Ralar Distributors, Inc., In re

• Decision Date: 06 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-2463,92-2463
• Citation: 4 F.3d 62
• Parties: , Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,452 In re RALAR DISTRIBUTORS, INC., et al., Debtors. RALAR DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Halmar Distributors, Inc., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. RUBBERMAID, INCORPORATED, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 62

4 F.3d 62

24 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 1099, Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,452

In re RALAR DISTRIBUTORS, INC., et al., DebtorsRALAR DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Halmar Distributors, Inc.Plaintiffs, Appellants, v.RUBBERMAID, INCORPORATED, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 92-2463.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard April 6, 1993.

Decided Sept. 14, 1993.

Paul R. Salvage with whom Michael J. Coyne, Susan L. Burns and Bacon & Wilson, P.C., Springfield, MA, were on brief for plaintiffs, appellants.

Dustin F. Hecker with whom Cornelius J. Chapman, V. Denise Saunders and McDermott, Will & Emery, Boston, MA, were on brief, for defendant, appellee.

Before CYR and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, ^*Senior District Judge.

CYR, Circuit Judge.

Chapter 11 debtors Ralar Distributors, Inc. and Halmar Distributors, Inc.(hereinafter: "debtor" or "R-H") appeal a district court order affirming a bankruptcy court's award of summary judgment to Rubbermaid, Inc.("Rubbermaid") in R-H's adversary proceeding to recover a $453,000 preferential transfer.We affirm.

IBACKGROUND

R-H, a wholesale distributor of household products, sold Rubbermaid and non-Rubbermaid merchandise to several retail store chains, including Caldor.Between 1987 and 1989, Rubbermaid and Caldor entered into a series of annual contracts, the latest executed in March 1989, which the parties refer to as an "advertising support program"("ASP").Rubbermaid authorized Caldor to incur expense for promotional ads of Rubbermaid products subject to reimbursement by Rubbermaid.Rather than reimburse Caldor directly for incurring these ASP expenses, however, Rubbermaid arranged with R-H, which was never a signatory to the ASP agreement, to serve as a go-between.Caldor would incur the ASP expenses, then deduct them from the next invoice it received from R-H.R-H routinely treated Caldor's ASP expenses as credits against Caldor's account with R-H ("ASP credit").To offset these ASP credits, R-H in turn would reduce its next payment for Rubbermaid merchandise by the amount of its most recent ASP credit to Caldor.The net effect of the ASP transaction on R-H's books was a "wash."

On October 16, 1989, R-H commenced its chapter 11 reorganization proceeding.In its adversary proceeding complaint against Rubbermaid, R-H alleged that Rubbermaid received a voidable preferential transfer "on or about"July 24, 1989, when it authorized Caldor to offset ASP expenses totalling $453,000 as ASP credits on Caldor's account with R-H.The bankruptcy court entered summary judgment for Rubbermaid on the ground that the ASP credits merely constituted a "recoupment of mutual rights under one transaction."Seeinfra notes 1 and 10.The district court affirmed.

IIDISCUSSION

Bankruptcy Code Sec. 547(b) sets out the essential elements of a voidable preference:

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section[setting out defenses to avoidance], the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property--

(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor [viz., Rubbermaid];

(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made;

(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;

(4) made--

(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition ...; and

(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if--

(A)the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title [11 U.S.C. Secs. 701-766];

(B) the transfer had not been made; and

(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title [11 U.S.C. Secs. 101-1330].

11 U.S.C. Sec. 547(b)(emphasis added).A "transfer" of the debtor's "property," within the preference period, that enables a creditor to realize more than it would have received on its claim in a chapter 7 liquidation of the property of the debtor estate, seeBankruptcy Code Sec. 726,11 U.S.C. Sec. 726, violates the theme of equality of distribution among all creditors of like class.H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-78, reprinted in1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 6138[hereinafter: H.R.Rep. No. 595].Section 547(b) is designed to deter creditors from "dismember[ing] the debtor during [its] slide into bankruptcy."Id. at 177.

