Ramey v. Bowsher

• Decision Date: 05 October 1990
• Docket Number: 87-5306,Nos. 87-5305,s. 87-5305
• Citation: 915 F.2d 731
• Parties: 53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1757, 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,286, 286 U.S.App.D.C. 288 A. Eugene RAMEY, Appellant, v. Charles BOWSHER, Comptroller of the United States.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 731

915 F.2d 731

53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1757,

54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,286, 286 U.S.App.D.C. 288

A. Eugene RAMEY, Appellant, v. Charles BOWSHER, Comptroller of the United States.

Nos. 87-5305, 87-5306.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Nov. 18, 1988.

Decided Oct. 5, 1990.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civ. Action No. 82-01644).

Walter T. Charlton, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Daniel Bensing, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.

Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., Michael J. Ryan, Bradley L. Kelly, Royce C. Lamberth, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., entered appearances for appellees.

Before EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and ROBINSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, Alfred Eugene Ramey, contends that his former employer, the General Accounting Office (GAO), discriminated against him on the basis of his sex when it promoted a female coworker to a position for which he had applied, and that several of his former supervisors committed tortious acts against him after he complained. He asks that we reverse the orders of the District Court dismissing his tort claims against the individual supervisors and granting judgment for the Government on his claim of sex discrimination. He also asks that we direct the GAO to award him the promotion with retroactive benefits. Because we can find no merit in Ramey's claims, we affirm the orders of the District Court.

I. BACKGROUND

In late 1980, Ramey, a former GS-13 computer systems analyst in the Financial and General Management Studies (FGMS) division of the GAO, sought a promotion to GS-14. Jack Kearns, a group director in the FGMS division, interviewed Ramey and eight other applicants for promotion to the position of Accounting and Financial Systems Computer Specialist. Kearns rated and ranked each of the applicants based upon eight job elements in the job announcement; subsequently, Kearns awarded the position to Norma Drake, the applicant who had received the highest score during the interview process. Ramey was ranked lowest among all applicants. Upon learning that he had not been promoted, Ramey filed an administrative complaint charging discrimination based on sex. Later, after being denied a within-grade increase, Ramey amended the complaint to reflect new allegations of retaliation and reprisal.

The GAO Personnel Appeals Board, which has the authority to hear employees' discrimination claims, see 31 U.S.C. Sec. 753(a)(7) (1982), determined that Ramey's non-selection had not been due to discrimination. It concluded, however, that Ramey "was denied his within-grade salary increase at least in part because of his having filed a complaint of discrimination against Kearns and other management officials." See Ramey v. GAO, 1 PAB R & D 102, 115-19 (Oct. 19, 1981), reproduced in part at Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 333. Accordingly, the Appeals Board awarded Ramey the requested within-grade salary increase.

Ramey was not satisfied with the decision of the Appeals Board, so he filed the instant action in the District Court against the GAO's Comptroller General and against selecting official Kearns, in his individual capacity. Ramey charged the FGMS division with sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16 (1982), and Kearns with various acts of libel, slander, civil fraud and conspiracy during both the selection process and the subsequent administrative appeal.

The District Court dismissed Ramey's tort claims against Kearns on immunity grounds. ¹ See Ramey v. Bowsher, Civ.No. 82-0268 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 1984) (order). Subsequently, after encountering further difficulties on the job which resulted in his termination, Ramey amended his complaint, adding several more former supervisors, in their individual capacities, as defendant tortfeasors. On March 6, 1985, the trial court granted the Government's partial motion to dismiss the additional charges made in the amended complaint, finding that the cited supervisors, like Kearns, were immune from suit. The remainder of the case was then set for trial.

