Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks

Citation183 N.E. 419,281 Mass. 233
PartiesRALDNE REALTY CORPORATION v. BROOKS.
Decision Date06 December 1932
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; W. P. Hall, Judge.

Action by the Raldne Realty Corporation against Shirley F. Brooks. Verdict was directed for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

J. C. Johnston, of Boston, and V. C. Stoneman, of Cambridge, for plaintiff.

E. O'H. Mullowney, of Boston, for defendant.

CROSBY, J.

This is an action of tort for the conversion of certain personal property.

The plaintiff offered evidence from which the following facts could have been found: The defendant was the owner of certain real estate which was occupied by the Unique Furniture Company (hereafter referred to as the company) as a tenant at will. The company manufactured household furnishings and furniture. The premises were equipped with certain machinery, used by the company as a tenant at will and owned by the defendant, which is the property alleged to have been converted. The defendant entered into a contract with the company for the sale of this property dated January 1, 1928.

The plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that the company did not pay the defendant $3,500 on account of the agreed purchase price of $5,000. On January 31, 1929, the defendant delivered to an officer of the company an unsigned document wherein it was provided that the defendant should give to the company a clear title to the property alleged to have been converted on payment of $600 in cash and two notes of $100 each to become payable in sixty and ninety days respectively. Shortly thereafter the defendant learned that the officers of the company had applied to the plaintiff for a loan of $1,500 on the property. The defendant later informed two officers of the company that they might negotiatethe loan giving to the plaintiff a mortgage upon the property. A short time before February 4, 1929, these officers, on behalf of the company, applied to the plaintiff for a loan of $1,500. They showed the plaintiff's representative the agreements above referred to and reported to him that the defendant had agreed to execute a bill of sale of the property on receipt of $600. Thereupon the plaintiff's representative, by telephone, repeated to the defendant what he had been told by the officers of the company and asked him if the same were true; the defendant replied in the affirmative. At this conversation the plaintiff's representative stated that it appeared that the property was worth $5,000, and he asked the defendant if it was worth $2,500, to which the defendant replied that it was. There was further evidence from which it could have been found that on or about February 4, 1929, in accordance with the foregoing understanding, and with full knowledge of the defendant, the officers of the company borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of $1,500 securing the same by a mortgage of the personal property executed to the plaintiff. At the time the loan was negotiated, the officers of the company again informed the plaintiff that the defendant was the actual owner of the property, that he had agreed to sell it to the company, and that he had authorized them to execute and deliver a mortgage on the property to secure the loan, upon condition that the plaintiff should hold for the defendant the sum of $600. The plaintiff's representative again telephoned the defendant, told him of the representations made by the officers of the company, and the defendant stated that the representations were true and that he would deliver to the plaintiff a bill of sale of the property to the company within a day or two, upon condition that the plaintiff should reserve for him a check for $600. In accordance with this understanding the plaintiff made two checks to the company covering the amount of the loan-one for $600, and the other for the balance of the loan. The check for $600 was indorsed by the company and retained by the plaintiff, and the other was delivered to the officers of the company. Immediately thereafter the plaintiff's agent notified the defendant that the plaintiff was holding the check for $600, and the defendant agreed to come to the plaintiff's office within a day or two and get it and deliver to the plaintiff the bill of sale in accordance with the terms of the agreement. A few days later the plaintiff's agent again notified the defendant to call and get the check, and the defendant replied that he would do so in a short time. At frequent intervals within the following four months the plaintiffs notified the defendant, who agreed in each instance to get the check and deliver the bill of sale. On or about April 4, 1929, there was a default in the conditions of the mortgage and at the expiration of about four months from the date of the original loan the plaintiff made demand upon the defendant that he deliver a bill of sale in accordance with his agreement, and accept the check which was held for him. The defendant then for the first time refused to consummate the transaction, and informed the plaintiff that the company was indebted to him in a substantial amount for rent and that the only condition upon which he would deliver the bill of sale was that the rent due him should be paid. There was evidence that from the date of the original loan to the date of the...

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11 cases
  • Vincent v. Plecker
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • May 13, 1946
    ...from the town, without disclosing her own title, doubtless she would be estopped to set up her title against him. Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks, 281 Mass. 233, 183 N.E. 419;Looney v. Trimount Theatres, Inc., 282 Mass. 275, 184 N.E. 683. But at the time the defendant Plecker had no title. Sh......
  • Vincent v. Plecker
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • May 13, 1946
    ...... set up her title against him. Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks, 281 Mass. 233 . Looney v. Trimount Theatres,. ......
  • Sprague v. Rust Master Chem. Corp.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • January 14, 1947
    ...one to deny the truth of his statement. McLearn v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617, 77 A.L.R. 1039.Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks, 281 Mass. 233, 183 N.E. 419.Looney v. Trimount Theatres, Inc., 282 Mass. 275, 184 N.E. 683.Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 52 N.E.2d 968. Compare Ford v. Rogo......
  • Hayes v. Gessner
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • January 31, 1944
    ...upon which the plaintiff relied. McLearn v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617, 77 A.L.R. 1039;Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks, 281 Mass. 233, 183 N.E. 419. The case is distinguishable on the facts from Ford v. Rogovin, 289 Mass. 549, 194 N.E. 719. Murdoch's conduct is binding upon the defenda......
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