Ramey v. Dc Dept. of Employment Services
| Decision Date | 05 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-AA-743.,06-AA-743. |
| Citation | 950 A.2d 33 |
| Parties | Benjamin RAMEY, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent. Potomac Electric Power Company, Intervenor. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Benjamin Ramey, pro se.
Kevin J. O'Connell was on the brief for intervenor.
Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time the briefs were filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Solicitor General at the time, filed a statement of respondent in lieu of brief.
Before FARRELL, RUIZ, and THOMPSON, Associate Judges.
Petitioner filed a claim for workers' compensation arising from work-related events that occurred on August 30, 2003, which he alleged had caused him to develop post-traumatic stress disorder. He sought benefits for temporary total disability from November 3, 2003, to the present and continuing, and payment of medical expenses.
Because the employer (PEPCO) contested the claim, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary hearing, following which she concluded that petitioner's "claim for benefits [was] not compensable, in that [Ramey] did not sustain [an] employment-related emotional injury as alleged" (emphasis added). In so concluding, the ALJ recognized that "[e]motional injuries resulting from job stress[1] are, in appropriate circumstances, compensable `accidental injuries' under the statute[, D.C.Code § 32-1501(12) (2001)]." Applying then-prevailing law, however, the ALJ defined those "circumstances" as follows:
In order for a claimant to establish that an emotional injury arises out of the mental stress or mental stimulus of employment, the claimant must show that actual conditions of employment, as determined by an objective standard and not merely the claimant's subjective perception of his working conditions, were the cause of his emotional injury. The objective standard is satisfied where the claimant shows that the actual working conditions could have caused similar emotional injury in a person who was not significantly predisposed to such injury.
Compensation Order at 6 (emphasis added).
For this required comparison to a hypothetical "normal employee," id., the ALJ cited Landesberg v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 794 A.2d 607 (D.C.2002); Porter v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 625 A.2d 886 (D.C.1993); Spartin v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 584 A.2d 564 (D.C.1990); and Dailey v. 3M Co., H & AS No. 85-29 (Final Compensation Order of May 19, 1988). Applying the cited standard, the ALJ found that "[t]he credible version of the events surrounding [Ramey's] activities on August 30, 2003 does not reflect the presence of stressors which would cause emotional injury to a person not predisposed to such injury."
On petitioner's appeal to the Compensation Review Board (CRB or Board), that body likewise concluded that he had not invoked the presumption of compensability "by showing that a particular incident or situation at work was a significant stressor that could reasonably be expected to affect a person of ordinary sensibilities in the same way that it affected the injured worker" (emphasis added), citing Sturgis v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 629 A.2d 547, 552 (D.C.1993) (in turn citing Porter and Spartin, supra).
In McCamey v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., No. 04-AA-211, 947 A.2d 1191, 2008 D.C.App. Lexis 239 (en banc), however, this court rejected the "person of ordinary sensibilities" standard as one that must be met by a person claiming emotional or psychological injuries caused in part by a predisposition to such injury. We held that, as applied to claims of disability involving psychological injuries that result from accidental physical injuries occurring in the workplace (i.e., the situation presented in McCamey), "a so-called objective test or standard ... requiring [the claimant] to show that an average person not predisposed to such injury would have suffered a similar injury" is "inconsistent with the language of the [Workers' Compensation Act] ... and is contrary to the purposes underlying the District's workers' compensation laws." McCamey, 947 A.2d at 1201, 1214, 2008 D.C.App. Lexis 239, at *23, *63.2
Of particular importance to the present case, moreover, we went on to state that "our analysis in this case necessarily affects the scope of the objective standard in mental-mental cases as well":
The reason that the objective test is unnecessary in the physical-mental context — that the physical accident supplies the necessary work-connection — flows back to Dailey's conflation of the desire for objective...
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Ramey v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs.
...working conditions could have caused similar emotional injury in a person who was not significantly predisposed to such injury.” Ramey I, 950 A.2d at 34 (emphasis in original). In ALJ Govan's March 17, 2006 Compensation Order, she concluded that petitioner was not entitled to benefits becau......
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Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs.
...District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act (WCA). On appeal, the CRB remanded, concluding that under Ramey v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 950 A.2d 33 (D.C. 2008), Ms. Johnson's claim could be compensable under the WCA if Ms. Johnson demonstrated a psychological injury a......