On March 25, 1987, at the close of Ramey's case, the Government moved for a judgment in appellees' favor. J.A. at 265. The trial judge, ruling from the bench, granted the Government's motion, finding absolutely no evidence of sex discrimination. J.A. at 269-70. ² On denial of his motion for a new trial, see Ramey v. Bowsher, No. 82-0268 (D.D.C. May 28, 1987) (order), Ramey noted an appeal from the orders of the District Court dismissing his suit against the individual supervisors and granting judgment for the Government on his claim of discrimination. He asserts that, contrary to the District Court's findings, he proved his claim of discrimination.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Dismissal of the Claims Against the Individual Supervisors on Immunity Grounds

Ramey argues that the District Court erred when it dismissed the tort claims against the supervisors on immunity grounds. We disagree. We find that each supervisor was entitled to assert his official immunity as an absolute bar to Ramey's tort claims.

In general, federal officials are absolutely immune from state-law tort actions when their conduct is "within the scope of their official duties and the conduct is discretionary in nature." Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-98, 108 S.Ct. 580, 584, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988) (emphasis in original). Thus, "federal officials are not absolutely immune from state-law tort liability for all actions committed within the outer perimeter of their duties;" rather, an official must demonstrate that he "exercised sufficient discretion in connection with the alleged tort to warrant the shield of absolute immunity." Id. at 299, 108 S.Ct. at 585. As the Court noted in Westfall, "[t]he central purpose of official immunity, promoting effective government, would not be furthered by shielding an official from state-law tort liability without regard to whether the alleged tortious conduct is discretionary in nature. When an official's conduct is not the product of independent judgment, the threat of liability cannot detrimentally inhibit that conduct." Id. at 296-97, 108 S.Ct. at 584.

An official who claims absolute immunity from personal liability bears the burden of "showing that such an exemption is justified." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). The supervisors in the present case clearly have met this burden. First, it cannot be seriously disputed that they acted within the scope of their official duties. The alleged torts committed by the supervisors arose out of their evaluation of Ramey's work performance, their hiring and firing decisions, and their testimony at the administrative adjudicatory proceedings. See Tr. 7-16, J.A. at 25-34. We therefore have no trouble concluding that these activities bear "some reasonable relation to and connection with [their] duties and responsibilities." Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir.1988) (citation omitted); see, e.g., McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766, 771 (D.C.Cir.1984) (quoting Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 359 (8th Cir.1980)) ("federal supervisors are generally entitled to absolute immunity 'from liability in tort for actions relating to the discharge of their subordinates' "); Lawrence v. Acree, 665 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.Cir.1981) (per curiam) ("[a] supervisor's candid evaluation promotes efficient government by enabling an agency to identify and correct, and on occasion dispense with, performance that is unsatisfactory. The judgment might be distorted if their immunity from damages arising from that decision is less than complete").

Second, the record in this case indicates that the alleged tortious conduct of the supervisors was "the product of independent judgment," and the "exercise [of] decisionmaking discretion," of the sort described by the Supreme Court in Westfall, 484 U.S. at 296-97, 108 S.Ct. at 584. As the Westfall Court suggested, because of the nature of their job responsibilities, these supervisors remained free to evaluate job performance, make hiring and firing decisions, and testify at administrative adjudicatory proceedings without fearing potential personal liability arising from the exercise of these duties; to hold otherwise would be to "shackle" the supervisors in the exercise of their official duties so as to prevent them from pursuing "vigorous, and effective administration of the policies of government." 484 U.S. at 297, 108 S.Ct. at 584. On the record before us, we can find no error in the District Court's ruling that the supervisors' actions were "discretionary" in nature and, thus, protected by official immunity.

We reject appellant's argument that tortious acts are unlawful per se and therefore cannot be considered either discretionary or within the outer limits of the official's duties. "No government officer, of course, can be 'authorized' to act unlawfully. But if the scope of an official's authority or line of duty were viewed as coextensive with the official's lawful conduct, then immunity would be available only where it is not needed; in effect, the immunity doctrine would be 'completely abrogate[d]'." Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425, 1429 (D.C.Cir.1987) (quoting Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 15 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978)).

The question before us is simply whether the supervisors took discretionary action within the outer limits of their official duties. Because we answer that question in the affirmative, we have no occasion to analyze Ramey's common-law tort claims. And to the extent that Ramey attempts to recast his tort claims against the...