Rajnowski v. Detroit, B. C. & A. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1889
• Citation: 41 N.W. 849,74 Mich. 15
• Parties: RAJNOWSKI v. DETROIT, B. C. & A. R. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

41 N.W. 849

74 Mich. 15

RAJNOWSKI v. DETROIT, B. C. & A. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

February 8, 1889

Error to circuit court, Alpena county; KELLEY, Judge.

Action by Catharine Rajnowski against the Detroit, Bay City & Alpena Railroad Company for damages caused by burning plaintiff's house. For further statement, see Rajnowski v. Railroad Co., 41 N.W. 847.

A. M. Henry, (Shields &amp McNamara, of counsel,) for appellant.

Cobb & Currier, (Depew & Rutherford, of counsel,) for appellee.

CAMPBELL J.

This is one of two cases brought to recover damages arising out of the alleged burning of plaintiff's house by sparks from a locomotive belonging to and run by defendant. This case is for the loss of furniture burned, and the other (ante, 847) for the death of a child. There are some differences in the facts set forth in the two records, but none that in this proceeding in error we can notice. Plaintiff recovered $192 as the value of the furniture when burned, which seems to have been the only value shown. The facts in dispute related chiefly to the condition of the locomotive as to security against scattering sparks, as well as to its management, and also to the real cause of the fire as caused by the engine, or as started from something within the house itself, and not from outside. Some claim was also set up of contributory negligence in allowing the furniture to burn up. The declaration is criticised, but we do not discover it has any failure to charge negligence, both as regards the condition of the locomotive, and as regards its management; and the charge of the court was sufficiently careful as to the circumstance under which liability would exist for the burning. And we do not think that the charge fairly construed, allowed the jury to resort to any knowledge peculiar to any of them of material facts. What the court meant, and what they would naturally understand was meant, was no more than this; that the jury should apply to the testimony and the facts their own general intelligence and knowledge of affairs. This all sensible men are bound to do.

There was very strong testimony to the effect that the engine was in perfect order, and properly managed, and that no such scattering of fire as was charged was probable or possible. But there was, on the other hand, testimony equally positive of such an escape of fire as indicated both a defective spark-arrester and careless management. In such a conflict we are not authorized to disturb a verdict as contrary to what we might possibly believe, if called on to decide the facts. The case certainly presents some peculiar features, but we are unable to see that there was not testimony legally competent to lead to a verdict, if believed, as it seems to have been. Neither, in our opinion, is there anything in the record which would justify us in taking the question of contributory negligence as one to be decided for defendant. There was testimony for the jury to be passed upon. The language of the court does not, so far as we can see, violate any rule of law, so as to give defendant any sufficient ground of reversal. So far as the record shows, if...