Raj v. Dickson City Borough, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-692
| Decision Date | 14 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-692 |
| Parties | ANTHONY RAJ Plaintiff v. DICKSON CITY BOROUGH and MICHAEL RANAKOSKI, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE MANNION)
Presently before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants the Borough of Dickson City ("Dickson City"), and Michael Ranakoski ("Ranakoski"), (collectively, "Defendants"). (Doc. 29). For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be GRANTED and judgement will be entered in favor of Defendants.
This suit stems from an incident that occurred in the early morning hours of July 23, 2014. While on patrol, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Ranakoski observed a white Nissan sedan stopped at a red light with no headlights. After the light turned green, the vehicle turned left onto the Scranton Carbondale Highway, and Ranakoski initiated a traffic stop. Shawn Baynes ("Baynes") was the driver and the plaintiff Anthony Raj ("Raj") wasseated in the front passenger seat. Upon running their drivers' licenses, Ranakoski discovered Baynes's license was suspended out of North Carolina, but Raj's license was valid. Ranakoski agreed to let the vehicle go without a citation, as long as Raj drove. Baynes and Raj then switched positions. After telling them that they were free to leave, Ranakoski struck up a conversation with Baynes and Raj, asking where they were coming from and what their destination was.
Ranakoski became suspicious when Baynes began acting nervously and upon learning that the two were unrelated and traveling from North Carolina to Binghamton, New York. Ranakoski asked if he could search the vehicle and both agreed. After determining that the vehicle was a rental, and that Baynes had rented the vehicle, Ranakoski specifically asked Baynes if he consented to the search of the vehicle and Baynes consented. Raj, who was in the driver's seat, popped open the trunk and inside Ranakoski found two backpacks—a blue and gray bag that contained packages of suspected cocaine, and a blue and orange bag that did not contain any contraband. Nothing in the bags identified the owner of the item, but Ranakoski assumed one bag belonged to Raj and one to Baynes.
Ranakoski told them they were being detained, handcuffed them, sat them on the curb, and then called for backup. Without first telling them that he found drugs, Ranakoski asked which bag belonged to whom. Baynes stated that the blue and gray bag, which contained the drugs, was his, andRaj claimed ownership of the blue and orange bag. A field test of the substance was positive for cocaine.
Raj and Baynes were then transported to the Dickson City Police Department. On the way, Ranakoski, pursuant to department policy, called the on-call Lackawanna County Assistant District Attorney, Gene Riccardo ("ADA Riccardo"), in order to get felony charges approved. Ranakoski originally intended to charge Baynes with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and Raj with conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, but Riccardo only approved charges against Baynes. At the police department, Raj was released and Ranakoski prepared a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause against Baynes, as well as an incident report.
After several continuances, Baynes's had a preliminary hearing before a magistrate on October 16, 2014, at which Ranakoski testified, and all charges were bound over for trial. After the hearing, Lackawanna County Deputy District Attorney Shane Scanlon ("ADA Scanlon") instructed Ranakoski to apply for an arrest warrant for Raj. That same day, Ranakoski prepared a criminal complaint with an affidavit of probable cause against Raj, setting forth the following charges: (1) manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance; (2) use/possession of drug paraphernalia; and (3) conspiracy - use/possession of drug paraphernalia. The complaint and affidavit were presented to a magistrate, who issued an arrest warrant for Raj.
In December 2015, Raj was located by the United States Marshals Services ("USMS") in Broome County, New York. He remained in the Broome County Jail until June 21, 2016, as a result of the warrant as well as an additional tampering with evidence charge he received for disposing of cocaine in his possession when USMS located him.
Raj was transported to Lackawanna County, arraigned on June 21, 2016, a preliminary hearing was held on July 14, 2016. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found that a prima facie case had been made against Raj and bound over all counts for trial. Raj testified that the Office of the District Attorney made an offer that "if he testified against Baynes and pled guilty to a reduced charged the matter would be over." (Doc. 30, at 8). On November 4, 2016, Baynes pleaded guilty and, on November 9, 2016, the charges against Raj were nolle prossed.
On April 18, 2017, Raj brought this two-Count civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and state law. On June 19, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the court denied by memorandum and order dated January 26, 2018. (Doc. 26; Doc. 27). Defendants then filed an answer and raised affirmative defenses. (Doc. 28). Subsequently, Defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 29), a brief in support, (Doc. 35), and statement of facts, (Doc. 30). Raj filed a brief in opposition, (Doc. 42), an appendix with exhibits, (Doc. 41), and a response to the statement of facts, (Doc. 40).
Because the parties set forth the correct legal standard with respect to a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) in their briefs, the court does not fully repeat it herein. Suffice to say that, if the moving party meets its burden by showing that "on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party," In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003), then the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts," and show that sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor," Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998).
Section 1983 Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006). To state a claim under Section 1983, "a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States." Id. (citations omitted). "A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvementin the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003).
In Count I, Raj alleges, pursuant to Section 1983, that Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, arrest without probable cause, and malicious prosecution, as well as his right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law. He also alleges that Dickson City has been deliberately indifferent to the need for more or different training, supervision, investigation, or discipline with respect to the proper exercise of its officers' arrest power.2
As a preliminary matter, however, the court notes that Raj brings his claims against Defendants under the both the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment, alleging that his arrest constituted a deprivation of due process. Because the Fourth Amendment covers the stated claims, Raj's Fourteenth Amendment claims, asstandalone claims, must be dismissed under the "more-specific provision rule." "Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing the claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Betts v. New Castle Youth Development Center, 621 F.3d 249, 261 (2010). Also, since Pennsylvania provides the constitutionally required procedures under the Fourth Amendment for pre-trial detainees and affords them the process that is due for the seizures of such persons in criminal cases, there is no Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. Id. ().3 Accordingly, Raj's Count I claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are DISMISSED.
Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate on Raj's Count I Section 1983 claims because he cannot establish the prerequisite requirement that Raj was deprived of his constitutional rights. More particularly, Defendants argue that the evidence of record shows that Ranakoski had probable cause to file the criminal complaint against Raj, since the affidavit of probable cause set forth in great detail the basis for the three separate drug charges filed against Raj. Defendants contend that the mere fact Baynes claimed ownership of the backpack containing the cocaine does not negate that there was probable cause to also arrest Raj for the drug charges which, they note, the magistrate agreed with at Raj's preliminary hearing and bound all of his charges over for trial.4 Therefore, Defendants argue that because probable...
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