Ralls v. State
| Decision Date | 21 February 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 34479,34479,2 |
| Citation | 75 S.E.2d 26,87 Ga.App. 655 |
| Parties | RALLS v. STATE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
The remarks and statements of the solicitor-general in the presence of the jury, although in the form of a question which was unanswered, tended to prejudice the jury and influence them against the defendant; and it was error for the court, under the circumstances (and this being a close case), to overrule the motion for a mistrial promptly made by the defendant.
Molly Ralls was indicted by the grand jury of Monroe County at the August term of the superior court of such county, for the murder of her husband, Ernest Ralls, on July 1, 1951. To this indictment she pleaded not guilty, and the case on August 14, 1952, proceeded to trial in the Superior Court of Monroe County before Hon. Frank B. Willingham, Judge of the Superior Courts of the Flint Judicial Circuit, and a jury. On the same day, the jury rendered their verdict finding the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Thereupon the defendant moved for a new trial on the general grounds, and by amendment added one special ground, in which she assigns error on the refusal of the trial judge to grant the motion of her counsel for a mistrial, the same being made promptly upon the prejudicial remark and statement by the solicitor-general in the presence of the jury. Roscoe Treadwell, who was a member of the coroner's jury, and appeared as a witness for the State, was asked by the solicitor the following question: The witness had just previously testified that he had been on the coroner's jury which investigated the death of Ernest Ralls. Before the witness replied to this question, counsel for the defendant arose to object thereto, when the court, without waiting for counsel to formally object, ruled, 'I will exclude that question.' Counsel for the defendant thereupon promptly stated 'Your Honor, for that suggestion to the jury, which is wholly improper, I ask for a mistrial,' and the court ruled: The foregoing is a complete statement of what transpired. The court did not rebuke the solicitor for propounding said question and thereby injecting into the case and before the jury such improper fact. The defendant insists that the injury done to her by said remark and question was not eradicated by the instructions of the court to the jury, and says that same was prejudicial to her, (1) because some informed the jury that the coroner's jury, investigating the homicide of her husband, had made a finding recommending this defendant to be held for his murder; (2) because same prejudiced the minds of the jury against her by stating that another jury had rendered a verdict that she should be charged with the murder of Ernest Ralls; (3) because same was in effect testimony by the solicitor, who was not a witness; and (4) because same imparted to the jury knowledge or understanding which the solicitor said he had of the verdict of the coroner's jury. This defendant avers that this question was not referable to any other evidence or fact in the case or to her statement, and that the court erred in failing to grant a mistrial.
The trial judge overruled the defendant's motion for a new trial, as amended, and to this judgment she excepts to this court.
Williams & Freeman, Forsyth, for plaintiff in error.
Benjamin B. Garland, Sol. Gen., Jackson, A. M. Zellner and Hugh D. Sosebee, Forsyth, for defendant in error.
1. This was a close case on the evidence. The jury could very well have rendered a verdict of not guilty, finding that the motion of the defendant in inflicting the mortal wounds on the deceased was justifiable and in protection of her life. The evidence for the State tended to show that the body of the deceased was discovered by the undertaker about two to three hundred feet from his home, that he had been stabbed and cut, one would directly through the heart, and one on his back, and that stabbing was the cause of his death, he having been stabbed through the heart and lungs. Most of the wounds were on the left arm and left back, and them in the heart, that is most of them were on the left side in the front and the back. When he was seen by the sheriff, the deceased did not have his shoes on, one being in the house and the other 261 feet from the house up the road towards the body. The sheriff saw Molly Ralls that Sunday morning (July 1, 1951, when the homicide is alleged to have occurred) at Mr. Treadwell's house, and she freely and voluntarily said she cut the deceased. She told the sheriff that she was fixing supper and her husband came into the kitchen, and 'one word brought on another and he throwed a big andiron at her', and 'she said she got a butcher knife then and they started tusseling and they fell down on the floor, and she cut him.' She also said he got a rifle and pointed it at her and said he was going to kill her. The sheriff said he found no finger marks on the rifle. The sheriff stated that the little boy said he pulled the knife out of his daddy's back and ran up the road and threw the knife into the weeds, but it was not found. It appeared that there had been a little blood on the floor and an effort had been made to clean it up. This was in the front room where the front door was. Without the admission by the defendant that the deceased threw an andiron at her and she and the deceased started tusseling and fell to the floor and she cut him, and the testimony of the 14-year-old son of the defendant, there was nothing directly showing that the defendant did the killing. This boy testified that his father had been drinking; that the deceased threw the fire dog at the defendant; and his mother ...
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Ailstock v. State
...motion for mistrial was made and it was error not to do so. Stanley v. State, 94 Ga.App. 737, 96 S.E.2d 195, supra; Ralls v. State, 87 Ga.App. 655, 75 S.E.2d 26 (1953); Gore v. State, 124 Ga.App. 398, 184 S.E.2d 24 (1971). The fact that appellant responded negatively to the question and tha......
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