Ralston v. Cannon
| Decision Date | 09 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-1146 |
| Parties | CRAIG RALSTON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CHAPLAIN HOSEA CANNON, Defendant-Appellee. LAWYERS' CIVIL RIGHTS COALITION, Amicus Curiae. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00247-SKC) (D. Colo.)
Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and EID, Circuit Judges.
Mr Craig Ralston has filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Hosea Cannon, chaplain for the Denver, Colorado sheriff's department. Mr. Ralston alleges that Mr. Cannon violated his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying his request for a kosher diet when he was This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. held in the Denver Detention Center. The district court granted summary judgment to Mr. Cannon. It found that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court based its decision on the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis, concluding that Mr. Ralston failed to show a violation of a constitutional right.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. However, we do so on an alternative ground-that is, the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis. When Mr. Cannon denied the kosher diet request, it was not clearly established that his conduct violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. More specifically, the law was not clearly established that, even if Mr. Cannon did not act with a discriminatory purpose, his denial of a kosher diet could effect a violation of Mr. Ralston's free-exercise rights.
Mr. Ralston is a Messianic Jew. In December 2013, he was arrested and booked into the Denver Detention Center. On an intake questionnaire, Mr. Ralston left blank a question about his religious affiliation. He also indicated that he did not require a special religious diet. Three days later, however, Mr. Ralston filed a grievance, stating that his faith required him to keep a kosher diet. The Denver Detention Center's chaplain, Mr. Cannon, was responsible for coordinating special diet requests from inmates. On January 2, 2014, he denied Mr. Ralston's request for a kosher diet. In a written explanation, he noted that Mr. Ralston had not indicated a religious affiliation on his intake questionnaire. And he also stated that a rabbi had "examined our menu" and determined that "our meals are fully acceptable in the Messianic Jewish Faith." R., Vol. I, at 47 (Denver Sheriff Department Inmate Grievance Form, dated Jan. 2, 2014).
On January 28, Mr. Ralston filed both another request for a kosher diet and also a § 1983 action pro se against Mr. Cannon.[1] In his complaint, Mr. Ralston alleged "religious discrimination and/or persecution based on the denial of religious freedom, by denying a recognized religious diet" in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 15 (Prisoner Compl., filed Jan. 28, 2014). On February 4, 2014, Mr. Cannon approved Mr. Ralston's kosher diet request. Mr. Cannon thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the § 1983 action, asserting qualified immunity.
The district court dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claim but not the First Amendment claim. Mr. Cannon later filed a motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment claim, again asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied it. The court found that it was "reasonable to infer" that Mr. Cannon "substantially burdened [Mr. Ralston' s] sincerely-held religious beliefs" when he denied the kosher diet request. Id. at 196 (District Ct. Order Regarding Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., filed Sept. 8, 2016). The court further found that "a genuine issue exists as to whether [Mr. Cannon] consciously or intentionally interfered with [Mr. Ralston' s] free exercise rights by denying the kosher diet request." Id.
Mr. Cannon appealed the qualified-immunity ruling.[2] He argued that the court erred in finding that a reasonable juror could conclude that he acted consciously or intentionally to violate Mr. Ralston's First Amendment rights. We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that "[e]ach aspect of [Mr.] Cannon's appeal . . . amounts to a challenge to the district court's determinations of evidentiary sufficiency." Ralston v. Cannon ("Ralston I"), 884 F.3d 1060, 1062 (10th Cir. 2018).
Our decision in Ralston I included a lengthy footnote-footnote 3-in which we discussed Mr. Ralston's reliance on our decision in Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2009), "as setting the relevant parameters of a § 1983 free exercise claim." Id. at 1063 n.3. With reference to Gallagher, we stated that "there is reason to doubt whether 'conscious' interference with an individual's right to free exercise amounts to a viable § 1983 First Amendment claim for damages." Id. We acknowledged that Gallagher appeared to endorse the view that a § 1983 plaintiff only needed to show "conscious or intentional interference with the right to free exercise." Id. However, we recognized that, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that, if a plaintiff raises a claim of "invidious discrimination" in violation of the First Amendment, he must "plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). We ultimately concluded that it was "unnecessary . . . to attempt to reconcile Gallagher and Iqbal," due to our lack of jurisdiction over Mr. Cannon's appeal. Id. Instead, we "le[ft] it to the district court's discretion . . . whether to take up this question on remand and revisit the propriety of summary judgment." Id.
On remand, the district court allowed Mr. Cannon to file a motion to reconsider the order denying him summary judgment. Mr. Cannon based his motion on our "invitation to revisit the appropriate standard applicable to [Mr. Ralston' s] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 free exercise claim," citing to our footnote in Ralston I. R., Vol. I, at 222 . Mr. Cannon argued that the "standard described in Iqbal" applied to Mr. Ralston's claim and that, to survive summary judgment, Mr. Ralston "must establish that Chaplain Cannon's denial of [Mr. Ralston' s] kosher diet request was motivated by his intent to discriminate against Mr. Ralston based on his religious beliefs." Id. at 225. Thus, Mr. Cannon insisted that Mr. Ralston had to show purposeful discrimination, and not merely conscious interference with his free-exercise rights, to sustain his § 1983 claim.
The district court agreed. It granted summary judgment to Mr. Cannon after finding that Mr. Ralston "failed to raise a triable issue of disputed fact over whether [Mr.] Cannon's conduct rises to the level of a constitutional violation." Id. at 283 (). Relying on Iqbal, the court concluded that, to sustain a § 1983 free-exercise claim, a plaintiff must "plead and prove that the defendant acted with a discriminatory purpose." Id. at 280. The court then concluded that there was "no evidence" that Mr. Cannon acted with purposeful discrimination, i.e., that he denied Mr. Ralston's kosher diet request "because of [Mr.] Ralston's religion." Id. at 283. Therefore, the court found that Mr. Cannon was entitled to qualified immunity because Mr. Ralston had not alleged a constitutional violation and granted summary judgment to Mr. Cannon.
Mr. Ralston then brought this timely appeal.
Mr Ralston raises three arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Cannon's motion to reconsider because it was untimely. Second, he argues that the district court erred in finding that Mr. Cannon was entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, he contends that the district court erred by not allowing him to amend his complaint. We address the three arguments in turn and conclude that they are all without merit.
Mr Ralston first argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Cannon's motion to reconsider because it was untimely filed. He points to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which provides that a motion to alter or amend a judgment "must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). Mr. Ralston notes that, although we dismissed Mr. Cannon's interlocutory appeal in Ralston I on March 13, 2018, Mr. Cannon did not seek to file a motion to reconsider until June 19, 2018. And he eventually filed the motion on August 10, 2018. Therefore, according to Mr. Ralston, Mr. Cannon clearly failed to comply with Rule 59(e)'s 28-day time limit.
This argument is not persuasive because Rule 59(e) is inapposite as to the motion to reconsider filed by Mr. Cannon. Rule 59(e) applies to motions made after a final judgment. However, no final judgment had been issued in the district court case when Mr. Cannon filed his motion to reconsider; the district court only had denied Mr. Cannon summary judgment on Mr. Ralston's First Amendment claim.
"A final judgment 'is one that "ends the litigation on the merits," leaving nothing to decide.'" United States v. Romero, 511 F.3d 1281, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521 (1988)). The district court's denial of Mr Cannon's motion for summary judgment was interlocutory and did not have this litigation-ending effect. More specifically, a "[d] enial of summary judgment 'is strictly a pretrial order that decides only one thing-that ...
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