Ralph Martinez, In re

• Decision Date: 23 January 1970
• Docket Number: Cr. 13858
• Citation: 83 Cal.Rptr. 382,1 Cal.3d 641
• Parties: , 463 P.2d 734 In re Ralph MARTINEZ on Habeas Corpus.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 382

83 Cal.Rptr. 382

1 Cal.3d 641, 463 P.2d 734

In re Ralph MARTINEZ on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 13858.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Jan. 23, 1970.

Ralph Martinez, in pro. per., and Marsha B. Shanle, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David Cunningham, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

Ralph Martinez, currently incarcerated in Folsom State Prison, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking release on the grounds that the Adult Authority revoked his parole without adequate cause. Petitioner alleges that the authority's determination to terminate his parole status was based primarily on (1) evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure and (2) a confession obtained in violation of People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, and petitioner contends that such mattersters should not properly be considered by the Adult Authority. We conclude that in view of the uniquely critical responsibilities inherent in the administration of the parole system, the authority could properly consider all the evidence before it.

Initially we review the facts of the case. On May 12, 1955, petitioner was convicted of violation of section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code (sale of narcotics other than marijuana), sentenced and committed to the state prison. After serving over seven years of his sentence, petitioner was released on parole on June 12, 1962. Then in February 1963 he was arrested and charged with possession of heroin; in October 1963 he was found guilty of the charges and sentenced to state prison.

Following the conviction in October 1963, petitioner's parole was cancelled on November 15, 1963, and formally revoked on February 13, 1964. The revocation was ostensibly based on three grounds: (1) the October 1963 conviction; (2) driving a motor vehicle without the knowledge or consent of his parole agent or the Division of Parole, and (3) using alcoholic beverages to excess.

The following year, on March 11, 1965, the Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed petitioner's 1963 conviction, concluding that evidence introduced at trial was obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional search ¹ and that statements used against petitioner were obtained in violation of the dictates of People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (People v. Martinez (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 796, 43 Cal.Rptr. 197). On July 13, 1965, the charges on which petitioner had been convicted in 1963 were dismissed. Petitioner remained in prison, however, because his parole on his 1955 conviction had been revoked.

When petitioner's application for parole next came before the Adult Authority in October 1965, the reversal of petitioner's 1963 conviction was brought to the authority's attention. The authority nonetheless decided not to restore petitioner to his parole status. The comments recorded on the authority's official evaluation sheet disclose the panel's reasoning: 'panel notes that although 1963 charges dismissed on legal technicality of illegal search--case was not dismissed because of lack of involvement--also noted that inmate initially admitted to the charges--and (did) not prosecute appeal for some two years--continuance of incarceration based on parole behavior and not on 1963 commitment.'

The circumstances of the present case are comparable to those addressed by this court in In re Brown (1967) 67 Cal.2d 339, 62 Cal.Rptr. 6, 431 P.2d 630. There, as here, the Adult Authority revoked the defendant's parole on several grounds, a criminal conviction constituting the primary, most serious ground. In Brown, as in the instant case, the conviction was later overturned on appeal; in Brown, reversal rested solely on the introduction at trial of a confession obtained in violation of Dorado. Under those circumstances we held that the invalid conviction, relied on by the Adult Authority, could not properly constitute a basis for 'cause' to revoke the defendant's parole, and we remanded the case to the authority so that they could decide whether to retain the revocation on the basis of the lesser parole violation with which the parolee had been charged. In addition, we indicated that the reversal of the conviction would not preclude further inquiry by the Adult Authority into the subject matter of the crime in question, to determine if the defendant 'ha(d) engaged in conduct that constitutes cause for parole revocation.' (67 Cal.2d at p. 342, 62 Cal.Rptr. at p. 8, 431 P.2d at p. 632.) ²

