Ralls v. Manson
Decision Date | 07 May 1974 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. H-205. |
Citation | 375 F. Supp. 1271 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | John Wesley RALLS v. John R. MANSON, Commissioner of Corrections of the State of Connecticut. |
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Morton P. Cohen, David Golub (Martha Stone on the brief), West Hartford, Conn., for plaintiff.
Michael Dearington, Asst. State's Atty., New Haven, Conn., for defendant.
Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree on November 17, 1970, after a jury trial in Connecticut Superior Court at New Haven. On December 11, 1970, he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. He is presently incarcerated at the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, claiming that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution were denied during his trial in state court. Before the merits of his substantive claims may be assessed, however, it must be determined whether 28 U.S.C. ? 2254(b), which requires state prisoners to exhaust available state court remedies before applying for federal habeas corpus, bars this Court from considering petitioner's claims.
The chronology of the petitioner's direct appeal in the state courts is not in dispute. Petitioner's trial counsel, a Public Defender for New Haven County, was originally appointed to represent petitioner on appeal. On December 30, 1970, the Public Defender filed a notice of appeal of the petitioner's conviction in New Haven Superior Court.1 On August 19, 1971,2 the Public Defender filed a request for a finding and a draft finding,3 as required by Sections 629 and 630 of the Connecticut Practice Book. The petitioner subsequently sought a change of counsel, and on October 28, 1971, the Public Defender was granted permission to withdraw as petitioner's appellate counsel and a Special Public Defender was appointed to represent the petitioner.4 On November 15, 1971, the Special Public Defender moved for and received permission to file an amended draft finding.5 On December 15, 1971, the Special Public Defender filed an amended draft finding, and on January 3, 1972, he filed an amended request for a finding.6 Thereafter the State's Attorney moved for and received numerous extensions of time in which to file its draft counterfinding,7 required by Section 631 of the Practice Book. The draft counterfinding was ultimately filed on January 5, 1973.8 The trial judge filed his finding, required by Sections 634-635 of the Practice Book, on March 12, 1973.9 Both the Special Public Defender and the State's Attorney immediately moved to correct the trial judge's finding, pursuant to Section 636 of the Practice Book, and the trial judge filed a corrected finding on May 2, 1973.10 The Special Public Defender filed assignments of error, required by Section 612 of the Practice Book, on May 29, 1973.11 The record in the case finally went to the printer in June of 1973. The printed record was sent to the Connecticut Supreme Court and the parties on October 31, 1973.12 An appendix to the record, which the Special Public Defender sent to the printer in July of 1973, is being printed at the present time.13 Thus, almost three and one-half years after the petitioner's notice of appeal was filed, briefs have still not been printed or filed with the Connecticut Supreme Court, nor has a date been set for argument before the Connecticut Supreme Court on petitioner's direct appeal of his state court conviction.14
The Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. ? 2254, provides as follows:
"(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner."
This provision has generally been construed to foreclose issuance by a federal court of a writ of habeas corpus until the petitioner has presented his claims to the state courts and received a decision in his case:
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). As long as the petitioner fairly presents his claims to the state courts, it is of no consequence that the claims are dismissed for failure to comply with state procedural requirements: "The state courts need not have decided the merits of the claims raised by the applicant in the state courts in order for him to be considered to have exhausted his state court remedies." United States ex rel. Meadows v. State of New York, 426 F. 2d 1176, 1179 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 941, 91 S.Ct. 944, 28 L. Ed.2d 222 (1971). See Hawkins v. Robinson, 367 F.Supp. 1025, 1029 (D.Conn. 1973). However, the petitioner must have presented to the state courts the same claims which he subsequently urges upon the federal habeas court. Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S. at 276.
It is well established that the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. ? 2254 is not jurisdictional: it does not restrict the power of the federal court to grant relief in appropriate cases. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); United States ex rel. Graham v. Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1972). Rather, the exhaustion requirement is grounded in flexible considerations of comity, "a doctrine which teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter," Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950), quoted in Fay v. Noia, supra, 372 U.S. at 420. Indeed, the broad scope of federal habeas corpus indicates that federal courts must place primary emphasis on the redress of constitutional deprivations rather than on deference to the state judicial machinery: Fay v. Noia, supra, 372 U.S. at 401-402. As the Supreme Court recently declared, in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349-350, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 1574, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973):
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