Ralls v. Ralls
| Decision Date | 07 November 1923 |
| Docket Number | (No. 2193.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
| Citation | 256 S.W. 688 |
| Parties | RALLS v. RALLS et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Crosby County; W. R. Spencer, Judge.
Suit by Dollie M. Ralls against P. B. Ralls and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and remanded.
Preston Martin, of Weatherford, and Goree, Odell & Allen, Ernest May, and Hampton Spiller, all of Fort Worth, for appellant.
Bean & Klett, of Lubbock, P. B. Randolph, of Plainview, and Gibson & Dalton, of Crosbyton, for appellees.
On November 16, 1920, the district court of Crosby county, in a suit pending in said cause No. 448 and styled "Mrs. Dollie M. Ralls v. John R. Ralls," entered a judgment of divorce and disposition of the community property of the parties to the suit. The judgment disposing of the property was entered in pursuance to an agreement of the parties filed in said cause, and decreed that Mrs. Ralls recover of John R. Ralls certain specific parcels of property, valued in the aggregate at the sum of $65,800, and the further sum of $10,000 cash. All other community property without particular description or valuation was decreed to John R. Ralls, subject to the payment of all community debts. John R. Ralls died on October 19, 1921, and thereafter Mrs. Dollie M. Ralls filed this suit against P. B. Ralls, the independent executor of the will of the said John R. Ralls, and the other defendants, who are devisees and legatees under the said will, to set aside said judgment in said cause No. 448, and the agreement for distribution of the community estate belonging to the said Dollie M. Ralls and John R. Ralls. Plaintiff alleged that, at the time of the agreement and judgment, the community property belonging to the said parties was, after deduction of all debts, of value in excess of $500,000; that plaintiff was awarded in said disposition property worth about $40,000 or $50,000; that the agreement and judgment based thereon were procured by fraud, coercion, and intimidation, which rendered the judgment of divorce and the partition of the property invalid. No detailed statement of the pleading is necessary, because there is no question of its sufficiency to raise the issues of fact which will appear from our further statement of the case.
The trial court instructed the jury peremptorily to find for the defendants, and the appeal is from the judgment entered on this verdict. The record does not disclose what particular theory of the law or evidence controlled the trial court in his action. Appellees, in their brief, take the position that the peremptory instruction is sustained by any one of three theories. The following summary of these will assist in an understanding of the relevancy of the facts to the questions that are to be decided:
(1) That no fraud in the settlement agreement or procurement of the divorce was shown. As subdivisions of this general proposition it is said (a) That the record shows that the bulk of the property standing in the name of John R. Ralls at the time of the separation agreement, and which it was conceded was of more than $500,000 in value, was the separate property of John R. Ralls, and that Mrs. Ralls received a fair share of the community property; and (b) that no fraud was practiced in securing her assent to the agreement, it being made after an independent investigation of her own as to the property and its value.
(2) That the judgment in cause No. 448 precluded any further inquiry into the question of fraud in the agreement on which the judgment of distribution was rendered.
(3) That Mrs. Ralls' pleading and proof, that the judgment of divorce was the result of collusion between herself and husband, showed a participation on her part in the perpetration of a fraud on the trial court, and would preclude her from now making any complaint against said judgment.
The record is very voluminous. While a statement of the facts in some detail is necessary to a proper discussion of the case, we state results of the evidence rather generally in preference to making a detailed recital of the evidence which would justify the more general conclusion.
In arriving at these results, the evidence has been considered in the light most favorable to appellant, as must be done in passing on the propriety of a peremptory instruction.
John R. Ralls and Dollie M. Martin, the the plaintiff, were married in Texas, in 1890. John R. Ralls was at that time engaged in the mercantile business in Texas, and his interest in the business was worth $6,500, or less. The Ralls moved to the Indian Territory in 1892, and John R. Ralls continued in the mercantile business, setting up the business by transportation from Texas to the Indian Territory of the stock of goods on hand at the time of the move. The value of the stock of goods at such time was from $10,000 to $15,000. The Rallses continued to live in the Indian Territory until in 1907 or 1908, when they moved back to Texas. The mercantile business was continued until some time in 1905, at which time the stock of goods was traded in on the Mickle lands, hereinafter mentioned. During the time that John R. Ralls resided in the Indian Territory, he was engaged in other lines of business and acquired other property in the Indian Territory, in particular, some lots and real estate hereinafter mentioned and some bank stock in a bank at Ryan, Okl. During this time he bought some land in Clay County, Tex., paying therefor the sum of $12,000 or $13,000, paying partly cash and executing notes for deferred payments. For several years he was engaged in the ranching business on these lands. The cattle were finally sold off, and in 1905 the property was sold and he and his wife conveyed it to the purchaser for a recited consideration of $28,360.