Although the February 1964 parole revocation order in the instant case is identical to the one before the court in Brown in that it grounds revocation primarily on a conviction which has subsequently been found invalid, we agree with the People's contention that the proceedings in the Adult Authority after the appellate reversal of the defendant's 1963 conviction must properly be viewed as 'further inquiry' into the subject matter of the conviction as approved in Brown and thus must be considered by this court. In its subsequent proceeding the authority sustained 'continuance of incarceration based on parole behavior and not on 1963 commitment.' Upon a complete reading of the authority's records we believe that, although the authority predicated its decision on 'parole behavior' rather than on the conviction, the authority considered the illegally obtained evidence that resulted in the reversal of the conviction; the People concede that this is true. ³ In this case we thus face two of the questions left open by our decision in Brown: May the Adult Authority, in exercising its broad authority over the parole system and parolees, properly consider evidence which had been obtained by government officials (1) as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure and (2) through a confession obtained through interrogation when a defendant has not been adequately apprised of his constitutional rights?

We are required to face these issues directly in this case, only because we find, from the facts as related in the prior judicial decision (People v. Martinez, supra, 232 Cal.App.2d 796, 797--799, 43 Cal.Rptr. 197), that the police authorities, in obtaining the extrinsic evidence and statements from defendant, did indeed violate the defendant-parolee's Fourth and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. ⁴ Although past cases have sometimes declared that a parolee is in 'constructive custody' or 'without liberty,' '(f) ictions of 'custody' and the like * * * cannot change the reality of a parolee's conditional freedom and cannot affect the constitutional protections surrounding his interest in that conditional freedom.' (Rose v. Haskins (6th Cir. 1968) 388 F.2d 91, 98 fn. 2 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).) In the instant case regular police officers undertook the search pursuant to their general law enforcement duties; the officers at the time of the search, did not even know of defendant's parole status. The investigation involved suspected criminal activity, not parole violations. Under these circumstances the officers cannot undertake a search without probable cause and then later seek to justify their actions by relying on the defendant's parole status, a status of which they were unaware at the time of their search. (People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176, 178, 41 Cal.Rptr. 590, 397 P.2d 174; People v. Gastelum (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 205, 207, 46 Cal.Rptr. 743; People v. Hernandez (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 147, 40 Cal.Rptr. 100 fn. 2; cf. People v. Rosales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 299, 66 Cal.Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489 (parolee entitled to protection of Penal Code section 844).) ⁵

Since we do not adjudicate a search of a parolee initiated by a parole agent in connection with duties of parole administration, we need not decide under what circumstances, if any, such a search may be 'reasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even without a full showing of probable cause. ⁶ The Court of Appeal, in the previous criminal action, correctly determined that evidence obtained pursuant to this search could not be admitted at the defendant's criminal trial.

In addition, the defendant's parole status, of course, did not permit the police to interrogate the defendant in connection with the suspected criminal activity without first apprising him of his constitutional rights. The strictures of Dorado apply whenever the police initiate custodial interrogation in connection with their investigation of a new criminal matter; indeed, in Dorado itself, the defendant was an incarcerated prisoner, who had allegedly committed a crime within the prison and who was interrogated by prison officials. (62 Cal.2d at pp. 342--344, 42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361.) The Fifth Amendment rights of parolees equally demand these protections. (See In re Brown, supra, 67 Cal.2d 339, 340, 62 Cal.Rptr. 6, 431 P.2d 630; People v. Gastelum, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 205, 209, 46 Cal.Rptr. 743.) Thus the statements elicited from defendant Martinez in the instant case were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and were properly determined to be inadmissible at his criminal trial.

We therefore must now turn to the difficult problems presented by the Adult Authority's consideration of this evidence. In resolving these questions we look initially to the test articulated by our court in People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800; there we examined the applicability of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to a civil narcotics commitment proceeding. We declared in Moore: 'Whether any particular rule of criminal practice should be applied in a narcotic addict commitment proceeding depends upon consideration of the relationship of the policy underlying the rule to the proceeding. (Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13--14, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527.)' (69 Cal.2d at pp....