventh Amendment immunity acts as a jurisdictional bar. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Estate of Ritter v. University of Mich., 851 F.2d 846, 850-51 (6th Cir.1988). Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment shields the state, a state agency or a state official sued in his or her official capacity from suit for monetary damages or retrospective relief. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment "bars suits in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347).

A claim that seeks to enjoin a state instrumentality or state officer from violating federal law, however, is exempt from Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Ex...