In 1907 or 1908 the Rallses moved to Crosby county, Tex., and thereafter John R. Ralls was engaged in active business, ranching on the Mickle lands, improving said lands, buying and selling lands, etc. The following list contains a description of the property held by John R. Ralls either for himself or for the community at the time of the divorce with the valuation placed thereon by some of the witnesses:
Section. Acres. Value
(1) N. 1/2, Sec. 892, 320 ................$ 24,000 00
(2) E. pt. Sec. 60, L. 2, 110 ................ 8,250 00
(3) Sec. 61, L. 2, 162.9 ................ 12,217 50
(4) Sec. 13-20-21, L. 4, 255.72................ 19,179 00
(5) Sec. 14-19-23, L. 4, 289.07................ 21,680 25
(6) Sec. 15-19-23, L. 4, 249.92................ 18,744 00
(7) Sec. 16-17-24, L. 4, 210.73................ 15,804 75
(8) Sec. 15-16-21-22, L. 4, 640 ................ 48,000 00
(9) Sec. 1-2-3-6-7-8, L. 4, 960 ................ 72,000 00
(10) Town lots and buildings.......................... 204,050 00
(11) Mickle land and lot notes........................ 80,230 10
(12) Notes on C. B. land, sold........................ 20,063 49
(13) Unsecured notes.................................. 4,159 26
(14) Miscellaneous personal........................... 37,003 79
(15) Terry county land 640............................ 9,600 00
___________
$594,982 14
The debts owed at this time amounted to about $57,000. There were other debts aggregating nearly $100,000, representing amounts due on purchase of the C. B. Live Stock Company lands and conveyed to others, on which P. B. Ralls would be liable, but these debts had been assumed by others, and as the security was amply sufficient to secure their payment, they may be disregarded in arriving at the value of the estate.
Items 2, 3, 10, and 11 represent what is left of what is known as the Mickle lands and notes due on sale of parts thereof; items 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12 pertain to the C. B. Live Stock Company lands hereinafter mentioned. As it was the appellee's contention that all of this property was the separate property of John R. Ralls, we make the following statement as to the acquisition of the various tracts of land mentioned:
(1) The Mickle lands consisting of 7,500 acres in Crosby county were acquired in 1905 and were paid for as follows: First, delivery to the vendor of the mercantile stock in the Indian Territory valued in the trade at about $18,000; second, conveyance to such vendor of some lots at Ryan, Ind. T., valued at about $8,000, the deed of conveyance being signed by Ralls and his wife; third, assumption of the payment of indebtedness outstanding against the Mickle lands which was subsequently paid and amounted to about $10,000. The Rallses moved onto the Mickle lands when they came to Texas and ranched thereon for several years. Later the town of Ralls was located on these lands, and a considerable portion thereof was sold, the list above representing the unsold balance. During this time improvements were put on the property at a cost of about $140,000.
(2) In 1907, shortly before the Ralls moved to Texas, John R. Ralls bought the north half of section 892, in Crosby county, shown on the foregoing list, paying therefor $7,520 by check drawn on his account in a bank at Ryan, Okl., and executing notes for $3,360 balance. It is not shown how these notes were paid.
(3) The section of land in Terry county was acquired in 1911. It was paid for by the conveyance of one-fourth section of land in the Indian Territory, title to which stood in the name of John R. Ralls, valued at $4,000, and by the execution of notes and assumption of indebtedness against the land aggregating about $3,000. It is not shown how the deferred payments due on this land were met.
(4) Beginning with the year 1916, and during several succeeding years, John R. Ralls bought a quantity of land from the C. B....
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