Ramapo Hunt & Polo Club Ass'n, Inc. v. Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 January 2021
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A-5711-18T4
• Parties: RAMAPO HUNT & POLO CLUB ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RAMAPOUGH MOUNTAIN INDIANS, INC., Defendant-Appellant. TOWNSHIP OF MAHWAH, Plaintiff, v. RAMAPOUGH MOUNTAIN INDIANS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

RAMAPO HUNT & POLO CLUB ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RAMAPOUGH MOUNTAIN INDIANS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

TOWNSHIP OF MAHWAH, Plaintiff, v. RAMAPOUGH MOUNTAIN INDIANS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

DOCKET NO. A-5711-18T4

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

Argued October 21, 2020

January 12, 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Before Judges Fuentes, Whipple and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket Nos. L-3189-17 and L-6409-17.

J. Remy Green argued the cause for appellant (Bennet D. Zurofsky and Cohen & Green, PLLC, attorneys; Bennet D. Zurofsky and J. Remy Green, on the briefs).

Justin D. Santagata argued the cause for respondent (Kaufman, Semeraro, & Leibman, LLP, attorneys; Justin D. Santagata, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Ramapough Mountain Indians Inc. (RMI), owns real property at 95 Halifax Road (95 Halifax), in Mahwah. RMI appeals from a June 7, 2019, order denying its motion for counsel fees and costs under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000c-5 (RLUIPA, or the Act) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against an abutting landowner, plaintiff Ramapo Hunt & Polo Club Association, Inc. (Polo Club).

Our review of the record reveals that on May 9, 2017, the Township of Mahwah (the Township) filed a complaint against RMI to enjoin violations of the Township's zoning ordinance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-18 because RMI appeared to be erecting buildings or other prohibited structures.

Four months later, plaintiff Polo Club, a nonprofit homeowners association, filed a verified complaint and order to show cause seekingtemporary restraints against RMI and the Township, alleging RMI was engaging in various activities, uses, or actions at 95 Halifax in violation of the Township zoning ordinances and seeking an injunction for compliance of the zoning ordinances. Specifically, "the main uses that the [Polo Club was] complaining about . . . [were] public assembly, religious use and house of worship camping and campgrounds, that w[ere] not permitted." The Polo Club and Township's lawsuits were eventually consolidated.

An order to show cause was denied on December 15, 2017, after RMI rectified certain zoning violations in response to the lawsuits. Nevertheless, the case continued to move forward on the underlying complaint. The Township settled with RMI just before trial; however, the Polo Club declined to join in the settlement. Thus, the court conducted a bench trial from April 1 to May 3, 2019, to address the Polo Club's complaint. After the Polo Club presented its case in chief, the trial court granted RMI's motion for a directed verdict, stating:

The [c]ourt has gotten, and [the Township] has freely come to resolution with [RMI] that there's no longer going to be erection of buildings, etc. There is a recognition that this property is in a flood plain, and as such, will not be used in the future in the unlawful way.

. . . .

So the relief -- and I have always been curious as to what the relief the plaintiff [is] now seeking insofaras there are no longer those violations of law. It appeared that there is a request to enjoin [RMI] from gathering on the land and praying, and that public assembly is prohibited by the zoning laws per the claim of the plaintiff[]. Well, people can assemble in their homes, people may be able to park on the street, if they can't park on the street they can get parking tickets, but the relief being requested today is not fathomable, [t]he [c]ourt notes, for injunctive relief. The parties seeking the injunction must have no adequate remedy at law. Here we know that there are zoning laws and they're being enforced to comply with and agreed to.

. . . .

This [c]ourt is mindful [of] the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. . . . To now say that this court should enjoin people from freely assembling on property and praying goes against it. That would be inappropriate court action and authority. Certainly, this court would never do that. It would be a prior restraint on the liberty of a free people to assemble and gather on their property and to that which they say they're allowed to do and which the law recognizes that they are allowed to do.

The [c]ourt also does not see any violations of law currently occurring. Assemblage on property that they own and praying is no more violative of the law than me having a party over at my own home. This is their land, it's 13.8 acres of their land that they are allowed to go on. They are permitted to put stones in a circle and place tree stumps upright and to leave a stone pillar where it's been. They may not have the right to park illegally, they do not have the right to build a structure, etc., but they already recognize that. [The Township] has enforced [its] ordinances and the RMI ha[s] obeyed now and been fined, and ha[s] settledthose matters. . . . There is no showing that [the Township's] not enforcing the law as of today and, as such, being that there is no current violation, or one even being contemplated, [t]he [c]ourt is devoid of any evidence and finds that plaintiff[] ha[s] failed to show a prima facie case to give a restraint as a matter of law against the defendant[] and, as such, the application is denied and the case is dismissed that is presently before this court, and the other case that was consolidated with this has been dismissed as settled.

Because the court found that the Polo Club did not establish its prima facie case, RMI presented no evidence regarding the RLUIPA affirmative defense it pleaded in its answer. The court entered an order dismissing the Polo Club's complaint, and that order has not been appealed.

On May 13, 2019, RMI moved to amend the trial court's order pursuant to Rules 1:1-2(a); 4:50-1(f); 4:42-8(a); and 4:42-9(a)(8), "to include an award of costs to [d]efendant inclusive of reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to RLUIPA and 42 U.S.C. § 1988." On June 7, 2019, the court denied RMI's motion for costs. This appeal followed.

Ordinarily, we review a Rule 4:50-1 motion for a clear abuse of discretion. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012); Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994). Under the "American Rule," which is followed by the federal courts and by the courts of this state, "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' feefrom the loser." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 301 (1966); R. 4:42-9. A prevailing party is entitled to an award of counsel fees only if they are expressly provided for by statute, court rule, or contract. See R. 4:42-9. Thus, the trial judge's reasons for denying RMI's motion are questions of law, which we review de novo. Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-83 (2010).

On appeal, RMI contends the trial court improperly denied its motion for "those routine costs that every prevailing litigant is entitled to, inclusive of the attorneys' fees that [RLUIPA] and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 expressly provide." The trial court denied RMI attorneys' fees under RLUIPA for multiple reasons: (1) the matter was brought before the court on a motion for an order to show cause, not by way of a complaint and answer, and therefore it was not a judgment resulting from trial; (2) defendants never filed an action requesting attorneys' fees and costs if they were successful and did not specify a monetary amount; and (3) it is unclear whether RLUIPA applied in this action, as RLUIPA claims may be raised against a government, and the Polo Club cannot be considered a government as defined by the statute. However, accepting for the sake of thisdiscussion that RMI's RLUIPA claim was properly before the court, we are constrained to affirm.

I.

Congress passed RLUIPA in response to the United States Supreme Court's invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as applied to the states and their subdivisions, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) (noting that in Boerne, the Court "invalidated RFRA as applied to States and their subdivisions, holding that the Act exceeded Congress' remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment."). RLUIPA invokes federal authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses and targets two areas: "Section 2 of the Act concerns land-use regulation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc; § 3 relates to religious exercise by institutionalized persons, § 2000cc-1." Ibid. Section 2 of the Act, at issue here, establishes a "general rule" that:

No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution--

(A) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.

[42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).]

This "general rule," however, is circumscribed to apply only to cases where:

(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability;

(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; or

(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use

...