Rajput v. Synchrony Bank

• Decision Date: 31 October 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-1595
• Citation: 221 F.Supp.3d 607
• Parties: Rachel RAJPUT, Plaintiff v. SYNCHRONY BANK f/k/a GE Capital Retail Bank, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

221 F.Supp.3d 607

Rachel RAJPUT, Plaintiff

v.SYNCHRONY BANK f/k/a GE Capital Retail Bank, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-1595

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed October 31, 2016

Craig Thor Kimmel, Kimmel & Silverman, Ambler, PA, for Plaintiff.

Valerie Eifert Brown, Reed Smith LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

William J. Nealon, United States District Judge

On August 14, 2015, Plaintiff, Rachel Rajput, filed a complaint against Defendant, Synchrony Bank f/k/a GE Capital Retail Bank, under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. ("TCPA"). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that "[b]eginning in or around August 2014 and continuing through October 2014 Defendant called Plaintiff on her cellular telephone on a repetitive and continuous basis in an attempt to contact her about a Gap, Inc. credit card." (Id. at p. 3). She claims that "[w]hen contacting Plaintiff on her cellular telephone, Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system [ ("ATDS") ] and automatic and/or pre-recorded messages." (Id. ). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that she "explicitly revoked any consent that may have been previously given for Defendant to call her on her cellular telephone." (Id. ). According to Plaintiff, her "revocation of consent was heard and acknowledged by Defendant." (Id. ). Furthermore, Defendant allegedly "persisted in calling Plaintiff on her cellular telephone" after her alleged revocation. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Plaintiff claims that these allegations support a claim under section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA because Defendant "plac[ed] repeated calls using an [ATDS] to Plaintiff's cellular telephone without prior express consent." (Id. at p. 4).

On January 29, 2016, Defendant moved to stay the above-captioned action until the United States Supreme Court ruled in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , –––U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1892, 191 L.Ed.2d 762 (2015), and the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in ACA International v. Federal Communications Commission , Case No. 15–1211, 2015 WL 5361805 (D.C. Cir. filed July 10, 2015). (Doc. 10). On March 10, 2016, Defendant's motion to stay was granted in part and dismissed as moot in part. (Doc. 11). Specifically, this matter was stayed pending the disposition of Spokeo by the Supreme Court of the United States. (Id. at p. 7). As a result, Defendant's request to stay this action pending the United States Circuit Court for the D.C. Circuit's disposition of ACA International was dismissed as moot. (Id. at p. 7 n.1).

On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Spokeo . Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff notified the Court of the Spokeo decision and, as a result, sought to reopen the above-captioned matter. (Doc. 12). As a result of that notice, the Court lifted the stay and reopened this case. (Doc. 13).

On July 12, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to stay this action pending the D.C. Circuit's disposition of ACA International and brief in support. (Doc. 14). On July 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. 15). On August 1, 2016, Defendant filed its reply. (Doc. 16). As a result, the motion to stay pending the D.C. Circuit's disposition of ACA International is ripe for review. As discussed in more detail below, Defendant's motion will be granted.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in support of her TCPA claim: She has had a cellular telephone number for over a year, which she has "only used... as a cellular telephone number." (Doc. 1, p. 2). This cell phone number "has been assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls." (Id. ).

"Beginning in or around August 2014 and continuing through October 2014 Defendant called Plaintiff on her cellular telephone on a repetitive and continuous basis in an attempt to contact her about a Gap, Inc. credit card." (Id. at p. 3). In making these calls to Plaintiff, "Defendant used an [ATDS] and automatic and/or pre-recorded messages." (Id. ). These "telephone calls...were not made for ‘emergency purposes.’ " (Id. ). "During one of Defendant's call...Plaintiff explicitly revoked any consent that may have been previously given for Defendant to call her on her cellular telephone." (Doc. 1, p. 3). Although "Plaintiff's revocation of consent was heard and acknowledged by Defendant," it "persisted in calling Plaintiff on her cellular telephone." (Id. ).

As a result of these allegations, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA. (Id. ). Plaintiff seeks statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3)(B), (c)(5)(B), and (c)(5)(C) ; injunctive relief pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) ; and "[a]ny other relief deemed appropriate." (Id. at pp. 4–5).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket." Clinton v. Jones , 520 U.S. 681, 706, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). "A stay is an extraordinary measure, [footnote omitted] and the decision to impose a stay rests within the sound discretion of the district court." Barker v. Kane , 149 F.Supp.3d 521, 525 (Mar. 3, 2016) (Conner, J.) (citing Walsh Secs., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd. , 7 F.Supp.2d 523, 526 (D.N.J. 1998) ; In re Adelphia Commc'ns Secs. Litig. , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9736, 2003 WL 22358819 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ). "To exercise that discretion within the bounds of the law, a district court must ‘weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.’ " Germann v. Watts Regulator Co. , 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168475 at *5, 2015 WL 9182805 at *2 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (Jones, J.) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co. , 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936) ). "As numerous courts in the Third Circuit and the Middle District have held, ‘[i]n determining whether to grant a motion to stay, courts should consider: (1) the length of the requested stay; (2) the "hardship or inequity" that the movant would face going forward with the litigation; (3) the injury that a stay would inflict upon the non-movant; and (4) whether a stay will simplify issues and promote judicial economy.’ " Barnard v. Lackawanna Cnty. , 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14143 at *6, 2016 WL 362424 at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2016) (Mannion, J.) (citing Structural Grp., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 2008 WL 4616843, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82266 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (Kane, J.); Scicchitano v. Cty. of Northumberland , 2015 WL 7568357, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158956 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (Brann, J.); Pa. ex rel. Kane v. McGraw – Hill Cos., Inc. , 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49462, 2013 WL 1397434 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (Conner, J.); Vasvari v. Rite Aid Corp. , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86361, 2010 WL 3328210 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (Jones, J.)). "The Third Circuit has further noted that, ‘efficiency does not, by itself, allow a federal court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favor of proceedings in an alternative forum.’ " Id. (citing CTF H otel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott Int'l, Inc. , 381 F.3d 131, 135–36 (3d Cir. 2004) ).

III. DISCUSSION

As stated, Defendant moves for an order staying this case pending a decision in ACA International . (Doc. 14). After considering the four (4) factors outlined above, the Court determines that Defendant's motion should be granted and a stay should be entered. Those four (4) factors will be addressed seriatim.

A. Length of Requested Stay

As to the first factor, Defendant argues that a stay pending the D.C. Circuit's disposition of ACA International will be "relatively short." (Doc. 14, p. 12). In support, Defendant cites to a number of district court cases which have found that a stay pending the resolution of ACA International would be for a relatively short period. (Id. at pp. 12–13) (citing Rose v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC , 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85287, 2016 WL 3369283 (N.D. Ga. June 14, 2016) ; Adams v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC , No. 15–CV–9912 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2016); Chattanond v. Discover Fin. Servs., LLC , No. 15–CV–8549 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2016); Small v. GE Capital, Inc. , No. 15–CV–2479, 2016 WL 4502460 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2016) ; Fontes v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. , 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169580, 2015 WL 9272790 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2015) ). Also, Defendant notes that briefing in ACA International concluded as of February 24, 2016. (Id. at p. 12). Plaintiff responds by noting that "[t]his matter has already say stagnant for four months waiting for one decision which has had no meaningful effect on the way this litigation should proceed." (Doc. 15, p. 2). Further, Plaintiff claims that "[b]y the time that the ACA International decision is rendered, it is likely that another high-profile TCPA case may be pending before another circuit court." (Doc. 15, p. 3).

District courts assessing the potential duration of a stay based upon ACA International have reached at least two (2) differing conclusions. Some district courts have determined, as noted by Defendant, that a stay pending the D.C. Circuit's disposition of ACA International would be relatively short. See , e.g. , Errington v. Time Warner Cable Inc. , 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66317 at *10, 2016 WL 2930696 at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2016) ; Rose , 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85287 at *4, 2016 WL 3369283 at *2. Recently, for example, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota determined that a stay pending a decision by the D.C. Circuit in ACA International "will be relatively short in duration."

Frable v. Synchrony Bank , 215 F.Supp.3d 818, 821, 2016 WL 6123248, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 17, 2016). In support of this conclusion, the court noted that oral argument in ACA International "will be held later this week, on October 19, 2016." Id. Further, while the district court conceded that it "cannot predict when the D.C. Circuit will rule, it will likely be no more than a few months." Id.

A number of district courts, however, "have come to the...