Ralls v. Manson, Civ. No. H-205.

• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Connecticut)
• Writing for the Court: Michael Dearington, Asst. State's Atty., New Haven, Conn., for defendant
• Citation: 375 F. Supp. 1271
• Parties: John Wesley RALLS v. John R. MANSON, Commissioner of Corrections of the State of Connecticut.
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-205.
• Decision Date: 07 May 1974

375 F. Supp. 1271

John Wesley RALLS
v.
John R. MANSON, Commissioner of Corrections of the State of Connecticut.

Civ. No. H-205.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

May 7, 1974.

375 F. Supp. 1272

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

375 F. Supp. 1273

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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Morton P. Cohen, David Golub (Martha Stone on the brief), West Hartford, Conn., for plaintiff

Michael Dearington, Asst. State's Atty., New Haven, Conn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BLUMENFELD, District Judge.

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree on November 17, 1970, after a jury trial in Connecticut Superior Court at New Haven. On December 11, 1970, he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. He is presently incarcerated at the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, claiming that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution were denied during his trial in state court. Before the merits of his substantive claims may be assessed, however, it must be determined whether 28 U.S.C. ? 2254(b), which requires state prisoners to exhaust available state court remedies before applying for federal habeas corpus, bars this Court from considering petitioner's claims.

I. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES

A. Petitioner's Direct Appeal

The chronology of the petitioner's direct appeal in the state courts is not in dispute. Petitioner's trial counsel, a Public Defender for New Haven County, was originally appointed to represent petitioner on appeal. On December 30, 1970, the Public Defender filed a notice of appeal of the petitioner's conviction in New Haven Superior Court.¹ On August 19, 1971,² the Public Defender filed a request for a finding and a draft finding,³ as required by Sections 629 and 630 of the Connecticut Practice Book. The petitioner subsequently sought a change of counsel, and on October 28, 1971, the Public Defender was granted permission to withdraw as petitioner's appellate counsel and a Special Public Defender was appointed to represent the petitioner.⁴ On November 15, 1971, the Special Public Defender moved for and received permission to file an amended draft finding.⁵ On December 15, 1971, the Special Public Defender filed an amended draft finding, and on January 3, 1972, he filed an amended request for a finding.⁶ Thereafter the State's Attorney moved for and received numerous extensions of time in which to file its draft counterfinding,⁷ required by Section 631 of the Practice Book. The draft counterfinding was ultimately filed on January 5, 1973.⁸ The trial judge filed his finding, required by Sections 634-635 of the Practice Book, on March 12, 1973.⁹ Both the Special Public

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Defender and the State's Attorney immediately moved to correct the trial judge's finding, pursuant to Section 636 of the Practice Book, and the trial judge filed a corrected finding on May 2, 1973.¹⁰ The Special Public Defender filed assignments of error, required by Section 612 of the Practice Book, on May 29, 1973.¹¹ The record in the case finally went to the printer in June of 1973. The printed record was sent to the Connecticut Supreme Court and the parties on October 31, 1973.¹² An appendix to the record, which the Special Public Defender sent to the printer in July of 1973, is being printed at the present time.¹³ Thus, almost three and one-half years after the petitioner's notice of appeal was filed, briefs have still not been printed or filed with the Connecticut Supreme Court, nor has a date been set for argument before the Connecticut Supreme Court on petitioner's direct appeal of his state court conviction.¹⁴

B. Inordinate Delay and the Absence of Effective Available State Corrective Process Under 28 U.S.C. ? 2254 (b)

The Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. ? 2254, provides as follows:

"(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner."

This provision has generally been construed to foreclose issuance by a federal court of a writ of habeas corpus until the petitioner has presented his claims to the state courts and received a decision in his case:

"It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus. . . . We have consistently adhered to this federal policy, for `it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.' Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950) . . . ."

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). As long as the petitioner fairly presents his claims to the state courts, it is of no consequence that the claims are dismissed for failure to comply with state procedural requirements: "The state courts need not have decided the merits of the claims raised by the applicant in the state courts in order for him to be considered to have exhausted his state court remedies." United States ex rel. Meadows v. State of New York, 426 F. 2d 1176, 1179 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 941, 91 S.Ct. 944, 28 L. Ed.2d 222 (1971). See Hawkins v. Robinson, 367 F.Supp. 1025, 1029 (D.Conn. 1973). However, the petitioner must have presented to the state courts the same claims which he subsequently urges upon the federal habeas court. Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S. at 276.

It is well established that the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. ? 2254 is not jurisdictional: it does not restrict the power of the federal court to

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grant relief in appropriate cases. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); United States ex rel. Graham v. Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1972). Rather, the exhaustion requirement is grounded in flexible considerations of comity, "a doctrine which teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter," Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950), quoted in Fay v. Noia, supra, 372 U.S. at 420. Indeed, the broad scope of federal habeas corpus indicates that federal courts must place primary emphasis on the redress of constitutional deprivations rather than on deference to the state judicial machinery: "Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty. For its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release." Fay v. Noia, supra, 372 U.S. at 401-402. As the Supreme Court recently declared, in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349-350, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 1574, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973)

"While the `rhetoric celebrating habeas corpus has changed little over the centuries,' it is nevertheless true that the functions of the writ have undergone dramatic change. Our recent decisions have reasoned from the premise that habeas corpus is not `a static, narrow, formalistic remedy,' Jones v. Cunningham, supra, 371 U.S. 236 at 243 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 but one which must retain the `ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes.' Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 , 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969). See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 , 35 S.Ct. 582, 594, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). `The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.' Harris v. Nelson, supra, 394 U.S. at 291 89 S.Ct. at 1086.

Thus, we have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic procedural requirements. The demand for speed, flexibility, and simplicity is clearly evident in our decisions concerning the exhaustion doctrine, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, , 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953). . . . ." (Footnote omitted).

Thus the exhaustion doctrine "is a judicially-crafted instrument which reflects a careful balance between important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a `swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.'" Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 1127, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has noted that "once the federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied." Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). The exhaustion requirement

". . . does not erect insuperable or successive barriers to the invocation of federal habeas corpus. It is merely an accommodation of our federal system designed to give the State an initial `opportunity

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