Raleigh & C. R. Co v. Jones

Citation88 S.E. 896
Decision Date08 March 1916
Docket Number(No. 9318.)
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
PartiesRALEIGH & C. R. CO. v. JONES et al.

88 S.E. 896

RALEIGH & C. R. CO.
v.
JONES et al.

(No. 9318.)

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 8, 1916.


April 13, 1916.

[88 S.E. 897]

Gary, C. J., and Fraser, J., dissenting in part.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Marion County; J. W. De Vose, Judge.

Action by the Raleigh & Charleston Railroad Company against P. F. Jones and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

L. D. Lide and H. S. McCandlish, both of Marion, for appellants.

M. C. Woods, of Marion, for respondent.

GARY, C. J. This is an action to recover possession of a small parcel of land, in the town of Marion, over which, it is alleged, the plaintiff has a right of way. It appears from the record that W. J. Montgomery, who formerly owned the land in dispute, executed a deed of conveyance thereof to T. C. Mc-Neely, who thereafter, to wit, on the 5th of May, 1902, conveyed to the Carolina Northern Railroad Company an easement in said land 100 feet wide—50 feet from the center of the track on each side—and an additional 100 feet on the west side, where the land in dispute lies. The said deed was recorded on the same day it was executed. By successive conveyances, which were duly recorded, the property of the Carolina Northern Railroad Company became vested in the plaintiff. After T. C. McNeely had conveyed the easement to Carolina Northern Railroad Company, he also made a conveyance of his remaining interest in said property to Mrs. Fannie McNeely, who, in turn, conveyed to the defendants. There is no question that the plaintiff is entitled to the land unless it is estopped by its conduct. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, for the possession of the land, and the defendants appealed upon exceptions, the first of which is as follows:

"Because his honor erred, it is respectfully submitted, in refusing to allow the defendants' witness P. F. Jones to testify as to the worth of the buildings placed upon the lands in question by the defendants, or as to the cost thereof, and in holding that the character of the said improvements was not relevant, in that such testimony was strongly relevant and competent on the defense of the estoppel, on which the defendants relied, to wit, that plaintiff stood by and allowed them to make valuable, improvements on the land in question, the defendants believing in good faith that they had title thereto the refusal to permit such testimony being highly prejudicial to the defendants, because the same would have naturally tended to support their said defense, and because this testimony was unquestionably the only way the defendants could give the jury an adequate and fair idea of the nature of the improvements, which was the very essence of their defense of estoppel, and without this testimony the jury could not have properly considered said defense."

The record shows that this question arose as follows:

"Q. About what are those buildings worth? (Plaintiff objects to testimony in reference to betterments, as that issue is not set up in the defense.) Q. What did they cost? (Objected to.)

"Mr. Lide: We are not asking for betterments, we are just trying to find out the character of the improvements.

"The Court: I cannot see how the character of the improvements would be relevant."

The improvements consisted of an office, boiler house, and mill house. In order to sustain the defense of estoppel, it was incumbent on the defendants to show that they made the improvements bona fide, and under the belief that the land...

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