Ramey v. Ramey

• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: THOMAS, J.
• Citation: Ramey v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 673, 243 S. W. 934 (Ky. Ct. App. 1922)
• Decision Date: 22 September 1922
• Parties: RAMEY ET AL. v. RAMEY ET AL.

243 S.W. 934

195 Ky. 673

RAMEY ET AL. v. RAMEY ET AL.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

September 22, 1922

Appeal from Circuit Court, Rowan County.

Action by Cynthia Ramey and husband against Peach Ramey and others. From the judgment, certain defendants appeal. Affirmed.

J. W Riley, of Morehead, for appellants.

D. B Caudill, of Morehead, for appellees.

THOMAS J.

The only question presented for determination on this appeal is the proper construction of a deed executed by Warren Alderson to his granddaughter, the appellee Cynthia Ramey, "and her children, be they many or few, parties of the second part," on July 9, 1901, conveying 400 acres of land located in Rowan county. At the time of the execution of the deed, Cynthia Ramey was the wife of John Ramey, and she was then the mother of three living children. Since then there have been born to her six other children, and this action was filed by her and her husband against her nine children, some of whom are infants, to obtain a construction of the deed and upon final submission the court adjudged that Mrs. Ramey took under the deed a life interest in the land, and her nine living children and any who might thereafter be born took the remainder in fee. The three children who were in esse at the time of the execution of the deed have appealed from that judgment, insisting (1) that none of their brothers or sisters born after the execution of the deed are entitled to any interest in the land, since, as they claim, its language manifests an intention on the part of the grantor to limit the beneficiaries thereunder to only the children of Mrs. Ramey who were living at the time, and that it is not broad enough to include after-born children; and (2) that under the terms of the deed they took a present interest jointly with their mother, and are entitled to the joint use and occupation of the land during her life.

The caption and granting clause of the deed say:

"This deed of conveyance, made and entered into this the 9th day of July, 1901, between Warren Alderson, of the county of Rowan and state of Kentucky, party of the first part, and Cynthia Ramey, wife of John H. Ramey, and her children, be they many or few, of the county and state aforesaid, parties of the second part, witnesseth: That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar, in hand paid, and other valuable consideration, do hereby sell and convey to the parties of the second part, _____ heirs and assigns, the following described property, to wit."

The habendum clause says:

"To have and to hold the same together with all appurtenances thereunto belonging unto the parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns forever, with covenant of general warranty."

It has been so often declared by this and other courts that the one undeviating rule for the construction of deeds and other writings is to ascertain from their entire contents the intention of the maker or makers and to administer that intention, unless violative of some public policy or against some rule of law, that we deem it unnecessary to cite cases in support thereof. There exist in the law many technical rules as aids to the courts in construing deeds and other muniments of title to real estate, but all of them surrender to the lawful intention of the maker or makers, as gathered from the entire contents in the light of the surrounding conditions of the parties. The foregoing statements are so fundamental that we deem it unnecessary to incumber this opinion, or to consume time or space with a detailed consideration of the cases, and will content ourselves with only appending some of the many cases from this court in which the above principles of construction were recognized and applied. They are: Dinger v. Lucken, 143 Ky. 850, 137 S.W. 776; May v. C. & O. R. Co., 184 Ky. 493, 212 S.W. 131; American National Bank v. Madison, 144 Ky. 152, 137 S.W. 1076, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 597; Va. Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Dye, 146 Ky. 519, 142 S.W. 1057; Rice v. Klette, 149 Ky. 787, 149 S.W. 1019, L. R. A. 1917B, 45; Hunt v. Hunt, 154 Ky. 679, 159 S.W. 528; Duncan v. Medley, 160 Ky. 684, 170 S.W. 31; Justice v. Justice, 170 Ky. 423, 186 S.W. 148; Scott v. Scott, 172 Ky. 658, 190 S.W. 143; Edwards v. Cave, 150 Ky. 272, 150 S.W. 369; Wilson v. Woodward, 190 Ky. 326, 227 S.W. 446; Baker v. Baker, 191 Ky. 325, 230 S.W. 293; and many other cases referred to in those opinions.

Illustrating what this court has said, the opinion in the case of Bowe v. Richmond, 109 S.W. 359, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 173, quoted with approval from the one of Judge Kent in the case of Jackson v. Myers, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 388, 3 Am. Dec. 504, this statement:

"The intent, when apparent and not repugnant to any rule of law, will control technical terms; for the intent, and not the words, is the essence of every agreement. In the exposition of deeds, the construction must be upon the view and comparison of the whole instrument, and with the endeavor to give every part of it meaning and effect."

That statement of the law as applicable to the construction of written agreements, including deeds, was quoted with approval by this court in the American National Bank and the Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. Cases, supra, and there has been no effort since then to depart therefrom.

An examination of the cases referred to will disclose that one of the technical rules for the construction of writings transferring title to real estate, is that the word "...