R-H contended that the net effect of the challenged ASP credits was to permit Rubbermaid to receive the entire "benefit" of the $453,000 ASP credit (i.e., the account receivable Caldor owed R-H) which otherwise would have been apportioned among all of R-H's unsecured creditors, not merely Rubbermaid, in the event of a chapter 7 liquidation.The bankruptcy court disagreed, on the ground that the ASP credits effected no "transfer of an interest of the debtor in property."¹

Appellant R-H characterizes the ASP transactions quite differently: "On or about"July 24, 1989, Caldor owed R-H more than $453,000 for merchandise previously purchased from R-H.Thus, R-H held an account receivable--an enforceable contract claim in the amount of $453,000 against Caldor--which assumedly became property of the hypothetical R-H chapter 7 estate, seeBankruptcy Code Sec. 541,11 U.S.C. Sec. 541, hence available for pro rata distribution among all R-H unsecured creditors, not merely Rubbermaid.Instead, however, R-H in effect "released" Caldor from its obligation to pay R-H the full $453,000 account receivable, in order to effect reimbursement of the ASP expenses Caldor was entitled to receive from Rubbermaid under their separate ASP contract, thereby conferring an indirect "benefit" upon Rubbermaid.SeeBankruptcy Code Sec. 101(54),11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(54)(broadly defining "transfer" as including both "direct" and "indirect" modes of disposing of property);see alsoKellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc.(In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586, 591(5th Cir.1987)(mere "circuity of arrangement" cannot redeem a transaction which has the effect of a preference)(citingNational Bank of Newport v. National Herkimer Cty. Bank, 225 U.S. 178, 184, 32 S.Ct. 633, 635, 56 L.Ed. 1042(1912)).

Rubbermaid counters that such ASP arrangements are too customary in wholesale-retail trade to be considered preferential, and that this voluntary ASP arrangement constituted a long-established "course of dealing" among the parties.If a "transfer" occurred at all, says Rubbermaid, R-H received the benefit of the transfer because Rubbermaid accepted $453,000 less from R-H for household merchandise previously purchased from Rubbermaid, and if anyone received a voidable "transfer" from R-H, it was Caldor.Furthermore, these ASP credits ultimately produced a "wash" on R-H's books, documenting the fact that there was no net diminution in either R-H's property or the property of its hypothetical chapter 7 estate.Finally, recovery of these transfers from Rubbermaid would result in an unjust enrichment to R-H, which realized the benefits from the use of these ASP credits in reducing its outstanding debt to Rubbermaid, but would now recover the same $453,000 for the benefit of its chapter 11 estate.

There is surface appeal to the arguments of both parties, though both are wide of their mark.²If borne out by the evidence, the contentions advanced by R-H arguably would comport with the policy of equality of distribution, and R-H correctly asserts that it is the effect of the alleged transfer, not the subjective intent of the parties, which primarily governs the section 547(b) analysis.See4 Lawrence P. King, Collier on Bankruptcyp 547.01, at 547-13(and cases cited therein)[hereinafter: Collier ];but cf.infra note 5.We are persuaded, nevertheless, by Rubbermaid's contention that R-H failed to carry its burden of proof in opposition to Rubbermaid's motion for summary judgment.

In order to prevail, R-H ultimately must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, each essential element of a voidable preference under section 547(b).SeeBankruptcy Code Secs. 547(g),1107(a),11U.S.C. Sec. 547(g), 1107(a);Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc.(In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 980 F.2d 792, 799(1st Cir.1992).Once the movant presents sufficient competent evidence to entitle it to summary judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant cannot rest merely on the averments and denials in its pleadings, but must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.SeeFed.R.Bankr.P. 7056;Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e);Germain v. RFE Inv. Partners IV(In re Wescorp, Inc.), 148 B.R. 161, 162-63(Bankr.D.Conn.1992);see alsoMarshack v. Sauer(In re Palmer), 140 B.R. 765, 768(Bankr.C.D.Cal.1992).As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment for the moving party.SeeChristians v. Crystal Evang. Free Church(In re Young), 148 B.R. 886, 889(Bankr.D.Minn.1992)(citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)).

At trial, R-H would bear the burden of proving, inter alia, that the challenged ASP credits effected a "transfer of an interest of the debtor in property."Bankruptcy Code Sec. 547(b),11 U.S.C. Sec. 547(b).See alsoBankruptcy Code Sec. 547(e),11 U.S.C. Sec. 547(e)("[A][preferential] transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property [transferred].").A prepetition debtor acquires "rights" in property for section 547(b) purposes if, but for the challenged transfer, its interest would have been "property of the estate" under section 541 at the filing of a chapter 7 petition.SeeBegier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 58, 58 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 2263, 2263 n. 3, 110 L.Ed.2d 46(1990).

Accordingly, at the summary judgment stage, R-H was required to come forward with competent evidence that, immediately prior to its "transfer" of these ASP credits, its hypothetical chapter 7 estate owned...