Ramey v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 04-2088(RJL).,Civ.A. 04-2088(RJL).
• Citation: 468 F.Supp.2d 51
• Parties: Benjamin RAMEY Plaintiff, v. POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

468 F.Supp.2d 51

Benjamin RAMEY Plaintiff, v. POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 04-2088(RJL).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 31, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Maria Carlotta Mendoza, Khadijah R. Ali, Law Offices of Khadijah R. Ali, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Connie Nora Bertram, Winston & Strawn LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEON, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Benjamin Ramey, brought this action against defendants, Potomac Electric Power Company ("PEPCO"), David Duarte, and Gregory Johnson (collectively, "defendants"), alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981") and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), D.C.Code § 2-1401.01 et seq., and common law claims of negligent hiring, training and supervision, failure to create or implement policies, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Currently before the Court is defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a dark-skinned African American who allegedly suffers from a condition that causes the whites of his eyes to be a reddish brown. (Am.Compl. ¶ 8.) At the time of the events upon which plaintiffs claims are based, plaintiff was employed by defendant PEPCO as a conduit installer. (Flack Decl. at Ex. A, 4.) As part of his duties, plaintiff was required to operate commercial vehicles in excess of 26,000 pounds. (Flack Decl. at Ex. B, 2.)

On August 31, 2003,¹ at approximately 11:45 p.m., defendant Gregory Johnson, a PEPCO supervisor, accused plaintiff, shortly after he arrived for work, of being intoxicated. (Am.Compl. ¶ 9.) Indeed, defendant Johnson testified that he did so because the plaintiff "smelled of alcohol, his speech was slurred and incoherent, he was unsteady on his feet and his eyes were very bloodshot." (Flack, Decl. at Ex. A, 6.) Defendant Duarte, another PEPCO supervisor, directed Mr. Johnson to perform a breathalyzer test. (Am.Compl. ¶ 11.) Because a test could not be performed on-site, plaintiff was taken to 9th and G Streets²to have the test performed there. (Id.) Alas, the test could not be performed at 9th & G Streets either, and plaintiff was taken to a hospital in Virginia by Mr. Negussie Birratu, a PEPCO human resources partner, Mr. Loman Dudley, a union steward, and Mr. Johnson. (Id. ¶ 11, 13.) According to plaintiff, the four men waited for about an hour and a half before they learned that the breathalyzer could not be performed at the hospital. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff claims that he was then taken to another facility where he waited another four hours. (Id. ¶ 16.) Again, the breathalyzer could not be performed there, and plaintiff was returned to 9th & G Streets where the test was finally administered eleven to twelve hours after plaintiff was first confronted by his supervisor. (Id. ¶ 19-20.) At that time, plaintiff's blood alcohol level registered at 0.065% to 0.07%, a level at which an individual is considered unfit for duty under PEPCO guidelines. (Flack Decl. at Ex. A, 3,6.) In response, PEPCO placed plaintiff on Decision Making Leave ("DML"), the disciplinary step one level below termination. (Id. at Ex. A, 6.)

In addition, plaintiff alleges that he was denied water and the use of a restroom throughout the night. (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15, 16.) Plaintiff further claims that when he asked to use the restroom, he was told, "you [pause] shut up" (id. ¶ 12) and "you [pause] no" (id. ¶ 15). According to his Amended Complaint, plaintiff claims to have "understood" that he was being told "you `Niger [sic] shut up' (id. ¶ 12) and "you `Niger' [sic] no" (id. ¶ 15) by the inflection and tone of the speaker's voice and by the way the speaker paused (id. ¶¶ 12, 15). At no point, however, does plaintiff allege, let alone testify, that the word "nigger" was ever even uttered on the night of August 31, 2003 — or on any other night for that matter.

After the incident on August 31, 2003, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1900 ("Local 1900") filed a grievance against PEPCO on plaintiff's behalf.³ (Id. ¶ 21.) After the grievance was filed, plaintiff alleges that he was informed by Mr. Johnson that his request for leave, which plaintiff claims was approved prior to the incident, had not in fact been approved. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff further alleges that at a meeting with the Department of Human Resources on February 25, 2004, he was informed by Ms. Jill Flack, an attorney for PEPCO, that if he dropped the grievance and the lawsuit he could return to work. (Id. ¶ 25.) Then again on November 4, 2004, Ms. Flack told Mr. Joe Hawkins to inform plaintiff that if he dropped the grievance and the lawsuit he could return to work. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff refused to drop the grievance or the lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 27.) On November 9, 2004, plaintiff was terminated by PEPCO. (Id. ¶ 27.) According to PEPCO, plaintiff was terminated for failing to successfully complete a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program that he was required to undergo after he was found to be intoxicated at work in August 2003. (Flack Decl. at Ex. B, 7-8.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. "If, [however,] on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Because both parties have presented materials outside the pleadings — which the Court must rely upon in evaluating plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 — the Court will decide the Motion in accordance with Rule 56, rather than as a motion to dismiss. See Brug v. Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, 45 F.Supp.2d 33, 36 n. 3 (D.D.C.1999) (finding that where both parties have presented materials outside the pleadings it will be fair to treat defendant's motion as one for summary judgment).

Pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment shall be granted when the record demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Disputes over non-material facts may be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where facts material to the outcome of the case are at issue, however, the motion may not be disposed of by summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the facts in dispute are "merely colorable, or . . . not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 150 (D.C.Cir.1996). "[T]he determination of whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If there is insufficient evidence indicating that a jury could return a favorable verdict for the nonmoving party, then summary judgment is proper. See Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Int'l Media Associates, Inc., 732 F.Supp. 4, 4 (D.D.C.1990).

II. Plaintiff's Common Law Claims

Plaintiffs common law claims are preempted by the District of Columbia Worker's Compensation Act, D.C.Code §§ 32-1501 et seq., which provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs alleged injuries. D.C.Code § 32-1504(a). Section 32-1504(a) states that any liability of the employer under the act "shall be exclusive and in place of all liability of such employer to the employee." Id.; see also District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 634 (D.C.1991) (holding that the D.C. Council intended "to create a mechanism for addressing virtually every conceivable personnel issue among the District, its employees, and their unions — with a reviewing role for the courts as a last resort, not a supplementary role for the courts as an alternative forum"). Courts have consistently found that the common law claims brought by the plaintiff are the type of claims for which the Workers Compensation Act is designed to be the exclusive remedy. See Tatum v. Hyatt Corp., 918 F.Supp. 5, 8 (D.D.C.1994) (holding that claims of assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring and supervision are preempted by the D.C. Workers Compensation Act). Because the D.C. Workers Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for the common law claims brought by the plaintiff, these claims are dismissed.⁴

III. Plaintiffs Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff further asserts that he was discriminated against in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which guarantees freedom from racial discrimination in the "making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Our Circuit has adopted the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework to analyze a § 1981 claim. See Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C.Cir.2005). Under this scheme, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination....